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Abstract 
 
This work examines the limitations of Securitisation Theory by applying it to an ethnographic case 
study of Trinidad and Tobago – the state with the highest per capita ISIL recruitment rate in the 
Western World. It examines the reasons for the absence of a terrorism narrative for that country 
until very recently, where one might expect a narrative to have existed for decades. It argues that 
securitisation thinkers must continue to extend their arguments, as gaps in the current 
approaches are limiting their utility. To make this argument it shows that while securitisation 
theory on its own, fails to explain the absence of a narrative due to ineffectively providing a 
means to address contextual considerations, Agential Realism is able to effectively integrate the 
necessary historical and cultural realities through the quantum thinking informing its diffractive 
methodology and its hauntological approach to time and space. 
In applying both securitisation theories and Agential Realism to the case, it can be seen that 
history and culture are deeply entangled with the security politics of Trinidad and Tobago as a 
post-colonial state – as they are for the many other former colonies which make up the global 
landscape. This work shows that conventional approaches to understanding security in Trinidad 
and Tobago are limited in the questions which they can answer and that if the discipline seeks to 
have more profound understandings of a wide range of actors and be truly ‘global’, it must be 
willing to continue to push the expanding boundaries of critical orthodoxy. 
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Introduction 
 
When one thinks of the Caribbean, certain images tend to be conjured up in the mind. These 
images for your average vacationer might include tropical landscapes, for sport enthusiasts they 
might include cricketers or track athletes, and for avid party-goers they might include the 
elaborate carnival fetes and costumed street parades. For very few though, would mention of 
the Caribbean summon images of political violence or terrorism. Nevertheless the Caribbean is 
home to both. Indeed, in recent history, Trinidad and Tobago, one small-island state within the 
region has come to be known for its role as a recruitment ground for the terrorist group known 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereafter Daesh). When this knowledge became widely 
known, both in and outside of Trinidad and Tobago, it was met with surprise and even disbelief, 
as there existed no terrorism narrative for that state either domestically or internationally.  
Upon closer examination of the case however, one can easily become perplexed by the absence 
of this narrative, as Trinidad and Tobago can be shown to have a history featuring significant 
incidents of political radicalism, radical militant Islam and links to terrorist activity. This 
introduction shall for that reason, now proceed to outline the context which suggests that some 
form of terrorism narrative ought to have existed by the time Daesh recruitment emerged from 
the islands. 
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Terrorism and Trinidad and Tobago 
 
In order for a terrorism narrative to be justified for Trinidad and Tobago, it must be demonstrated 
that there is in fact a degree of activity related to the twin-island state that would warrant some 
sort of discourse domestically and or globally. The review of relevant literature therefore, shall 
survey the history of terrorist related activity as it relates to the twin-island republic. 
Trinidad and Tobago has during its short history as an independent state, had 2 attempted coups, 
both of which occurred at times of economic strain and intense public dissatisfaction. The first of 
these was in 1970 (Griffith 2005, 107) and took place within the context of ‘The Black Power 
Revolution’ in which thousands took to the streets. A state of emergency was declared, however, 
this backfired with a mutiny within the army (Griffith 2005, 122). The situation was eventually 
brought under control with the assistance of the United States however it has been noted that 
there was a distinct possibility that it could have been successful, bringing with it a socialist 
revolutionary government (Duncan 1991, 55–64). 
In the wake of this uprising, the government of Trinidad and Tobago utilised the wealth afforded 
it by petroleum price increases to abate the frustration of the populace and managed to keep 
peace for two decades (Duncan 1991, 71). Nevertheless social inequalities were identified as a 
potential motivation for terrorist activity (Alexander and Nanes 1986, 239). Despite the 
government’s efforts, in 1990, the Jamaat al Muslimeen, a Muslim sect located in the capital of 
Port of Spain (hereafter the Jamaat) bombed the police headquarters and besieged the Red 
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House – home of the Parliament - holding hostage the Prime Minister A.N.R Robinson as well as 
most of the Cabinet. 
The insurgents also took control of the national television network which they used to make 
statements of intent and to spread propaganda to the nation while holding 25 persons hostage. 
Another group of hostages were being held at the National Broadcasting Station (NBS) as the 
radio was also being used by the group to broadcast their activities. During the week that 
followed, 23 persons were killed and 300 injured during the widespread shooting, looting and 
arson which took place. In the wake of the events, approximately 4000 persons were left 
unemployed and an estimated 300 million Trinidad and Tobago dollars in property damage was 
left behind (Griffith 1991, 10–11). All 144 members of the Jamaat  who were involved in the coup 
attempt were charged with treason and their leader ‘was charged with 15 offenses including 
treason, 9 counts of murder, firearm possession and hostage taking'  (Griffith 1991, 11).  
At the time of the coup attempt, there was no legislation in Trinidad and Tobago which spoke to 
directly to terrorism as a specific offence, however Neville Duncan (1991, 65) openly refers to 
this event as an act of terrorism and the official Commission of Enquiry Appointed to Enquire into 
the Events Surrounding the Attempted Coup d'Etat of 27th July 1990 (hereafter the Commission 
of Enquiry) also refers to acts of terrorism carried during this insurrection (Simmons et al. 2014, 
102).  In a sworn  affidavit on the events of the coup, Acting President in 1990, Emmanuel Carter, 
identified the group as terrorists (Simmons et al. 2014, 318–19), and in 2014, then Prime Minister 
of Trinidad and Tobago, Kamala Persad Bissessar in support of her co-sponsorship of Resolution 
(S/2014/688) at the UN General Assembly is reported to have remarked on the coup as an 
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experience with terrorism (Douglas 2014). It is notable, that generally the trend regarding the 
coup was that those in proximity to it – Duncan as an academic,  the witnesses interviewed by 
the Commission of Enquiry and the Acting President – were those who referred to it in this way 
– as an act of terror - with the Prime Minister’s comment coming 15 years later as the country 
was forced into the spotlight at the UNGA due to Daesh recruitment, such that it became 
necessary to make a statement.  
The Commission of Enquiry - in contradiction to Trevor Munroe’s assertion that politically and 
ideologically motivated terrorism has not been a feature of the Caribbean security landscape - 
found that the intent of the coup was to overthrow the incumbent government and replace it 
with a new administration which was intended to be constituted at least in part by Jamaat 
members. Bakr was reported to be intending to introduce the Islamic system as he experienced 
it in Libya, to Trinidad. He is reported to have claimed that it was ‘decreed by Allah’ that Muslims 
change the system - which speaks to the group’s desire for an Islamic state (Simmons et al. 2014, 
779). 
Darius Figueira (2002, xix) describes the 1990 coup-attempt as ‘a Muslim insurgency, a jihad’ 
which could not be considered or understood outside of the context of Islamic discourse. While 
he opposes and dismisses the notion, Figueira (2002, xxi–xxii) acknowledges that the Jamaat was 
branded a radical Islamic terrorist organisation with ties to Libya since its inception in the early 
1980s and that successive administrations have attempted to link the organisation to 
international terror groups. Griffith (2005, 123) also acknowledges these allegations of ties with 
terrorist cells in the Middle East, while making note that credible evidence has been lacking in 
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this regard. Both of these works however were published prior to the findings of the Commission 
of Enquiry and as shall be discussed shortly, the inability of these investigators to explicitly 
provide evidence may not necessarily be an indication as to the group’s innocence. 
Since the publication of both of texts cited above, the Commission of Enquiry has revealed that 
Jamaat leader, Abu Bakr, had ties with Libya where a number of the organisation’s members had 
received ‘terrorist training’ and where Bakr had himself visited a number of times negotiating for 
money, ammunition and mercenaries for the cause (Simmons et al. 2014, 401). Financing was 
eventually obtained primarily from supporters in Libya and Saudi Arabia (Simmons et al. 2014, 
630). So proud was Bakr of his ties with Libya, that he kept a photograph of himself and Libyan 
leader Muammar Gaddafi in his office at the Jamaat’s headquarters (Pantin 2007, 11). 
Four short years later in 1994, two Trinidadian nationals were arrested while crossing the border 
from the United States into Canada, where they allegedly plotted to detonate bombs in a Hindu 
temple and at an East Indian movie theatre. They each served a sentence of  twelve years in 
Canadian prison before being deported to Pakistan, where the group with which they were 
affiliated – Jamaat ul Fuqra is based (Ferrand 2009). The Islamic organisation is reported to also 
have a compound in Trinidad and Tobago (Ali and Rosenau 2008, 15). 
On June 02, 2007 the US authorities subdued an alleged terrorist plot to blow up fuel lines and 
tanks at the John F. Kennedy airport in New York. Amongst those charged in the conspiracy was 
Imam Kareem Ibrahim, of Trinidad and Tobago who was sentenced to life in prison for the crime 
(Terdman 2010, 567). In the same year, the Jamaat  was also suspected of detonating four bombs 
concealed in trashcans in Trinidad’s capital and its suburbs. These were in public areas where 
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only members of the public were likely to be, rather than any political targets and scores of 
civilians were injured as a result. The Jamaat was also accused of detonating four bombs in the 
town of Chaguanas, in 1983 (Figueira 2002, xxi). 
 In 2014, nineteen Muslims were held in Venezuela under suspicion of involvement in terrorist 
activities. Venezuela’s intelligence agency found ‘jihadist uniforms’ and videos in the hotel rooms 
of the arrested men, three of whom were Imams who were in possession of 66 Trinidadian 
passports at the time. They claimed that they were taking them to the Saudi Arabian consulate 
for visas so that the citizens could go to make the holy pilgrimage. Venezuelan officials’ 
investigations suggested that they were instead trying to renew the passports through the 
Trinidad and Tobago consulate in Venezuela for travel to Syria, with the possible aim of fighting 
in the Jihadist war (Bailey 2014). Video evidence obtained by officials showed some of the men 
undergoing what appeared to be jihadist military training in Caracas. Eight of the nineteen  
continue to be held in Venezuela after being charged for terrorism and criminal conspiracy. At 
the time of writing, the Trinidad and Tobago government has ceased to seek repatriation 
(Jamaica Observer 2014).  
Since that time, a man by the name of Adnan Gulshair El Shukrijumah, described as a ‘top al 
Qaeda terrorist’ was killed in an operation in Pakistan in December of 2014. Shukrijumah - a 
Saudi-born Guyanese national who was on the US government’s FBI’s most-wanted list for 
terrorism related activities - lived in Trinidad and Tobago in the 1980s as a child (Julien 2014). His 
father was a cleric paid by the Saudi government, to spread the radical Wahaabi doctrine there 
(Stabroek Editor 2010). The al Qaeda operative was known to have been in Trinidad and Tobago 
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for months before the 2001 attacks on the US and was reported to have been staying on the 
compound of an Islamic group in Central Trinidad. This group has ties to a mosque in Florida 
which has been linked to terrorist activity. The FBI conducted searches in Trinidad in 2003 when 
immigration records indicate that he was on the island, but they were unable to locate him (Julien 
2014).  
Also in late 2014, it was discovered that Muslims from Trinidad and Tobago had gone to Syria and 
joined the insurgent group Daesh. This came to the attention of the population via social media 
as the men began to appear in propaganda videos as well as began posting gruesome videos of 
their jihadist activities and day-to-day lives. Their distinctive accents were recognised and soon 
after, a local investigative journalist uncovered that a number of nationals had travelled to Syria 
to join the group. The government eventually confirmed that 50 individuals had done so, later 
revising official figures to 150, giving the state the highest per capita recruitment rate in the 
western world (Cottee 2019, 303). 
In examining the literature, it would appear that Trinidad and Tobago’s history with radical 
political activity has a degree of continuity. However it is important to note that these details had 
to be mined from a wide range of sources with a great deal of effort in order to illuminate a 
pattern for the purposes of this work. This collection of details is not representative of common 
knowledge in or about Trinidad and Tobago and does not constitute an established narrative. 
Nevertheless, a common thread in the writings about the 1990 coup is that it was similar to the 
previous 1970s coup attempt in that there was a significant relationship between the 
insurgencies and impoverished black communities.  
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Raoul Pantin (2007, 11–12) and Dennis McComie (2010, 9) both speak directly to the membership 
of the Jamaat predominantly being these types of young men who were drawn to the discipline, 
structure and support provided by the organisation. Similarly, as shall be explored in Chapter 4 
of this work, McCoy and Knight (2016, 283–87) also profiled the Trinidadian Daesh recruit as black 
and socio-economically marginalised. Further to this, it can be seen that the country does have a 
history of radical Islamic elements who have sought to engage in terrorist activities both within 
Trinidad and across international borders. This introductory chapter shall consequently briefly 
examine the history of Islam in Trinidad and Tobago, linking it where relevant to extremist 
activity. 
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The History of Islam in Trinidad and Tobago 
 
The first Muslims to arrive in the Caribbean did so centuries ago during the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade. These were primarily West African Muslims, many of whom were forced to abandon their 
culture, religions and traditions upon enslavement, with many being forcefully converted to 
Christianity. Afro-Caribbean Muslims now comprise the smallest group of followers of Islam in 
the Caribbean (Voll 2002, 266–67; Samaroo 1996). The majority of the Caribbean’s Muslim 
population then arrived much later, after the abolition of slavery and the emancipation of slaves. 
Commencing from this time was a process of East Indian indentureship, whereby mostly South 
Asians migrated to the West Indies to work on the sugarcane plantations. While most of these 
labourers were Hindus, there were also many Muslims amongst them (Mustapha 1997, 251; 
Kassim 2017, 3–4). 
In Trinidad and Tobago, approximately 8% of the 1.2 million person population is Muslim – just 
over 100,000 persons. Most of them are of South Asian descent. There has however been a return 
to Islam in recent times, with increased conversion, especially amongst the marginalised Afro-
Caribbean segments of the population. Whilst most Muslims in Trinidad and Tobago practise 
their religion peacefully and are well integrated members of society, there are more openly 
radical segments of the Muslim population (Mustapha 1997, 263). According to Terdman (2010, 
567–68), this includes 14 relatively small groups which came into being largely as a result of 
Middle Eastern missionary work, and also the now notorious Jamaat al Muslimeen. Views on this 
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vary widely as only 3 groups are recorded in the Routledge Handbook of Terrorism, published 
soon after Terdman’s writing (Jongman 2011, 434). 
The Jamaat is led by a former policeman – Lennox Phillips, who has gone by the name Yassin Abu 
Bakr since his conversion to Islam in the late 1960s. The Jamaat was formed in the mid-1980s and 
has been described as a product of ‘the most extreme fringes of Pan-African nationalism, Black 
Power ideology and identity politics with Islamic rhetoric and symbolism’ (Terdman 2010, 571). 
Mustapha (1997, 263) asserts that this organisation is considered extreme even by the ‘more 
radical’ groups within the Trinidadian Muslim community. The organisation has a membership in 
the hundreds and is traditionally constituted of Afro-Trinidadian converts to Sunni Islam. Its 
previously outlined links to Libya are said to have funded its main physical infrastructure – 
mosque, schools and medical facility. It has also been suggested that via this link, the organisation 
has sent members to the Middle East – particularly Syria and Lebanon for jihadist military training 
(Terdman 2010, 572). Imam Abu Bakr himself was charged with Terrorism in 2004 – the only time 
in the history of Trinidad and Tobago that such a charge has been laid. This came as a result of a 
sermon demanding that wealthy Muslims of South Asian descent donate a portion of their wealth 
to charity or face violent consequences. Nothing came of these charges. 
In a 2014 interview with US based VICE News, Bakr proudly asserted:  
I’ve been charged for murder, I’ve been charged for conspiracy to murder, I’ve 
been charged for treason, I’ve been charged for terrorism, I’ve been charged for 
guns and ammunition, nothing has stuck because they have just fabricated all of 
these cases against me. 
(‘VICE News Extended: Trinidad’s Abu Bakr’ 2014)  
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Terdman recognises that Abu Bakr’s ‘willingness to resort to violence and other radical measures 
makes him virtually untouchable’ (Terdman 2010, 573), a notion further supported by Raoul 
Pantin (2007, 13). His reach is said to extend into the protective services, and ranges as far as the 
political elite of the government and major political parties and this is believed to insulate him 
from prosecution.  
McCoy and Knight (2016, 284–85) claim that recent patterns of extremist travel show Daesh 
recruitment which corresponds to areas of Jamaat influence. Two mosques in Central Trinidad 
were identified as having produced many recruits – both of which are described as having ‘some 
association’ with the Jamaat and being located in areas with ‘an established JAM [Jamaat] 
presence’. One mosque in particular, situated in Rio Claro – an area of southeast Trinidad – is 
known to be a splinter group of the Jamaat. These authors, writing in 2016, note that the Jamaat 
was conspicuously silent within a Muslim community which has for the greater part condemned 
violent extremism and membership in groups like Daesh. In early 2019 however,  Jamaat leader 
Yasin Abu Bakr commented to BBC News that he told his group’s follows not to go to Iraq, 
describing Daesh as ‘utter nonsense’ (BBC News 2019). 
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Trinidad and Tobago and Terrorism:  Legal Frameworks 
 
Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, several United Nations resolutions were passed concerning 
terrorism; two in the Security Council – UNSCR 1368 and UNSCR 1373 and another in the General 
Assembly – resolution 56/1. Trinidad and Tobago immediately expressed its intentions to take 
seriously its obligations under those resolutions (Gupta 2002, IV:513–14). Within its own Treaty 
Collection, the UN identifies 5 conventions on terrorism and a further 8 multilateral conventions 
on terrorism within other depositories. Trinidad and Tobago signed, acceded to and or ratified 
all but one of the UN conventions and each of the multilateral conventions identified  in the 
Treaty Collection (United Nations n.d.). Additionally, at the 2014 meeting of the UN General 
Assembly, in the wake of officially recognising Daesh recruitment, the Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago co-sponsored the United States’ resolution (resolution 2178) condemning extremism 
and emphasising the need to curtail the support and ability of foreign terrorists to travel. 
At the regional level, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) responded to the September 11th 
attacks collectively. On October 12th 2001, at a special meeting, CARICOM adopted the Nassau 
Declaration in which member states pledged full cooperation with the international community 
on matters relating to money laundering linked to financing terrorist activity and also in tracing 
and freezing assets which might belong to terrorist actors (CARICOM Secretariat 2001). Trinidad 
and Tobago was party to this declaration and its commitments were later written into domestic 
laws. As another regional organisation, the Organisation of American States (OAS) also 
responded to the attacks via the Inter-American Convention on Terrorism which was adopted in 
2002. This convention had a much wider scope and called for signatories to commit to upholding 
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various international conventions. Trinidad and Tobago later signed and ratified this convention 
in 2005 (Organisation of American States n.d.). 
In terms of domestic legislation, the first which can be interpreted as implicitly speaking to 
terrorism in Trinidad and Tobago is the Malicious Damage Act of 1925 which addresses the 
making or possession of explosive substances with criminal intent, arson or detonating explosives 
in private or public areas  (Alexander and Nanes 1986, 239; ‘Malicous Damage Act’ 2009). Abu 
Bakr and his followers were charged under this Act following the 1990 insurrection. More 
recently in 2005, the Anti-terrorism Act was passed. It has been revised most recently in 2018 
and addresses terrorism explicitly, considering offences such as the conduct, financing, support, 
incitement and solicitation of terrorist acts (‘Anti-Terrorism Amendment Act’ 2018). Trinidad and 
Tobago can be seen therefore as having, at least on paper, committed to fighting terrorism.  
 Close scrutiny of what appears to be a considerable list of activity on the part of the government  
reveals that early legislature such as the Malicious Damage Act was inherited from the British 
colonial legislature as opposed to being a product of Trinidadian governance. Conventions and 
Treaties signed can be seen as routine and on par with the conduct of regional and global partners 
who did the same as part of their commitment to global governance in the post-9/11 context and 
were not accompanied by any form of narrative related to terrorist threat in or from Trinidad and 
Tobago. The exceptions to this are the co-sponsorship of resolution 2178 in 2014 and the Anti-
Terrorism (Amendment) Act of 2018, each of which occurred during the period of direct 
international scrutiny with regards to Daesh recruitment. Chapter 4 of this work which considers 
the way in which domestic politics informs the security culture of Trinidad and Tobago shall 
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explore these exceptions framing them not as attempts to securitise terrorism – that is to say, to 
recognise and treat it as a threat, but rather to ‘manage’ terrorism, by treating it as routine as 
possible given that it was impossible under those conditions to depoliticise it. 
This section has shown that Trinidad and Tobago has had experience with radicalisation in 
general as well as with radical Islam and terrorism specifically. The absence of terrorism 
narratives for that state prior to word of Daesh recruitment is therefore curious. Within the realm 
of critical security studies, theories of securitisation map the process through which an issue 
becomes recognised and treated as a security threat and so it is within these theories that one 
would expect to find an explanation for this failure to securitise terrorism as a threat in Trinidad 
and Tobago. This work shall argue however that approaches to securitisation are, in their current 
forms unable to do so and that their limitations lie specifically in the failure to articulate 
meaningful ways to integrate history and cultural identity into their theoretical frameworks. 
 
Objectives 
 
This thesis concerns itself with highlighting that gaps in current approaches to theorising 
securitisation are problematic insofar as they are unable to effectively account for the way in 
which history and cultural identity affect securitisation processes. It argues that critical security 
scholars need to continue to push the boundaries of scholarship to recognise the importance of 
these factors. This work advances that is necessary to introduce systematic means of including 
them in existing theoretical frameworks, which would allow for them to be meaningfully and 
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intentionally integrated into analyses.  To do this, it explores how these factors are imperative to 
explaining the absence of domestic and international terrorism narratives for Trinidad and 
Tobago and how they fill gaps left by securitisation theories.  
The case study highlights how poorly securitisation theory is suited in its current form to account 
for the complexity of the colonial legacy on the security culture of Trinidad and Tobago, which in 
turn extends into the absentee narrative. Colonial legacies are common – and they continue to 
play significant roles in the security issues which formerly colonised territories face. Indeed, 
historian Martin Wiener (2013, 1–3) argues that the term now has highly negative connotations, 
with the many of the problems faced by ‘new’ states today being ascribed to this legacy including 
social, political and economic instability, corruption, and violence. While there are slight 
variations in the count depending on perspective, only about 15 countries of today’s non-
European world escaped colonisation in the 15th to 19th centuries (Ringmar 2019, 195–96). That 
our current perspectives on security are limited in their ability to take into account the realities 
of the vast majority of the world in this way is problematic for a discipline which considers itself 
to be international. 
Given the position which this work takes on the importance of history, culture and identity, this 
introduction shall now give a brief overview of the way in which these factors have been received 
in the discipline of International Relations, in order to contextualise the discussions in the 
following chapters. 
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History in International Relations 
 
The second of the Great Debates in International Relations, which took place in the 1960s, was 
concerned with the merits of scientific versus historical methods for analyses of the international 
political landscape. This manifested through differences in perspective between traditionalists 
and behaviourists, though both sides agreed that empiricism and positivism would characterise 
an IR based on scientific inquiry. An interpretivist historicist approach was by contrast non-
scientific (Curtis and Koivisto 2010, 433; Wendt 1998, 102). During this debate, the dominance 
of the American contribution to the field came to the  fore as a product of the behaviourist 
revolution in the social sciences taking place there and the influence of the scholars of the Vienna 
Circle who had emigrated to the US during World War II (Curtis and Koivisto 2010, 435–40). 
This supposed incommensurability between history and  science in International Relations can 
be traced back to the Enlightenment  in Europe.   The early positivists of  the ‘Age of Reason’ 
sought the unity of science – a single scientific method which would allow scientists to uncover 
the truths of both the natural and social worlds. Thinkers such as Auguste Comte and Henri de 
Saint-Simon were early proponents of this thinking. They believed that society and by extension, 
history, could be studied scientifically as  humans are an extension of the natural world , whose 
actions could be determined in relation to their material interests. Just as Newtonian mechanics 
had allowed human reason to uncover knowledge of the physical world, so too could it  work for 
the social world as there would be no distinction between the methods applied to each (Curtis 
and Koivisto 2010, 438; Ferraz, Alfonso-Goldfarb, and Waisse 2018, 110–12). 
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Unlike Comte and de Saint-Simon, Descartes  did not endorse a unity of science.  Contrastingly,  
he held history in deep contempt as being incapable of  the type of scientific systemisation  that 
would produce objective knowledge (Berlin 1960, 1–2; Navon 2001, 615–16). It was this Cartesian 
disdain which early positivists attempted and ultimately failed to overcome.  Thusly, Cartesian 
condemnation of history has become embedded in  IR through the work of behaviourists and 
later rational choice theorists who were inspired by behaviouralism. The scientific foundations of 
IR  then can be seen as drawn from empiricism and manifested in positivist methodology (Curtis 
and Koivisto 2010, 439–40; Smith 2011, 4).   
Neo-positivism is well represented in International  Relations – particularly within the realist and 
liberalist paradigms (Lebow 2011, 1219; Lake 2013, 570). Its assumptions include universalism, 
objectivity, one-to-one correspondence and ontological determinism. These assumptions and 
their link to Newton and Descartes (P. T. Jackson 2011, 6) are explored in Chapter 2 of this work. 
Indeed, Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (2010, 2) claim that positivism in IR is the standard 
around which the mainstream converges, such that a corresponding criticism has repeatedly 
emerged in the literature. A number of authors (Lebow 2011, 1219; Wendt 1998, 102; P. T. 
Jackson 2011, 9) argue that this look towards science has been rhetorical more than practical and 
linked to usurping the legitimising power of science to accredit certain perspectives  while 
marginalising others – a perspective which holds with the spirit of this work although remaining 
outwith its possible scope. 
The resulting disciplinary divide between science and history has reified the dichotomising of 
these approaches and persevered for half a century, continuing into the debate between 
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positivists and post-positivists which emerged in the 1980s (Wendt 1998, 101; Joseph and Wight 
2010, 1; Lake 2013, 570). Resultantly, alongside the contemporary predominance of positivism-
informed perspectives in IR, there continues to be a parallel tradition of theorising in IR such that 
perspectives have emerged which are fundamentally tied to history – for example the English 
School, Social Constructivism and World Systems Theory (Glencross 2010, 2; Koliopoulos 2010, 
13–16). Even if not given a central role in the mainstream of the discipline, history nevertheless 
does feature in the study of International Relations. 
 
Culture and Identity in International Relations 
 
The concepts of culture and identity have also experienced their fair share of disregard in the 
field of International Relations. Morten Valbjørn (2008, 57–58) articulates various challenges 
which culture has faced in International Relations which can be linked back to commitments to 
‘science’. He argues that, initially, culture was informed by Enlightenment thinking, whereby a 
single culture was expected to emerge as a result of  progress. Cultural diversity was therefore 
taken to be superficial, receding and unimportant. This, he cites as being a feature of  early liberal 
thinking on cosmopolitanism in IR.   Furthermore, Valbjørn speaks to the role of power in realism 
as also  washing culture out of  IR.  Along this line of thinking, under the conditions of anarchy, 
‘power trumps everything, also culture(s)’ (Valbjørn 2008, 58). Supported by Avruch (1998, 42), 
Valbjørn explains the realist perspective that in a system characterised by self-help,  all states will 
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fundamentally act in terms of their security interests such that power shall always trump culture, 
which is rendered irrelevant. 
Finally, and most directly linked to the preceding discussion, Valbjørn (2008, 58) presents the 
epistemologically-based argument that culture is non-scientific and therefore not an ontological 
concern of a discipline endeavouring towards the standards of ‘science’. Indeed, Rengger (1992, 
85) notes that culture characterises everything that committed positivist specialists in IR are 
conditioned to detest. Harshe (2006, 3945) endorses and elaborates this, citing culture’s 
unquantifiable character as the reason for this distaste.  Overall,  Valbjørn (2008, 59) asserts that 
the commonality between these seemingly different explanations for the way that culture has 
been treated in IR is the concept of universality. He claims that each of these ultimately return to 
universality claims inherent in mainstream thinking such that cultural diversity is always 
marginalised based on the notion that international relations  behave according to some form of 
universal logic. IR has in this sense become ‘a discipline which speaks partially, but which has 
assumed and declared universally’ (Chan 2001, 59). 
The  so-called ‘Cultural Turn’ within the discipline of International Relations allowed for the 
magnification of peripheral calls for due consideration to be given to culture. This has been 
reflected in the proliferation of attention being paid to the concept in contemporary scholarship 
(Hudson and Sampson III 1999, 667). It has not however been an easy transition for a discipline 
which has been culture-blind for most of its existence. Indeed as Valbjørn (2008 , 59-65)  explains, 
the discipline has been blind not only to diversity but also to its own bounded, parochial 
perspective. Consequently, it has been a challenge for scholars to understand how to  move 
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towards a less culture-blind discipline, keeping in mind exoticism and  ‘othering’ as they  attempt 
to do so (Hudson and Sampson III 1999, 668; P. Jackson 2008, 156).  
The mere inclusion of culture in the discipline does not necessarily lead to a better understanding 
of those cultures and how they relate to international relations. A prime example of this is Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations (1993) which was directly influenced by the writings of well-
known Orientalist, Bernard Lewis. Not only did Huntington reproduce  problematic orientalist 
views, but  in doing so , he also presented an entire region as a static monolith. His work highlights 
both othering and a lack of understanding of culture, which has been problematised within post- 
and decolonial perspectives (Said 1998, 4; Hudson and Sampson III 1999, 668). Christian Reus-
Smit (2019) argues that  even today, IR does not understand culture and that  the discredited 
view of culture is still  the default conception across rival schools of the discipline. This  he argues, 
renders the discipline yet unable to address culture despite its presence everywhere in global 
politics. 
Identity became a factor of renewed interest in International Relations at the end of the Cold 
War. It has therefore only comparatively recently made its way into the lexicon of the discipline’s 
theorists as an analytical category (Goff and Dunn 2004, 1; Wilmer 1997, 3). Neo-realists and neo-
liberalists alike treat it as they do culture- as prior to their main issues of concern and  subjugated 
by issues of power. Identity therefore remains less utilised than in other fields such as sociology 
and psychology, and where it has been included in IR it has been deeply scrutinised (Harshe 2006, 
3949–50). Much like culture, identity has found no consensus on  a definition, precisely how it 
matters or what is the best way for it to be studied (P. T. Jackson 2004, 169–70).  
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Identity also shares with culture the tendency for scholars in IR to engage in what Reus-Smit 
(2019) describes to be an antiquated anthropological approach which was abandoned within that 
field in the early 20th Century but which lingers in International Relations – essentialism. 
Essentialism refers to the narrow reductionist approach whereby culture and or identity are 
taken as bounded and immutable as opposed to contested, relational and in a state of flux. Goff 
and Dunn (2004, 3) elaborate this, explaining that for this reason, some scholars insert a caveat 
into their work which articulates their more sophisticated starting point in an effort to avoid 
falling into the essentialist trap. Indeed, this work does the same in Chapter 6 where it considers 
the political consequences of one particular entanglement of culture and identity in Trinidad. 
Linking identity to history and politics, Harshe (2006, 3949) also notes that racial identity has 
played a significant role in the conduct of international relations, by virtue of imperialism, yet it 
remains conspicuously marginalised in the discipline. Indeed, out of Enlightenment science also 
came scientific racism,  which was employed as part of colonial foreign policy for centuries. The 
legacy of the colonial racial imaginary continues to affect post-colonial politics and the fact that 
approaches which address this remain on the periphery of the discipline, points to its continuing 
Eurocentrism (Hira 2015, 138–39; Grosfoguel 2002, 211–13). Harshe (2006, 3950) argues that 
even Manichaean binaries - which feature in Chapter 3 of this work - are based on classical 
scientific notions of causality, such that racial identity is fundamentally entwined with the same 
science which informs the discipline’s privileged positions. Indeed, it is the same notion of 
universality which securely installed culture and identity into international relations in practice, 
that subsequently washed them out of the study of that practice.  
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Rendering culture and identity invisible in mainstream theorising, while they remain alive and 
well in practice, has preserved the Eurocentric status quo in the discipline of IR, while 
impoverishing analyses. This as well, has filtered into theorising security where certain 
commitments to the mainstream discipline remain. This too shall be explored in this work – 
particularly in chapters 4 and 5 which examine the effects of coloniality on cultural identity and 
domestic politics in Trinidad and Tobago. 
While the above focuses on the challenges which  history, culture and identity have faced as they 
have been reintroduced  into the discipline of IR,  this does not mean to suggest that   scholarship 
including these factors has not persevered and added meaningfully to  the study of international 
politics. Alexander Wendt’s theory of social constructivism might be considered canon in this 
regard, encompassing ideas on both culture and identity. Wendt’s theory presented anarchy 
from a different, socially constructed perspective where it would be what states make of it 
(Wendt 1992, 391–97). For Wendt, identity, a product of intersubjectivity  and shared culture 
informs interests and by extension plays a significant role in international interactions (Wendt 
1994, 384). 
Feminists too engage with notions of in socially constructed world. In particular, standpoint and 
post-structural feminists’ concern with the way in which gender as an identity is socially 
(therefore culturally) and performatively constituted   has made important contributions to the 
discipline in general and to  security in particular, as shall be elaborated in the following chapter 
(Shepherd 2010, 5–8; Hansen 2010, 18). Christine Sylvester (2002, 3) characterises Cynthia 
Enloe’s work as a call to looking for the diversity of people and places and everyday activities that 
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make the world go around and facilitate international politics. Kimberle Crenshaw’s work on 
intersectionality advocates that in so doing,  we do not conflate or ignore intra-group differences,  
but rather, look at the way in which differences interact to shape different experiences of 
oppression and marginalisation (Crenshaw 1991, 1243–45). Crenshaw effectively invites  greater 
consideration of  amongst other things the way that race and class impact these experiences, 
which necessarily  requires consideration of historical circumstances. 
Post-colonial scholars often find allies in their feminist counterparts as to them, race, gender and 
culture are seen as three of the most impactful, yet often invisible social forces in our lives 
(Persaud and Sajed 2018, 3; Bhabha 1994, 236). Post-colonialism pays close attention to the 
intersections between these social forces recognising culture and related notions of history, 
identity and representation as being a site for the tensions between oppressors and oppressed 
(Loomba 2015, 58; Bhabha 1994, 1–2). Indeed, Edward Said describes culture as ‘a sort of theatre 
where various political and ideological causes engage one another’ (Said 1994, xiii).  
It is through recognition of the central role which post-colonial and decolonial approaches have 
assigned to these factors that this work seeks to explore them through the lens of securitisation 
theory in considering the case study of Trinidad and Tobago. It does so with the added 
recognition that they are, especially in the case of the Caribbean and the colonisation of the ‘New 
World’, inextricably linked to what Walter Mignolo (2011, xi–xxiii) refers to as ‘The Economy of 
Accumulation’. This includes the material exploitation of land, wealth and black and brown 
bodies from and trafficked to the lands which were colonised (Loomba 2015, 21; Persaud and 
Sajed 2018, 3). A work such as this one then, which takes a definitively Caribbean perspective on 
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decoloniality, recognises that that the material and the ideational remain fundamentally 
entangled in any discussion of post-colonial territories. This finds particular relevance in chapters 
4 and 5 of this work, but also informs the choice of theory and methodology used to analyse the 
case of Trinidad and Tobago’s absent terrorism narrative.
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Methodology 
 
The previous sections of this introduction have established that within the discipline of 
International Relations, there are limitations to the way in which history and cultural identity 
factor into our analyses. They recognise that these limitations furthermore extend into the way 
that security is theorised in the discipline and this is particularly relevant to the utility of these 
theories to analyses of former colonial territories whose security issues are entangled with these 
factors.  This is illustrated using the case study of Trinidad and Tobago, whose absent terrorism 
narrative cannot be explained using approaches to  theorising security in their present form. 
The argument advanced is that there is a need for some means of systematic integration to make 
the inclusion of factors such has history and cultural identity meaningful in the current theoretical 
frameworks. Consequently, this work requires methodologies which facilitate this, and in the 
spirit of disciplinary diversity, ones which do not replicate exclusionary practices. Accordingly, it 
has adopted ethnography and diffraction as its main methodologies. 
 
Ethnography 
 
Ethnography is a qualitative research methodology which concerns itself with ‘social interactions, 
behaviours and perceptions that occur within groups…and communities’ (Reeves, Kuper, and 
Hodges 2008, a1020), it is therefore well suited to a study which seeks to give culture and identity 
due consideration. Trinidadian anthropologist Patricia DeFreitas (2007, 51) asserts that Carnival 
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is the most logical point of entry into Trinidad’s culture  and so the Trinidad Carnival plays a large 
role in this work. Considering the effects of the festival on Trinidadian society and by extension 
its security culture, has been largely an exercise in self-reflexivity based on decades of cultural 
immersion as a Trinidadian national.  
DeFreitas in her study of the Trinidad Carnival speaks to the challenges and value of this type of 
engagement. She asserts that in being both researcher and masquerader she felt that she was 
always negotiating a tension between two identities -  native and non-native, self and other, 
viscerally engaged and hyper–alert (DeFreitas 2007, 48). In elaborating and evaluating this 
approach DeFreitas explains that within the discipline of anthropology, like in IR, indulging in 
these binaries in identity are inimical to the practice of sound research. It would reduce 
objectivity and necessarily produce a flawed and biased account. Insofar as researcher and native 
or outside and inside, were therefore desired dichotomies for objectivity, her identities of 
Anthropologist-Masquerader and in this case, my Researcher-Trinidadian, are undesirable 
(DeFreitas 2007, 52–53).  
DeFreitas (2007, 57) explores the implications of these binaries and concludes that they 
inherently invoke ‘others’, which implicitly speak to power relations – those of outside-inside and 
core-periphery. The study of native cultures for the anthropologist, she argues, always takes on 
the character of outside-inside-outside again. The researcher goes into the field from the outside, 
quite often from a developed country or institution within the core, undertakes their research 
inside or within the community and then removes themselves once more to the outside where 
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that research is processed, analysed and interpreted in a vacuum which validates its objective 
status and academic worth.  
DeFreitas rejects these conventions and the implication that they necessarily more a productive, 
desirable and objective practice. Instead, she recognises that perspectives are all situated. The 
outside view is equally laden with its own biases and understandings which are imposed upon 
the research when it is taken outside of the research context, yet it is still considered to be of a 
higher value than the indigenous interpretation. She contends that it is especially important to 
understand the post-colonial Trinidadian context from the native view, such that the native 
researcher has a privileged perspective in this regard (DeFreitas 2007, 58–60). 
This research has taken as its initial position that the external view, which lines up with 
Eurocentric, science-oriented IR, provides only limited answers to the questions posed in this 
work. It has argued that the marginalisation of history, culture and identity within the discipline 
are also the product of Eurocentrism, but that they are key considerations nevertheless. 
Eurocentric views on these concepts deny regional and native scholars the epistemological 
opportunities historically afforded to the mainstream perspectives, therefore creating the 
dichotomies which DeFreitas has described. This work therefore aligns itself with DeFreitas’ 
position on the validity of the native experience and the value which it adds to analyses. A 
negotiation of identities between researcher and native and home and abroad are consequently 
seen not as subversive to the discipline of IR and detrimental to the quality of the study of 
international relations, but rather in service to it. 
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For this research, DeFreitas’ description of the outside-inside-outside dynamic is inverted to 
inside-outside-inside. It begins both physically and mentally from the inside and the insights that 
come with being Trinidadian. Fieldwork, even, is a journey inside to my epistemological and 
geographic starting point. Having had the most advanced aspects of my scholarship provided in 
Scotland, my experience of IR is then taken outside by virtue of spatial relocation and an 
institution where mainstream perspectives are more common than in Trinidad, where they are 
the exception. Ultimately however, the journey turns inwards once more for this work. It is not 
the researcher but the Trinidadian researcher that is able to access the context, nuance and 
insight which only indigenous thought can provide and which will enable more informed 
analyses.  
 
Social Media Ethnography 
 
Social media is described as having provided novel sites for ethnographic study. It concerns itself 
with the content generated by users on various digital platforms and is becoming increasingly 
popular for diverse fields of study ranging from healthcare to business and politics.  The flexibility 
of Ethnography has made it amenable to adaptation for the regularly shifting needs of the digital 
environment (Caliandro 2017, 1). Within the broader scope of digital ethnography, social media 
ethnography is considered to be particularly insightful in that scholars have convincingly argued 
that the online has become so naturalised into the everyday that it is no longer meaningful to 
distinguish between the two (Dalsgaard 2016, 97; Caliandro 2017, 3). The work of Christine Hine 
28 
 
has been identified as being integral in this regard as she elaborates virtual ethnography as a 
means for bridging the online and offline realms. Hine argues that the internet is used to 
empower and enact social identities and bonds (Hine 2000, 6–9) and for this reason it is 
particularly well suited to this work. 
 Researchers additionally highlight that social media ethnography is a particularly useful tool for 
navigating instances where opportunities for in-person fieldwork are limited as social media 
analysis creates the opportunity  for capturing naturally occurring interactions in near and real 
time, such that the researcher is given access to unmediated dynamics, sentiments, tensions and 
topics being communicated by platform users (Edwards et al. 2013, 239; Dalsgaard 2016, 96). 
Through the various posts made by platform users, researchers are able to examine patterns and 
networks which emerge from their interactions (McCay-Peet and Quan-Haase 2017, 13; Hine 
2000, 14; Quan-Haase and McCay-Peet 2017, 41). Postill and Pink (2012, 124) posit that ‘uses of 
social media can also be interwoven with the qualities, political structures and histories of 
localities or regions.’ Indeed, this appears to be particularly true for Trinidad and Tobago and it 
is exactly this quality which has made virtual ethnography useful for this work which is attempting 
to look at the way in which cultural identities are entangled with the history and political 
structures of Trinidad and Tobago. 
Anthropologist Daniel Miller (2011, 158) conducted ethnographic research of Facebook usage in 
Trinidad and Tobago and found that while, as expected, a smaller number of individuals use the 
platform than in the United States or United Kingdom, there is a higher rate of usage in relation 
to accessibility. In 2016, Trinidad and Tobago was estimated to have an estimated 700,000 
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Facebook users out of a population of 1.2 million people (Miniwatts Marketing Group 2016). 
Miller’s research further found that Trinidadians had come to appropriate the platform as part 
of their culture, colloquially renaming it Fasbook and Macobook. These names incorporate 
Trinidadian terms ‘fas’ and ‘maco’ which are typically associated with minding someone else’s 
business and the culture of bacchanal linked to the Trinidad Carnival (Miller 2011, 159).  
Miller’s respondents additionally indicated that Facebook participation was considered akin to 
‘liming’ – a group social activity - and that it is a place where ‘true identities’ are exposed (Miller 
2011, 49–50). Facebook then provides an ideal site for observing the public performance of the 
aspect of the Trinidadian identity with which this work concerns itself – and one in which 
Trinidadians expect to be observed. For these reason, Facebook was chosen as a data collection 
site which would give access to a wide range of demographics which would allow for an 
examination of the patterns which emerge from social interactions. 
Ethical considerations for digital ethnography in general and social media ethnography in 
particular pose something of a quagmire to navigate. This section considers them first in terms 
of the legal frameworks of the relevant states/region, outlining the positions of the United Sates, 
Trinidad and Tobago as well as the European Union. It then proceeds to consider the discussions 
of academic research ethics in the literature surrounding digital and social media ethnography.  
In the United States, where Facebook is based, the law does not protect information shared on 
social media from dissemination and receives no reasonable expectation of privacy (Mund 2018, 
239–40). In the wake of the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, where the data of more than 87 million 
users was misused (Isaak and Hanna 2018, 56), Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg asserts that the 
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platform is committed to privacy despite its commoditisation of personal data (Winder 2019). As 
a result the company has tightened and streamlined its privacy policy in cooperation with the UA 
Federal Trade Commission, aiming to set an industry standard, such that their accountability to 
the public is now greater than required by US law (Stretch 2019). 
In Trinidad and Tobago, where the research is based, neither the Data Protection Act of 2011 - 
which is only partially enacted into law with no timeline for completion (DLA Piper 2019, 2)  - nor 
the Cybercrime Bill of 2017 address data collection for research or cover expectation of privacy 
on social media networks in depth. The Cybercrime Bill of 2017 is the more closely relevant 
legislation however despite consultation with the University of the West Indies and the University 
of Trinidad and Tobago which raised issues regarding research, the bill does not address data 
collection (The Joint Select Committee 2018, 64).  The only reference to privacy and expectation 
of privacy for citizens (outside of court proceedings) within the Cybercrime Bill is Clause 16 which 
narrowly relates to recording and sharing images of a person’s body without their consent and 
sharing personal information with intent to harm (The Trinidad and Tobago Parliament 2017, 12).  
The European Commission commissioned a document entitled Ethics in Social Science and 
Humanities in 2018. Within it, attention was paid to the complexity of social media research and 
guidelines were offered. Firstly it was reiterated that assessment of risk is key as the ethical 
responsibility of the research is to minimise harm. If risk is anticipated, then researchers are 
encouraged to paraphrase data, seek informed consent and consider more traditional research 
methods (European Commission 2018, 8–9). Further to this, the report encourages researchers 
to consider that not all publicly accessible data is inherently acceptable for use. In this regard, it 
31 
 
is recommended that consideration is given to the online environment in which the information 
was shared and whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in that context. Examples 
given to illustrate where privacy might be expected were closed group discussion forums and 
password protected profiles. It was of course additionally recommended that institutional ethics 
approval be obtained for all research involving human participants (European Commission 2018, 
9–10). 
The academic literature on the ethics of social media ethnography varies widely offering even 
polarised opinions on what best practice might constitute. Lisa Sugiura, Rosemary Wiles and 
Catherine Pope explored this issue in depth, considering a wide range of resources from 
academic researchers to professional associations in a variety of different countries. They found 
that while there was no overall consensus on what constituted the best approach, that most 
discussions centred on three main themes: informed consent, expectations of privacy and 
anonymity (Sugiura, Wiles, and Pope 2017, 187–94). 
Ideas on informed consent coalesce around the idea that if behaviour is conducted in public 
domains, it may be observed and researched without consent. It also was deemed acceptable to 
waive informed consent if the research did not negatively impact the rights and well beings of 
the subjects and involved (Sugiura, Wiles, and Pope 2017, 186–88; Kitchin 2003, 404–8). This in 
turn linked up with expectations of privacy, where context was highlighted as being particularly 
important in assessing whether a domain was considered to be private or not and so whether 
rights were being negatively impacted (Golder et al. 2017, 9–12; Markham and Buchanan 2012, 
7). Some perspectives on this extended into suggesting that depending on the acknowledged 
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publicity of the venue, the less obligation there would be to protect individual privacy and 
confidentiality (Ess 2002, 5; Kitchin 2003, 409–10). This too played into discussions of anonymity 
with Sugiura et al (2017, 194) suggesting that it might be safest to err on the side of caution in 
removing identifiers, even though given the nature of the internet, this was limited in its utility. 
Ethical approval for all research conducted in this work was obtained prior to data collection 
which included assessing risks to participants. As is common with social media ethnography 
(Airoldi 2018, 666), data collected from Facebook included statuses, comment threads and 
internet memes which illustrate the dynamics of the arguments put forward in this work and 
support claims formulated through the auto-ethnographic aspect of this work. No recruitment, 
active involvement, influence, manipulation or direction of any kind featured in this data 
collection which, the European Commission guidelines indicate would have called for informed 
consent (European Commission 2018, 11). This data is used primarily in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
work to illustrate the entanglements between cultural identity and politics.  
Keeping in mind expectation of privacy concerns previously outlined, data was collected through 
the platform’s search engine which allows for search terms that generate themed results dated 
back several years. This search function allows for filtering of results to public posts only – that is 
to say, posts which users have chosen not to limit to their private networks, where they would 
reasonably expect privacy. For users who have set their accounts to private, this requires a 
deliberate changing of the visibility of the specific post to public. While debates continue as to 
whether it is necessary to anonymise this type of data, especially given the nature of digital media 
and digital footprints, the choice was made ultimately to err on the side of caution. Consequently, 
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identifiers have been blurred out of all of the screenshots collected, making for more onerous 
exercise if anyone should seek to trace the commentary back to its source. 
Further to this, no sensitive data was collected through Facebook by these means but rather 
reactions to issues of food, inclement weather, television shows and international news reports. 
The issues were chosen organically on the basis of what was generating conversation amongst 
platform users. A pattern of behaviour was revealed with regards to the way that the specific 
iteration of the Trinidadian identity explored in this work, manifested in relation to perceived 
threats. As Trinidadian society is highly reactionary and this work is premised on the notion of an 
absent narrative it was not possible to collect a variety of instances discussing terrorism 
specifically as they did not occur. It was however possible to establish support for the way in 
which cultural identity acts as an interrupter to securitisation through various examples 
 
 Interviews and Ethnographic Questionnaires 
 
One aspect of social media ethnography which this work was unable to employ was the notion 
of ‘following the people’ which would entail following the trail of links which would emerge 
through the observation process to obtain a deeper understanding of the issue (Airoldi 2018, 
665–66). This was not possible with regards to exploring the terrorism issue as so few 
conversations existed and those that did, did not offer for more profound perspectives. As an 
alternative to ‘following the people’ the ethnographic questionnaire was a means of inviting the 
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native. It was facilitated via social media (Facebook and Twitter) to take advantage of the depth 
of social media penetration previously highlighted.  
This type of questionnaire, is a qualitative method of data collection that has been growing in the 
last 15 years even though it is not very common. It speaks to guiding the inquiry with specific 
questions, as one might in individual semi-structured ethnographic interviews in order to gain 
the same types of insights into patterns and  attitudes of the community being studied in the 
broader execution of social media ethnography. It is used as other types of qualitative research 
often are – in conjunction with a theoretical framework for sound analysis (Hammarberg, 
Kirkman, and de Lacey 2016, 500; Soutrenon 2005, 121). In this work the data was used to explore 
attitudes regarding governance and terrorism in Trinidad and Tobago in Chapter 4. Although not 
a part of the social media ethnography, in depth semi-structured interviews were also conducted 
with a range of actors, including former government officials and journalists – these too were 
integrated into Chapter 4. Both the ethnographic questionnaires and semi-structured interviews 
received ethical approval for this work and were conducted with fully informed consent from 
participants.  
 
Diffraction 
 
Diffraction is an optical metaphor which articulates differences and their potential for creating 
change (Barad 2007, 72; Haraway 1997, 16). As a methodology, diffraction can be described in 
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its simplest form as reading oeuvres through one another (van der Tuin 2016). (Re)reading 
insights from different perspectives through each other enables scholars to explore relations of 
difference and their implications. This has the potential to illuminate insightful patterns which 
can only be appreciated if difference is given due consideration (Barad 2007, 71; Kleinmann 2012, 
80). A particular beauty of the diffractive method is that it does not consider sameness and 
difference in opposition - as binaries - but rather as entangled, complementary parts of the same 
phenomenon (Bozalek and Zembylas 2017, 115). Accordingly, this methodology is fundamental 
to this work, as it provides a  means for systematically introducing history and culture into existing 
‘science-based’ frameworks in a meaningful, complementary way. 
Reflection too, can be employed diffractively. It needs not be articulated classically in terms of 
subject and object but rather, can be described through intra-action which goes a step beyond 
the inter-action of Bourdieu-inspired reflexive methods.  In intra-action the entangled 
components are mutually dependent so that there is no fixed referent point – no permanent 
standard against which another is measured or compared (Bozalek and Zembylas 2017, 116). 
Instead it offers ‘a bi-directional approach that adds the results of what happens when each 
understanding takes a turn at playing the foil’ such that there is no privileging of either (Barad 
2007, 92). This is the way in which reflection is used in this work – providing an indigenous 
perspective which is read through securitisation theories to try to see a more whole picture of 
the case study. 
Karen Barad argues that we must reassess positions which rely either explicitly or implicitly on 
old ideas – not to simply reject them as dated or inapplicable but rather to address them 
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diffractively – that is to say, to read the old and the new through each other, infusing the best 
understanding that we currently have with the integral aspects of what we previously had so that 
a more holistic understanding of the world can be achieved (Barad 2007, 24–25). It is this position 
that has uniquely informed this work, which employs diffraction at two levels – within and across 
chapters. 
The first of these levels is within individual chapters examining the empirical aspects of the study 
– Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 - and entails the application of the theory. As the methodology underlying 
Agential Realism – one of the theories used heavily within this work - diffraction is used in each 
chapter to integrate what can be learnt from securitisation with what can be learnt from 
including the material-discursive aspects of cultural identity and history in our analyses. Through 
theoretical application, it therefore provides the necessary framework for systematically 
including these factors. The second level of usage is across chapters as the insights from the 
political and the cultural are then read through each other, allowing for the first level of insights 
to inform the second, this usage is more consistent with van der Tuin’s (2016) broader description 
of it as reading works through each other. It is by way of these readings that this work will 
ultimately answer questions on Trinidad’s absent terrorism narrative in the concluding chapter. 
This introduction has  made the case that it is fair to expect Trinidad and Tobago to have had 
some sort of terrorism narrative prior  to the publicity of Daesh recruitment, however, this was 
not the case. It has outlined this work’s objectives as highlighting the shortcomings of 
Securitisation Theory, insofar as it is unable to account for this absent narrative. It has further 
advanced  that the limited room for systematically exploring the  implications of cultural identity 
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and history within that theoretical framework can be held accountable for its  limitations in being 
affectively applied to this case study. It consequently suggests that Agential Realism offers a  
means of meaningful integration that can further the agenda of critical security studies. With that 
in mind, this work shall now proceed to its first theoretical chapter which examines approaches 
to  theorising securitisation.
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Chapter 1 
Approaches to Theorising 
Securitisation 
 
The emergence of Daesh has posed an unconventional but undeniable threat to security not only 
in the Levant but also to the rest of the globe. The group’s desire to build a transnational sharia-
based state is reflected in what has been described as its ‘strategic multilateralism’ and its 
emergence from both regional and global jihadi efforts (Ibrahimi 2018). It is therefore not 
surprising that Trinidad and Tobago was amongst the estimated 103 countries from which 
fighters had been recruited (Cottee 2019, 300). What does however make Trinidad and Tobago 
a curious case, is that it is a state out of which terrorist elements have emerged (even prior to 
Daesh recruitment) with relatively little to no corresponding narrative – domestic or international 
- to address or account for this issue.  
Insofar as there has been an absence of narrative, there has been equally little scholarship 
recognising or seeking to explain this absence. This work attempts to question this absence and 
in so doing, advance an argument for the systematic inclusion of the notions of history, and 
cultural identity into securitisation thinking. As the analyses within the empirical chapters that 
follow shall reveal, securitisation thinking in its current forms cannot, on its own, account for the 
absent terrorism narrative. The material-ideational entanglements of colonial history and of 
cultural identity in Trinidad and Tobago play too significant a role in the contemporary security 
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culture of the nation to be considered in an ad hoc manner, however the limitations of current 
approaches to securitisation do not allow for this to be revealed. 
This chapter shall proceed by outlining securitisation theory as it shall be used in this work. In 
doing this, it shall address relevant critiques of the theory which highlight its limitations – 
particularly those which come from feminist and post-colonial scholars whose work is amenable 
to the argument advanced in this thesis. This work shall additionally seek to highlight where there 
are gaps in the critiques, or where they would benefit from further follow through. The chapter 
closes with a consideration of how securitisation theory might be applied to the LAC regions, 
especially given the theory’s limitations and makes the argument that an additional theoretical 
framework might be of use in overcoming them. 
 
Theorising Securitisation 
 
The idea of securitisation as a process, is one which has been contemplated in academia by a 
variety of disciplines over time. The particular iteration of the discussion as it features in security 
studies in the discipline of International Relations, is as it relates specifically to politics and the 
way in which issues become seen and treated as security threats. It considers questions like what 
makes something a security issue, what responses might be appropriate for addressing an issue 
that has been so identified and by extension, what consequences might there be for accepting 
an issue as a threat and issuing a chosen response (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 496). In 
its most general form, it can be seen as ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat 
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with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 
25). This definition has been elaborated in different and at times divergent ways by scholars, as 
shall be explored later in this chapter. Despite this however, it has been the prominent approach 
to security for roughly the last two decades (Balzacq 2011b, xiii). 
Extending from the origin story of critical security studies, securitisation is typically told through 
a chronological unfolding, further delineated by schools of thought. Columba Peoples and Nick 
Vaughn-Williams explain that one of the ways in which broader critical security studies has been 
mapped in recent times is through ‘temporal mappings with distinctions between different 
critical approaches indicated via a set of geographical metaphors or “schools” ’ (Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams 2015, 9). This mapping is attributed to Ole Wæver who found that 
geographical origin might be a useful delineation by virtue of the groups’ differences in aims and 
modes of analysis.  In speaking of this evolution of the concept of security Rowley and Weldes 
(2012, 513–15) describe this chronology as a story which academics tell themselves and then 
perpetuate this myth to students. These authors argue that this myth is problematic in security 
studies as it makes artificially constructed delineations seem natural and incontestable. Peoples 
and Vaughn-Williams (2015, 6–9) also speak to the misleading nature of this approach and the 
way that it suggests distinction in areas where continuity does exist, thereby obscuring overlaps 
in approaches. 
Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2015, 497–99) present a similar argument for the theorising of 
securitisation, making the case that the story told through ’schools’ is as unproductive for 
securitisation as it is for security studies. They assert that preoccupation with categorising ignores 
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cross-pollination across ‘schools’ over time and does not account for scholars whose work falls 
neatly into no single school or into no school at all.  As an alternative to making explanations 
along evolutionary lines, Balzacq (2005, 178–79) posits that theorising securitisation in IR 
typically falls broadly into one of two approaches – the speech act approach or the pragmatic 
approach. Whilst he acknowledges the Copenhagen and Paris Schools,  tend to lean in one or the 
other direction in their approach to theorising securitisation, Balzacq argues that adhering rigidly 
to a single approach impoverishes security analyses. He opts instead for an integrative approach 
that keeps previous omissions in mind and gives due consideration to how those exclusions 
matter.  This stance resonates well with the overall spirit of this work for reasons that will become 
clearer in the Chapter 2.  
This chapter takes as its point of departure, an examination of Securitisation Theory as put 
forward by the Copenhagen School. Following Balzacq’s lead, it shall articulate this theory in 
terms of its commitment to the speech act approach.  As it progresses through outlining the 
theory, it shall highlight its limitations, particularly in terms of silencing, state-centrism, under-
theorising of the impact and role of audiences, and the notion of exceptional measures. These 
limitations shall be elaborated through the insights brought to securitisation thinking by the Paris 
School-informed pragmatic approach as well as the contributions of other critical perspectives. 
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The Copenhagen School 
 
The Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) has been described as perhaps ‘the most 
established school of critical security studies’ and a leader in security studies (Paulauskas 2006, 
223; Guzzini and Jung 2004). When COPRI came into being in 1985, it sought to navigate the 
changing terrain of security studies from a different approach. Guzzini and Jung  (2004, 5) 
describe it as one which sought not to parallel the mainstream, but to influence it without in turn 
making ‘undue concessions’ to it. The aim then was to allow for security to be re-analysed, re-
developed and then consequently allow for a re-insertion into the typical analyses. 
Jef Huysmans acknowledges that Copenhagen has ‘produced what is probably the most 
systematic and continuous exploration of its implications for security studies and policies’ (1998, 
482). Bill McSweeney  - one of the School’s strongest critics - has described its work as ‘canon 
and an indispensable reference point for students of security’ (1996, 81) while Claudia Aradau 
describes it as ‘a path-breaking alternative to realist and neo-realist understandings of security’ 
(2004, 389).  In considering its approach to theorising security, one might consider Copenhagen 
to reflect the middle ground of constructivism (Paulauskas 2006, 223). This is reflected in the  
Copenhagen School’s stance of security being neither an objective nor a subjective phenomenon 
- or to draw on Guzzini and Jung once more, an understanding that: 
Security mobilises inter-subjectively shared dispositions of understanding and 
political action. In other words it needs to be understood as an inter-subjective 
phenomenon not an objective or subjective one. 
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(Guzzini and Jung 2004, 5) 
Particularly recognised for work along these lines are Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Together they 
are known for their notable collaborative works pertaining to a securitisation theory, which is the 
basis for the speech act approach to securitisation. Resultantly, an almost iconic association has 
been made between the Copenhagen School and securitisation (Paulauskas 2006, 223; Huysmans 
1998, 486). This theory shall be the foundation used for theorising securitisation in this work and 
the use of the term Securitisation Theory (ST) shall refer to Buzan and Wæver’s theory, unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
Securitisation Theory 
 
Ole Wæver explains that security in the Post-World War II context came to have a very distinct 
meaning – ‘security is what it does’ (Wæver 2004b, 56). This meaning, which he identifies as 
being at the core of securitisation theory, refers to the ‘doing’ nature of security that has come 
to be considered the position of the Copenhagen School (Browning and McDonald 2013, 241; 
Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 8). He expatiates this further, stating that security is a 
process by which a securitising actor identifies a phenomenon which potentially poses an 
existential threat to or a person/group of persons, thereby endangering their inherent right to 
survival and thusly justifying the use of extraordinary measures to mitigate these circumstances 
(Wæver 2004b, 56–57). 
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This description is a concise summary of the comprehensive three-step securitisation process 
which is developed in his seminal collaborative work with Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). In its second chapter the book focuses on the 
tripartite securitisation process whereby an issue is transformed along a continuum of non-
politicised to politicised to securitised (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24).  Wæver places 
great importance on two main concepts in the securitisation process:  existential threat and 
emergency measures. Existential threats are understood not as an objective universal standard 
of threat to human existence, but as a subjective one which can only be understood in relation 
to the individual character of the specific referent object (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 21). 
This concept shall be explored in more depth in the following section. Emergency measures, an 
equally important part of the securitisation process, shall be explored later in the discussion.  
 
Existential Threat and the Speech Act 
 
In order for an issue to go beyond the ordinary to become classified as a security issue, the first  
criteria is that it must be framed as an existential threat to a specific referent object by a 
securitising actor via a speech act (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–26). According to ST, the 
staging of an issue as an existential threat rests not on the ability of the securitising actor to 
assess an objective threat and demonstrate its dangerous qualities, but instead on the ability to 
construct ‘a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a 
threat’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 26). Securitisation theory then adopts a constructivist 
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argument informed by John Austin’s theory of speech acts as it is premised on the notion of 
security as a successful illocutionary (speech) act (Stritzel 2007, 3558; Browning and McDonald 
2013, 241).  
Austin’s speech acts can be seen as comprising 3 types of acts: locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary. Locution refers to the utterance, illocution refers to the act performed in saying 
something while perlocution refers to the consequential effects of the speech act upon the 
receiving audience (Austin 2009, 88–102). In contrast to constative utterances which have the 
property of either being true or false, performative utterances according to Austin, fall outside 
of the traditional true-false dichotomy. Furthermore, performative utterances constitute part of 
undertaking an action which would not be typically described as serving only the purpose of 
saying something (Austin 2009, 4–5) – that is to say going beyond locution to illocution. In line 
with his rejection of the true-false binary, Austin further asserts that these performative acts 
have not ‘truth conditions’ but ‘felicity conditions’,  which, being met, allow for the success of 
the act. Conversely, acting outwith these felicitous conditions will result in the performative act 
being ‘unhappy’ and ultimately unsuccessful (Austin 2009, 13–15).  
Wæver (1995, 55) asserts that the mere act of referring to something as a security issue makes 
it so, or as concisely put by Claudia Aradau ‘issues are securitised by virtue of discursive 
construction’ (2004, 391). We see here, the basic argument that ‘saying’ security is an 
illocutionary speech act. This may, but does not necessarily require, an utterance of the word 
security; the designation of an issue as an existential threat may even be purely by way of 
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metaphor. Drawing on Austin’s work, a securitising speech act is more than merely ‘saying or 
describing something, but the performing of an action’ (Stritzel 2007, 361). 
The felicity conditions of Austin’s theory are reproduced within ST. These success-facilitating 
conditions are comprised of internal and external factors and are, according to Holger Stritzel 
(2007, 358), the second central concept upon which securitisation theory rests. Internal 
conditions refer to those relating to linguistics and grammar, while the external refer to 
contextual and social conditions. A successful speech act then requires a combination of 
conditions encompassing both language and society (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 32–33). It 
is this context of the speech act which deems it self-referential – a notion problematised by 
critics, as shall be discussed later in this section. 
 
Audiences in Securitisation Theory 
 
Another essential factor to keep in mind in considering the success of a securitising move, is that 
the designation of an existential threat requiring exceptional measures is not only made, but it is 
then endorsed by a relevant target audience (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 27–33). This 
returns to the earlier point that scholars of the Copenhagen School view security not as objective 
or subjective but, as a matter of inter-subjectivity – ‘[s]ecuritisation is inter-subjective and socially 
constructed’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 31). The securitising actor plays but one role in the 
success of the securitisation attempt. Their social capital or the privilege of their position in 
articulating security (external conditions) can have profound implications for its outcome, 
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however, the responsibility for the success of the attempt is also largely dependent on the target 
audience of the securitising speech act. 
Wæver asserts that the audience is of crucial importance to securitisation theory as audience 
assent is a key assumption and an integral part of the inter-subjective process.  He argues that 
an issue ‘is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such’, regardless of whether 
said acceptance relies on consent or coercion (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 25). Whether the 
proposed referent object of a securitising move is considered legitimate and by extension, 
whether the exceptional measures proposed to protect it are also seen as worthy of support or 
at least of toleration, lies in whether the audience is able to accept the protection of the referent 
object as a shared value. This step in the process, then, is ‘part of a discursive, socially constituted, 
inter-subjective realm’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 31). 
 
Problematising the Speech Act: Audiences and Silencing 
 
At this juncture, the discussion will momentarily pause from outlining ST, to engage with critiques 
of the speech act as it relates to audiences and silencing, before it moves on to discuss the 
relevance of emergency measures to Securitisation Theory. 
One aspect of ST which has been problematised by critics is a seeming contradiction within its 
logic where it claims both for a self-referential illocutionary act, but also an intersubjective 
perlocutionary act with reference to audience assent. Balzacq (2005, 178) rightly argues that the 
speech act cannot be both self-referential - depending on felicitous conditions as the 
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determinant for success and intersubjective - requiring audience assent as the determinant for 
success, as this creates a tension between illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of the speech 
act. Adam Côté (2016, 542) endorses this perspective, arguing that the terminology betrays the 
contradiction in that a definition which hinges on an act precludes one which is based on a 
process. Balzacq continues to explain that this is symptomatic of an inherent weakness within ST 
– the underdevelopment of the concept of the audience, despite its supposed centrality (2005, 
178). 
Indeed the focus on the self-referential nature of the illocutionary speech act and its associated 
contingencies, alongside the simultaneous underdevelopment of the audience, seems to point 
to a reductionist approach within ST (Salter 2008, 322). The insistence upon felicity conditions 
for the success of the speech act conflates the illocutionary with the perlocutionary, at the 
expense of a profound consideration of the audience (Balzacq 2005, 177–78).  Côté (2016, 543) 
supports this argument, articulating the audience within the speech act approach to 
securitisation as ‘agents without agency’.  
The Copenhagen School does little to help us figure out how to identify the audience despite 
their dual role as a check against the tyranny of state power as well as legitimising actor for the 
securitising move (Eroukhmanoff 2017, 106; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 497–98). This 
under-theorisation of the concept makes it very difficult to gauge the weight of the audience as 
a factor in the securitisation process. Being able to consider whether there might be multiple 
audiences for example, would allow for explorations of identity in the social construction of the 
threat.  It would also allow for consideration of how settings might inform who the enabling 
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audience(s) in securitisation attempt might be and consequently what a successful securitisation 
might entail (Salter 2008, 322; Vuori 2008, 72).  
Alternatively, Balzacq (2005, 178–79) asserts that the audience plays an active role assessing the 
persuasiveness of the speech act, inclusive of the securitising actor’s competencies, not only with 
respect to linguistic conventions but also in terms of contextual considerations. In his pragmatic 
approach to securitisation, he argues that contextual considerations are more significant than ST 
would suggest (2005, 171–72). While the Copenhagen School’s ST argues that successful 
securitisation changes the context in which the securitising move took place – an internalist view 
of context - Balzacq’s externalist approach adds another layer to this. While concurring that 
security does change context, he also argues that context determines the success of the 
securitising move insofar as that move must be articulated in terms of some external reality to 
which the audience can relate, such that the desired perlocutionary effects might be achieved 
(Balzacq 2005, 179–81). This perspective is well suited to the consideration of the implications of 
history and cultural identity in the securitising process. 
Aside from highlighting the limitations of securitisation theory regarding its consideration of the 
audience, the speech act has also been problematised in relation to silencing. Requiring a 
securitising actor to be able to articulate a threat assumes that agency is a given. Drawing on 
feminist perspectives on the power laden dynamics of ST, this can be seen as excluding the 
voiceless from ever being able to politicise and or securitise an issue (Hansen 2010, 285; Ciutǎ 
2009, 302–3; Guillaume 2018, 477). Sarah Bertrand (2018, 282) approaches the silencing issue in 
ST through a post-colonial lens, articulating that rather than through racialisation or location, the 
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silencing problem derives from the speech act itself.  Taking an intersectional approach however, 
this work shall look at the way in which the silencing problem can be found in the interstices of 
problematising the speech act and the power dynamics of colonial history. 
Having now considered the ways in which the speech act has been problematised in ST with 
respect to the under-theorising of the audience and as well as the silencing problem, this work 
shall return to elaborating ST, moving forward into a discussion of the feature of emergency 
measures. 
 
Emergency Measures in Securitisation Theory 
 
The concept of exceptional procedures or emergency measures is a feature of securitisation 
theory which draws on Carl Schmitt’s work on exceptionalism (Browning and McDonald 2013, 
241). One of the best known proponents of this notion, Schmitt speaks specifically to state 
exceptionalism and premises that the rule proves nothing, while the exception proves 
everything. He articulates that the exception not only proves the rule, but also that the rule is 
derived from it such that exceptionalism exerts both a philosophical and political primacy over 
the rules of ‘normal’ politics (Neal 2010, 57).  
Of clear relation to this discussion of securitisation is an aspect of exceptionalism which is 
developed in Schmitt’s 1922 work Political Theology and to which Andrew Neal refers as temporal 
exception. This speaks to a situation in which the existence of a state is fundamentally threatened 
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by a danger which exposes the limitations of orthodox politics and law. Falling beyond the 
capability of these institutions, Schmitt posits that treating with such existentially threatening 
situations warrants and legitimises a response which is beyond the law (Neal 2010, 58).  
This idea of exceptionalism informs securitisation theory in relation to the notion of the 
securitising move and is intertwined with the characterising textual feature of securitisation 
(Stritzel 2007, 360).  Invocation of security with the aims of adopting exceptional measures, is 
the action which takes an issue or threat beyond orthodox political procedures and couches it 
instead in terms of an exceptional form of, or beyond the scope of regular politics. These 
emergency measures, then, are accordingly, actions that are ‘outside the normal bounds of 
political procedure’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 23–24). 
Further discussing the success of a securitising move, ST states quite simply that ‘a successful 
securitisation thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency actions and 
effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules’ (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 26).   
While the effects on inter-unit relations speak to the theory’s way of accounting for  significance 
of a threat amongst other security issues and are therefore given some consideration, intra-unit 
relations are given far less attention by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, 25–26) – yet another 
symptom of the under-theorising of the role of the audience within ST.  
 
Problematising Emergency Measures in Securitisation Theory 
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In discussing the role of emergency measures in ST, Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2015, 504) 
problematise the lack of attention to power dynamics, arguing that understanding power 
relations helps to capture and explain the notion of how securitisation in this school has taken 
the form of questioning not what security is, but what it does. They point out firstly that 
securitising actors are quite often political elites and that the securitisation process enables them 
to reinforce and increase their power by firstly designating an existential threat, and in the 
context of the successful securitisation, how being granted special privileges to treat with this 
threat increases their power. They furthermore draw attention to the potential in analysing the 
pre-existing power configurations that the securitising actor and audience each bring to the 
interaction and how this in turn is able to preclude or enable processes of securitisation. These 
authors insightfully conclude that it is necessary to study these power dynamics as ‘they shape 
the distinctive ways of thinking, acting and the subject formation that precedes, accompanies 
and follows, processes of securitization’ (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 509).  
The very notion that extreme measures are a necessary part of the securitisation process has 
been questioned as being over-emphasised within the ST framework. Indeed, Felix Ciutǎ (2009, 
312) argues that exceptional measures may be the way that successful securitisation is enacted, 
however that it is not part of the securitisation process (moving from non-politicised to 
securitised). Tugba Basaran (2008, 340) meanwhile, has asserted that the actions taken as a result 
of a successful securitising move can at times be classified even as mundane or routine, if one 
were to consider them in terms of the bureaucracy of policy making. Other positions still, assert 
that especially in the context of unconventional security threats, ‘exceptional’ measures are not 
necessarily the  outcome or even the desired outcome of the securitising move and that these 
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non-traditional threats have the power to influence the way that security and by extension 
securitisation is conceptualised (Ciutǎ 2009, 309; Trombetta 2008, 589). Balzacq (2011a, 3) even 
offers a definition of securitisation which does not specify extreme measures, but rather the 
immediate undertaking of ‘customised policy’. As such, it is questionable to make exceptionality 
a yardstick in defining securitisation. 
The Paris School within which Balzacq’s pragmatic approach is situated, takes a distinctly 
bureaucratic approach to the field which is premised on the notion that there is a very strong link 
between security studies and security policy such that analysts and theorists have a direct impact 
on state policy (Paulauskas 2006, 222; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2015, 10; Innes 2015, 28; 
C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 449). The Paris School is well described by Ole Wæver (2004a, 11) as 
being ‘less oriented to discourse and more to all practices of agencies’. Balzacq, Leonard and 
Ruzicka (2015, 498) would concur with Wæver on this evaluation as they assert that while various 
theories of securitisation can be seen as deriving from the analytics of government, they diverge 
in the approach that they take in their analyses. Whilst the Copenhagen approach focuses on 
securitisation through speech act,  the Paris School can more accurately be characterised by its 
focus on securitisation through practice (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 517). 
The problem with these critiques is that they are premised on the idea of the state as a unitary, 
rational actor seeking to maximise national interest – an ontological position that is decidedly 
un-critical. This is problematic insofar as it simply does not hold with the reality of many 
postcolonial states with fractured democracies characterised by competing interest, or non-
democratic contexts where the aim may not be to go beyond the norm, but to create a norm, 
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construct discipline or reproduce a political order (Vuori 2008, 69–70). While these authors 
articulate the mundane or routine in terms of government or bureaucracy, there is interesting 
potential here for considering the measures taken as a result of securitisation in terms of the 
everyday. Especially taken in conjunction with the way that this intersects with considering 
unconventional security issues, this finds suitable application in this work as it considers the 
limitations of securitisation theory in explaining certain cultural aspects of the case study that do 
not align with bureaucratic administration.  
This chapter has thus far outlined  the Copenhagen School’s speech act approach to  theorising 
securitisation.   Whilst doing this, it has highlighted critiques of certain aspects of the theory: the 
underdevelopment of the audience, the silencing problem, the inattention to power 
configurations and the necessity of emergency measures. It shall now proceed to consider the  
pragmatic approach to securitisation, situated within the Paris School, where it shall further 
address  limitations of ST  and critiques of those limitations.
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Securitisation and this Study 
 
Securitisation theory is known for its primarily European character due to the founding influence 
of the Copenhagen School, despite Ole Wæver’s assertion that most work focusing on 
securitisation is currently being generated outside of Copenhagen  (Wæver 2004a, 13). Despite 
additional claims that Eurocentrism in ST is less powerful today (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 
2015, 507), application of securitisation theory still remains a largely, though not exclusively 
European exercise. Pinar Bilgin discusses the notion of this expanding presence of the theory, 
asserting that ‘there is no obvious reason to expect securitisation theory to have a significant 
presence outside of Western Europe’ (Bilgin 2011, 399) and supports this assertion with three 
points. 
Firstly, she asserts that one must consider the primacy of realism-informed, state-centric 
approaches in international relations, particularly as it relates to issues such as security, power 
and national interest. She argues that Copenhagen School diverges notably from these types of 
approaches, as a social constructivist approach is privileged in ST despite realist influence. 
Secondly, Bilgin (2011, 400–401) characterises the work of peripheral scholars as tending to be 
theoretically impoverished, relying instead on the unsystematic usage of an amalgam of 
arguments drawing on international history, area studies and international law amongst other 
subjects. Finally, acknowledgement is made of the Eurocentric origins of the approach and the 
inherent ethnocentrism which might make it less appealing to a global audience beyond Europe 
and North America. 
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In the face of this unlikelihood however, securitisation theory has made surprising strides in 
application amongst peripheral scholars and Bilgin provides an impressive list of works to 
illustrate this. With the exception of Turkey, the entire list is made up of studies of Asian and 
South Asian origin (Bilgin 2011, 401). Latin America – a region often merged with the Caribbean 
(hereafter referred to as the LAC regions to reflect this merge) – is meanwhile described as 
experiencing a dearth of theory-informed work. Tickner and Herz (2012, 93) who acknowledge 
this geographic conflation in their work, describe Latin American security studies as being of a 
‘non-theoretical and descriptive nature’ (2012, 107) and assert that: 
even when scholars set out to explore security ‘concepts’ and ‘theories’, what 
emerges in their stead are descriptive reflections on Latin American security 
dynamics and prescriptive recommendations. 
 (Tickner and Herz 2012, 93) 
 
This position seems to be incredibly lacking in perspective and begs the discussion of a field which 
needs to be decolonised. Robert Cox stated in 1981 that ‘theory is always for someone and some 
purpose’ (1981, 128). He explains that all theories are perspective driven and are informed by a 
political and social position in time and space. Furthermore he asserts that ‘social and political 
theory is always history-bound at its origin since it is always traceable to an historically 
conditioned awareness of certain problems and issues’ (1981, 128). Almost four decades later 
however, there still seems to be difficulty in appreciating this simple idea that context matters 
and that scholars in the developing world are entitled to begin with their historical experiences. 
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Following from this line of decolonial thinking on the geopolitics of knowledge, Ramon 
Grosfoguel (2002, 210) adds that ‘the global hegemonic colonial culture involves an intricate and 
uneven set of narratives with long histories that are re-enacted in the present through complex 
mediations’. The criticism of the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) regions as put forward by 
Bilgin, Tickner and Herz is a demand for the developing world to see itself through the European 
eyes which dominate the field in order for their perspective and their ways of knowing to be 
considered legitimate – to re-enact Eurocentrism. This is a reflection of the ‘implicit assumption 
that Western analytical concepts are both universally acceptable and unquestionably valid’ 
(Puchala 1997, 129). It is further, one which seems to ignore the fact  that ‘by far the most 
prominent and indeed the most powerful theme in Non-Western narrative today is 
emancipation’ (Puchala 1997, 131) and that for the LAC regions, this is inextricably linked not 
only to history, culture and identity but also to remedy of history’s colonial ills. The criticisms of 
provincial scholarship are therefore embedded in the hegemonic colonial narratives to which 
Grosfoguel refers. 
Speaking specifically to theoretical approaches to security, Wæver  (2004a, 25) advances that 
Latin America finds itself hesitant to proceed without caution in embracing theory which might 
widen the concept of security. This, given the region’s consciousness about the legacy of security 
rhetoric and repression in those states. He argues nonetheless that the Copenhagen School’s 
approach to securitisation especially vis-a-vis de-securitisation makes it one which should be 
attractive to that region’s scholars. Very little appears to have been said though on the Caribbean 
region specifically as regards use of theory in security studies, though this is likely related to the 
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fact that - as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this work – security as a whole is a much 
neglected academic field in the Caribbean.  
Nevertheless, one of the most recognised names in the limited field of Caribbean security 
scholarship is Ivelaw Griffith who speaks very intuitively on the topic of theory and Caribbean 
academic culture. He acknowledges the privileging of realism in security studies as well as the 
turn towards ‘unconventional (critical) lenses’ through which to view security in the Post-Cold 
War context. He continues to explain however, that this conceptual adaptation ‘has not been as 
striking for Caribbean security scholars, as non-conventionality has long been the convention’ 
(2004, 3).  It is in the spirit of Griffith’s words that this work shall seek to apply its chosen theories. 
This work engages strongly with Securitisation Theory in trying to account for Trinidad and 
Tobago’s absent terrorism narrative. It does so in shameless conjunction with a strong 
engagement with historical and contemporary social contexts and contingent material 
considerations. This approach invokes Walter Mignolo’s decolonial challenge, questioning ‘what 
are the connections between your body, bio-graphically and geo-historically, located in the 
colonial matrix of power and the issues you investigate?’ (Mignolo 2011, xxiv). Postcolonial 
scholar, Edward Said’s travelling theory is useful in reconciling these ideas. 
 Said posits that there are stages through which a theory travels. The first of these stages speaks 
to the origins of the theory and the context in which it was formulated. The second concerns 
itself with the spatial and temporal travels of that theory such that it comes to prominence in a 
different context from its origins. The third stage in Said’s theory considers the acceptance or 
resistance which that theory may face in its new context and the conditions which facilitate this. 
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The final stage however, is that which is most relevant to this discussion. Said asserts that in this 
stage: 
The now full (or partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is to some extent 
transformed by its new uses, its new position, in a new time and place  
(Said 1983, 226) 
 
In as far as the European political reality informed the development of securitisation theory in 
the genesis of its travels, so too shall the post-colonial political reality of Trinidad and Tobago 
inform its application in the context of this work and contribute to the evolution of that theory 
in its fourth stage of Said’s model. While the European history may have become naturalised and 
implicit in the theories being applied in this work, the Trinidadian history will be bold and 
unapologetically so in the analyses to come. As the following chapter shall elaborate, Agential 
Realism facilitates this, by allowing for the both the material and ideational aspects of the colonial 
experience to be brought to bear on the ensuing analyses. 
The Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory is one with tremendous analytical power, making 
its mark on the landscape of security studies.  This has not however granted it immunity from 
criticism nor is it an approach without limitations. A number of those limitations have been 
outlined in this  chapter: silencing, state-centrism, under-theorising of the impact and role of 
audiences, and the notion of exceptional measures. Indeed, one might argue that with the 
existing gaps in the theory ‘securitisation hides more than it helps us see’ (Aradau 2018, 300). 
Nevertheless, this work argues that securitisation theory can benefit from an approach which will 
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allow for the systematic integration of missing or invisible factors – one which is deeply 
committed to the notion that exclusions matter.  For this, Karen Barad’s Agential Realism is 
particularly  useful.  The following chapter shall outline Agential Realism and  highlight the ways 
in which it can be complementary to securitisation theory whilst also being particularly amenable 
to   a decolonial agenda.
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Chapter 2 
Agential Realism 
 
Trinidad and Tobago is a state with a growing security problem as far as terrorism is concerned. 
Nevertheless, until quite recently, a terrorism narrative for the state has been absent. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the various approaches to theorising securitisation are able to 
provide limited insights into this phenomenon as a result of current gaps in securitisation 
thinking. These gaps do not facilitate the meaningful integration of concepts like history and 
cultural identity, which are key factors in this case study. Consequently, this work argues that a 
framework is required which will allow for the systematic integration of these considerations into 
the existing thinking on securitisation. To integrate the discussion of exclusions into the analysis 
in a way that does not dispense with, but rather facilitates inclusion of the critical approaches, 
Karen Barad’s Agential Realism shall be employed.  
This theory, which falls under the general umbrella of New Materialisms, provides much to this 
work by way of its quantum thinking. This chapter shall proceed to elaborate this by focusing on 
three contributions which underpin this work: the equal consideration given to both the material 
and the ideational, diffraction, and as an extension of diffraction - hauntology. It will begin first 
by contextualising Agential Realism within New Materialisms in order to lay the ground for a 
discussion of how colonial history and in the Americas is one which finds the material and the 
ideational to be fundamentally entwined, such that this key to fully appreciating aspects of the 
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case study. It shall next delve briefly into the science behind the theory to discuss diffraction, as 
it is within the science that one sees how well suited this theory is for finding gaps, or ‘seeing 
absence’ as well as for integrating multiple perspectives. Finally it shall pay particular attention 
to the notion of hauntology, which plays a considerable role in this work. 
 
Quantum Thinking 
 
At times referred to as neo-materialism (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012c, 19), the term New 
Materialisms was coined in the late 1990s by two of the scholars still most closely associated with 
it – Rosi Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 48). It is an umbrella 
term for the emerging theoretical approaches which seek to give matter due consideration in 
how we make sense of the world. Coole and Frost explain the novelty of the term by 
acknowledging the traditional materialist heritage of the perspective, while also demonstrating 
how it addresses contemporary matters which are unprecedented and thus novel for the 
application of materialist approaches (Coole and Frost 2010, 4–5). This is according to Braidotti, 
one of the most important traits that contemporary materialism should possess (Dolphijn and 
van der Tuin 2012c, 20).  
While calls for a quantum social science are not at all new – reaching as far back as a century ago 
- it is only within the last thirty years that an actual shift in that direction has become visible for 
the study of politics. In the early 1990s  Theodore Becker’s Quantum Politics was published, which 
offered a range of different suggestions for quantising political issues, though none of them 
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appear to have become prominent (Tesař 2015, 492; Wendt 2015, 4). Bühlmann, Colman and van 
der Tuin (Bühlmann, Colman, and van der Tuin 2017, 47–49) in their examination of the 
genealogy of New Materialisms,  however, advance that one of its most important influences has 
also been the development and consideration of quantum thinking in the 20th Century.  
By understanding quantum thinking, Bühlmann et al (2017, 49–56) claim that we are able to 
achieve a state of quantum literacy. They describe this type of literacy as a cognitive faculty which 
allows us to express processes through quantum thinking. In so doing, former binaries 
established by classical thinking are dissolved as we dispense with previous givens and embrace 
a spectrum of possibilities. This literacy rejects identifying with any single truth, but rather 
concerns itself with pushing limits and sees transgressing on the formulaic as natural and 
necessary.  
In her discussion of post-colonialism and security, Pinar Bilgin (2017, 5–6) invokes Edward Said’s  
notion of  ‘contrapuntal awareness’ to speak to the way in which students of critical security 
studies could benefit from a multiplicity of perspectives in order to best rethink the limits and 
possibilities of theorising.  Post-colonialism and  quantum thinking can  already be seen as  allies 
in this regard, particularly in the context of this work which can be seen as transgressing on the 
formulaic nature  of Securitisation Theory. 
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Diffraction 
 
Diffraction is a very meaningful concept in this work. Not only does it provide a methodology 
extensively utilised throughout, as outlined in the Introductory chapter, but it also has a greater 
significance, for any critical scholar who is concerned with matters of exclusion – it allows us to 
understand how to see absence. In order to appreciate this special quality, it is necessary to 
engage briefly with the science behind Agential Realism – quantum physics. This section shall 
now contextualise diffraction in terms of particle-wave duality and the Two-Slit Experiment in 
order to explain this seeming paradox. 
 
Particle-Wave Duality 
Much of physics has concerned itself with the behaviour of light. Light was understood since the 
18th century as being characterised by its behaviour as a wave (Plotnitsky 2010, 161:46). This 
assumption had been well supported with the results of repeated experiments, however in the 
early 20th century the work of Arthur Compton found that light also showed the characteristics 
of particle-like behaviour (Nadeau and Kafatos 2001, 34). This was particularly problematic as 
waves and particles have very distinct properties - waves are continuous, spread out over space 
and time and are understood as extended, while particles are on the other hand, akin to a point 
- localised in space and time (Barad 2007, 100). How then could light exhibit the properties of 
both a wave and a particle? How might it be simultaneously local and extended? The answer to 
these questions is where this chapter’s journey to the concept of diffraction begins. 
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Physicists committed themselves to researching the unusual behaviour of light and came to 
conclusions that were no less perplexing. In 1924, de Broglie, in light of Compton’s discovery, 
conjectured that like light, matter also exhibited both wave and particle-like behaviour or wave-
particle duality – something he had believed even prior to Compton’s experiment (Kumar 2009, 
146). Erwin Schrodinger, engaged with de Broglie’s work and in turn, developed a description of 
‘matter-waves’ through a mathematical wave function which assumed their reality (Nadeau and 
Kafatos 2001, 34). Through the work of Schrodinger and William Hamilton (whose equations 
informed Schrodinger’s function) these waves can be plotted graphically, creating a visual 
depiction of an un-observable entity.  Schrodinger’s wave function, therefore mathematically 
allowed for scientists to have some limited knowledge about the location of a particle – the 
probability of finding that particle in a particular region and in a particular state.  
 In 1936, however, a year after Schrodinger’s development, Max Born recognised that in the 
classical sense, the wave function was not ‘real’ in so far as it was only based on assumptions of 
reality. He further asserted that the probability of locating a particle does not allow for precise 
prediction of the particle’s location – an assertion which was poorly received in the scientific 
community. The reception that Born’s position received was due to his definition of probability 
not being one which fit into the deterministic classical understanding of neatly assessing the 
overall behaviour of systems. This unobservable wave function was mathematically able to 
predict the probability of certain events happening, yet it was in practice, experimentally unable 
to predict the specific event that would happen – which of course does not follow a strict 
deterministic logic (Nadeau and Kafatos 2001, 34–36; Kumar 2009, 213–19). Einstein himself 
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thusly described the wave function as a ghost field which represented not a ‘real’ (observable) 
matter wave but rather a probabilistic reality (Nadeau and Kafatos 2001, 36). 
 
The Two-Slit Experiment 
 
One of the easiest ways to elaborate the wave-particle dualism outlined previously, is through 
an experiment called the 2-slit experiment. As it is central to Niels Bohr’s philosophy physics, 
understanding it is essential to a reading of Karen Barad’s theory of Agential Realism. This 
experiment began first, as a thought experiment in an extended debate between Einstein and 
Bohr and its various iterations (and its later actual performances when technology allowed) bring 
us to a point of understanding the various aspects and dynamics of Barad’s approach. 
In the previous section, light was described as being a focus within the study of physics and it was 
explained as exhibiting both particle and wave behaviour. The original double split experiment, 
done using light was conducted at the start of the 19th century by Thomas Young and was 
intended to resolve whether light behaved as a particle, or as a wave travelling through some 
hypothetical medium. In theory, it was believed that the experiment could be conducted using 
any type of quantum object but in this regard functioned only as a thought experiment until the 
1960s when it was first conducted using matter -  electrons (Plotnitsky 2010, 161:47).   
For the purposes of this chapter an idealised conception of this experiment will consider the 
behaviour of electrons in showing matter’s particle-wave duality, as it is noted for its ability to be 
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explained qualitatively without reliance on quantum knowledge (Plotnitsky 2010, 161:47). One 
must visualise the apparatus of this experiment as two screens set up with one directly in front 
of the other with an electron gun pointed at them.  The first screen contains two slits and the 
second screen serves as a detector which will record a bright spot where an electron impacts it.  
When the experiment is first conducted, only a single slit on the first screen is open. A beam of 
electrons is fired and the particles pass through the slit in the first screen and hit the second one. 
The pattern of bright spots formed on the detector screen shows a concentration of hits directly 
opposite the slit. This pattern – called a scatter pattern - is characteristic of particle behaviour; 
consistent with the idea of matter as a particle.  
When the experiment is repeated with both slits open however, the results differ. The pattern 
that appears on the screen is not the expected scatter pattern seen previously, but one of 
alternating bands of bright spots where there was an impact on the detector screen and darkness 
where there was not. This second pattern is referred to as an interference pattern and is a 
product of diffraction (Nadeau and Kafatos 2001, 47).  
 
The Diffraction Pattern 
 
Diffraction is an important concept in this study. It is Barad’s method in the theory of Agential 
Realism which shall be examined later in this chapter, and is applied extensively throughout this 
work. The method is an analogy for diffraction as it is understood in physics. In scientific terms, 
diffraction is a wave property. It has to do with the behaviour of waves when they encounter an 
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obstacle and bend around it (Barad 2007, 74) – in the case of this 2-slit apparatus, the behaviour 
of waves when they hit the first screen. 
In the 2-slit experiment a wave would encounter the screen and then diffractively make its way 
through the slits by splitting. Once on the other side of the slits, these new multiple waves would 
continue to propagate their energy forward, overlapping and interfering with each other as they 
do. There are multiple types of interference taking place in this dynamic - constructive and 
destructive. Where the waves are superposed such that the trough of one wave coincides with 
the crest of another, the two cancel each other out – this is destructive interference. The result 
is no impact on the detector screen for destructive interference; accounting for the dark bands. 
Where the crests of waves line up, constructive interference takes place, the amplitude of the 
wave is increased and this registers on the detector screen, resulting in the formation of the 
bright bands (Barad 2007, 102). This presence of this interference pattern indicates wave-like 
behaviour and illustrates that matter, like light shows particle-wave duality (Nadeau and Kafatos 
2001, 19). 
It is the patterns of interference however that are of interest to this work – constructive and 
destructive interference. Constructive interference, where the amplitude of a wave increases 
maps abundance – where similarities or familiarities accumulate. Destructive interference – 
where a cancelling out takes place, maps absence. For there to be abundance, there must also 
be absence, as they are a product of the same phenomenon. Diffraction by definition therefore 
can be seen as concerned with exclusion and furthermore, with exclusion of which we are 
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necessarily aware. This can be clarified further through considering the concept of 
complementarity. 
 
Complementarity 
 
Physicists continued to be perplexed by the outcome of the 2-Slit Experiment as they were simply 
unable, according to classical physics, to be able to account for the diffraction pattern. Einstein 
continued his thought experiments with Bohr, positing that if we were to modify the apparatus, 
placing an observation instrument at the slits - – a which-slit detector- one would necessarily 
capture the particle going through one slit or the other and would therefore be able to observe 
the particles behaving like waves. Niels Bohr however rebutted that should an observation take 
place, a scatter pattern rather than an interference pattern would emerge – particles would be 
seen to be behaving as they should (Kumar 2009, 268–70). When physicists were finally able to 
conduct this experiment some years later using even larger particles - atoms instead of electrons 
- their results vindicated Bohr. When observed, the particles ceased to exhibit wave-like 
behaviour and returned to exhibiting particle-like behaviour – measurement played a 
fundamental role in determining the nature of the entity being observed. (Barad 2007, 267–68).  
This puzzle begs the question of how the particle appears to materialise in one state or the other 
when it passes through the slit and leaves a corresponding impact on the detector screen. To 
address this, the concept of complementarity must be explored. For Bohr, entities do not exist 
with a complete set of properties as assumed in the Newtonian classical understanding, but are 
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instead ontologically indeterminate. He believed that the ‘total’ reality of a quantum system is 
both wave and particle and that understanding this totality required a logic that departed from 
the classical understanding that entities were ontologically either wave or particle. 
Complementarity was the logical framework which he developed to explain this (Barad 2007).  
The logic of complementarity argues that particle and wave are constructs which represent 
profound oppositions, each of whose existence precludes the other’s in a given context. Only one 
can be applied in a single instance, however both are necessary in order to understand the 
totality of the situation (Nadeau and Kafatos 2001, 43). Wave and particle are therefore best 
understood as ‘mutually exclusive, yet complementary aspects of the same phenomenon’ 
(Kumar 2009, 242). Similarly, any entity will have a pair of complementary variables – 
determinate and indeterminate - and there will never be a situation in which all properties will 
simultaneously have determinate values. Complementarity is therefore closely linked to 
exclusion. 
Complementary variables require mutually exclusive sets of apparatus in order for one or the 
other to become defined, so it is the specificity of the experimental apparatus that is key here 
(Barad 2007, 19–20). Measurement for Bohr, facilitates interactions with particular apparatuses 
that allow certain properties of an entity to become determinate at the exclusion of others.  
Putting a detector at the slit would result in an interaction between the specific measurement 
apparatus and the entity being observed, which would produce a determinate ontological 
outcome of particle-like behaviour.  
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What we can discern from this exclusionary logic of complementarity is the shape of absence. By 
looking at the features of what has materialised, and the specificity of the apparatus which has 
enabled this materialisation, we are also able to get an impression of what is not there. If we are 
able to see both what is there and what is not, then we become aware of multiple stories, and 
move towards the contrapuntal awareness that Bilgin  (2017, 5–6) endorses for pushing the 
boundaries of theorising security. 
As this chapter moves into a place of seeing things that are not there and discerning shapes in 
empty spaces it seems only natural to proceed into the section on Hauntology. This section shall 
start with a brief discussion on time before returning to the science to consider a different type 
of diffraction and what it allows us to understand about time and by extension, history. 
 
Hauntology 
 
Time is a consistent theme throughout this work as it makes its argument for due consideration 
of history, identity and culture. Later chapters shall examine time in unconventional ways as they 
explore the way that these factors have been brought to bear on the present and meaningfully 
contribute to explaining the absence of a terrorism narrative  for Trinidad and Tobago. 
Time 
 
A good starting point for this part of the discussion is Walter Benjamin’s notion of Homogenous 
Empty Time. Benjamin’s approach to the concept of history derives from a critique of the concept 
72 
 
of progress as seen in the ideology of social democracy, as well as an objection to the naturalistic 
approach to historicism. Starting with the latter, this refers to Benjamin’s philosophical position 
on the common understanding of history as linear and based on causality such that there is 
temporal continuity between past, present and future (Osborne and Charles 2015). This 
approach, steeped in positivism, fails to see history as ongoing, and a product of immanent 
differentiations, reducing temporal differentiation to the new reproducing the old in a series of 
structurally similar processes. This notion of time is clock measured – all moments are equivalent 
and empty – this is Homogenous Empty Time (HET) (Robinson 2013; Taylor 2016, 207). 
To add a political layer to this philosophical one, Benjamin sees the consequence of temporal 
naturalism vis-a-vis progress to be conformism. This is to say that the determinist nature of 
causality is necessarily conformist and antithetical to progress. Indeed, Benjamin considered this 
to be the time of capitalism and so Marxism and its dialectic approach was for him tarnished by 
this mentality of linear progress. For Benjamin then, determinism was demobilising and an 
obstacle. He asserted that historical materialism was better articulated in terms of interruption 
rather than of progress – interrupting the vacuous sameness of linearity that characterised 
historical determinism would be the source of revolution and change (Osborne and Charles 2015; 
Taylor 2016, 207). Benjamin took as a personal goal the development of a new philosophy of 
historical time – quantum physics gives us a basis to consider a new philosophy. 
 
Temporal Diffraction 
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Returning to the science, this section considers another iteration of the 2-slit experiment in order 
to contextualise the contribution of quantum physics to a new conceptualisation of time. The 
previously described versions of the experiment have all seen slits which were separated in space 
– they were both available at the same time but not in the same location and facilitated spatial 
diffraction. Consider a different configuration of the apparatus. Rather than a stationary screen 
with 2 slits which an electron beam encounters, there is instead a spinning disc. This disc 
alternates slits and shutters such that while there are still multiple slits they are no longer all 
available to the electron beam simultaneously – they are temporally rather than spatially 
separated, a configuration which facilitates temporal diffraction (Barad 2017, 66–67).  
In such a configuration, the expected outcome is rather like it was when the electrons were shot 
through a single slit – that they would form a scatter pattern on the recording screen when they 
passed through an available slit or alternatively bounce off of a shutter and not be recorded at 
all. On the contrary however, a diffraction pattern emerges. In the previous 2-slit experiment this 
was articulated in terms of the ontological indeterminacy of the particle, in this case – the 
diffraction pattern is representative of the ontological indeterminacy of time - it shows different 
times overlapping and bleeding into each other (Barad 2017, 67–68). In this, lies the opportunity 
to question the linearity of classical understandings of time, where one moment is complete 
before another begins.  
Other configurations of this experiment, such as the Quantum Eraser Experiment in which the 
results (particle or wave properties) could be undone after the fact by merely erasing the 
measurement, also render strange our understandings of time. That version of the experiment 
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allows for us to question linear causal configurations where time progresses only in one direction 
and where one moment is complete before another starts (Barad 2017, 71–73). This notion of 
temporal discontinuity (Barad 2007, 234) again lends itself to what Benjamin hoped to achieve 
in terms of understandings of history based on non-linear philosophies. 
Reminiscent of Einstein’s probabilistic ghost field, Barad argues that the results of these 
experiments – especially of the Quantum Eraser experiment – can be seen as the past never 
having been determined in the first place, but always open and yet to come. Returning to the 
spinning-reel experiment – all versions of the event are superpositioned. The world, for Barad is 
linked together by woven moments in time - temporal entanglements of past, present and future 
such that there is no specified point in time in which an event is taking place. Superpositioning in 
this case is of all possible histories – or space-time configurings - multiple histories entangled 
with the present and the future –  a past that is happening (Barad 2017, 67–69; 2007, 234).  
 
Ghosts in the Field 
 
Jacques Derrida is credited for coining the term Hauntology in his lectures, and consequent book 
entitled Specters of Marx. Derrida argues that the dead are not simply dead and gone, but rather 
that ‘he who has disappeared, appears still to be there and his apparition is not nothing. It does 
not do nothing’ (Derrida 1994, 97). This conceptualisation of haunting immediately troubles 
conventional understandings of time as moving forward in tiny complete intervals, as Derrida 
advances that the ghostly displace themselves such that although haunting is necessarily 
75 
 
historical, it is not  fixed to a specific moment in time or assigned to a calendar date (Derrida 
1994, 4). We are reminded here of  Barad’s discussion of temporal diffraction – showing the way 
in which moments in time could be seen as bleeding into each other in the materialisation of our 
reality. Haunting then, according to Derrida can be seen as occupying this sort of indeterminate 
time, while having material effects on our world. Absence then can be seen as meaningful.  
Derrida speaks to the negative regard in which ghosts are held, continuing to suggest that this is 
a misplaced hostility (Derrida 1994, 47–48). Instead, he advances that living well is learning to 
live with and in conversation with ghosts, a practice which he asserts is part of the pursuit of 
justice in what amounts to ‘a politics of memory, of inheritance and of generations’ (Derrida 
1994, xviii–xix). In order to ‘live well’ in this way, Derrida (1994, 108) posits that what is required 
is positive conjuration -  that is to say, a conjuring of ghosts which is welcoming and hospitable, 
as opposed to intending to call them up in order to exorcise them. This is a process which he 
asserts is necessarily and fundamentally linked to anxiety, as with these specters come their 
ability to ‘charge’, ‘accuse’, ‘assign’ and indebt’ the current generation.  
This anxiety, which lays in necessarily having to answer for and account to the dead, Derrida 
describes as ‘properly revolutionary’ (1994, 109) in its call to action. The past then is not only 
present  in these overlapping moments and affecting the here and now, but has implications for 
the future  and implications for justice – a perspective with which Barad (2007, 236) concurs.  
Furthermore, Derrida asserts that while pondering the name for his lectures, he found himself 
preoccupied with the way in which hegemony was tied to haunting, insofar as it organises the 
repression which necessitates the haunting in the first place. He concludes that ‘haunting belongs 
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to the structure of every hegemony’ (Derrida 1994, 37) and that the positive conjuration of ghosts 
is certainly an alliance which lends itself to neutralising hegemony and disrupting or overturning 
a power structure (Derrida 1994, 48). These ideas can be seen as further elaborated in the work 
of sociologist Avery Gordon (2008), whose work on Hauntology has been suggested to be as 
influential as Derrida’s on the topic.   
Not unlike Derrida, Gordon claims that the presence and impacts of abusive systems of power  
which are supposedly no more, make themselves known through hauntings. These hauntings, 
she argues, defamiliarise a situation which allows the invisible to become visible (Gordon 2008, 
xvi–xvii). To link this back to discussions of diffraction – the familiarity of abundance in 
constructive interference is disrupted, allowing for those things cancelled out and rendered 
invisible through destructive interference to make their presence felt. Gordon  (2008, xvii) further 
explains that in a haunting, the social-subjective aspects are neither to be considered epi-
phenomenal, nor as disentangled from the political economy of the oppressive situation. This 
resonates strongly with the LAC decolonial approaches highlighted earlier in this work which 
centralise the combined social and material experience of colonialism. 
Gordon (2008, 12–13) elaborates this further by recognising that these entangled aspects are to 
be understood in the context of a history which is not over and asserts that writing stories of 
exclusion and invisibility is writing stories of real ghosts which produce material effects on our 
world (2008, 17). Indeed, like Derrida, she recognises the radical potential of haunting to create 
change such that through a history which is ‘alive and accessible to encounter’ there exists a 
‘chance in the fight for the oppressed past’ (Gordon 2008, 65) and to ‘fix and transform a 
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troubling situation’ (Gordon 2008, 22). Agential Realism therefore provides us, a theory which 
allows for these unconventional understandings of time and the potential change that come with 
them, to be systematically integrated into theories of securitisation through a diffractive 
methodology. 
 
Diffraction as Methodology 
 
Barad (2007, 23–24) believes that a rigorous examination, elaboration and extension of Bohr’s 
philosophy-physics provides an excellent foundation for theorising the social and the natural 
together. The science, she believes, provides us with the ontological and epistemological basis 
for questioning old ideas or ‘givens’ not for the purpose of rejecting them on principle, but in 
order to read our new understandings through our best social and political theories and reassess 
how we underestimate social phenomena. Barad advocates doing this, by using a diffractive 
methodology that clarifies their relationship.  
As previously outlined, diffraction in physics is related to interference and as a mapping of that 
interference, it speaks to differences rather than exclusively to sameness, highlighting the 
potential for identifying absences and being informed by those absences in attempting to create 
change (Haraway 1997, 16; Barad 2007, 72). Diffractive reading as a methodology allows integral 
aspects of each oeuvre to emerge and foster constructive and meaningful intersectional 
discourse. By (re)reading different perspectives through each other, scholars are able to explore 
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relations of difference and their implications. This has the potential to illuminate insightful 
patterns which only emerge if difference, which materialises as absence, is given due 
consideration (Barad 2007, 71; Kleinmann 2012, 80). It therefore enables researchers to better 
consider the totality of what they are attempting to study rather than only the patterns which 
appear through relations of similarity or constructive interference.  
Recalling  from the introduction to this work that diffraction does not consider sameness and 
difference to be binary opposites, but rather as entangled complementary parts of the same 
phenomenon (Bozalek and Zembylas 2017, 115), the methodology creates opportunity to 
theorise old ideas alongside the new in a productive way, focusing on what each theoretical 
apparatus materialises that the other might exclude in any given phenomenon. This work 
strongly takes the position that exclusions matter and that there are ethical implications for 
exclusions, particularly in security issues1. In applying theory to the case study diffractively, it will 
therefore attempt to show how these exclusions matter in our (in)ability to meaningfully answer 
research questions using only approaches to securitisation which currently form the orthodoxy 
within critical security studies.  
Furthermore, for Barad, it is not merely the diffraction patterns themselves that are of import, 
but what they represent. As waves are not physical entities, but motion which manifests 
physically via the medium through which it moves, the interference patterns which waves create, 
and the differences which those patterns represent, illustrate more than merely the differences 
themselves, but also the effects of those differences on our material world (Barad 2007, 72). 
                                                     
1 It is also for this reason that in the previous chapter Balzacq’s integrative approach to security was favoured and 
shall be employed heavily in the chapters that follow. 
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Giving due consideration to differences then allows us to recognise what effects differences 
might have on our material world and the consequent realities and experiences of those who are 
rendered invisible by exclusions. 
 
Phenomena and Intra-action 
 
Taking cues from the ontological lessons of Quantum Physics, Barad (2007, 139) asserts that the 
world is made up of phenomena such that the phenomenon is ontologically indeterminate and 
the smallest unit of analysis, as opposed to the classical notion of independent objects with well-
defined properties. Following from the lessons of Bohr’s philosophy-physics, she describes 
phenomena as the inseparability of agentially intra-acting components – that is to say that her 
theory understands the components of a phenomenon as being ontologically entangled and 
engaged in a type of co-constitutive process (Barad 2007, 77). Furthermore, for Barad, 
phenomena are more than mere products of deliberate human activity and design, but rather, 
they are complex interactions involving multiple apparatuses which may not necessarily involve 
humans at all.  
These components of a phenomenon - like the phenomenon itself - are  also ontologically 
indeterminate to begin with – as the assumption is that entities are the sum of all of their 
possibilities to start, until some form of measurement results in specific properties emerging. 
Meaningful embodied concepts only emerge from phenomena through an apparatus’ 
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contextually specific configuration intra-acting with an indeterminate ‘object’. The 
entanglement, produces a particular materialisation of a concept. This approach therefore 
facilitates what Barad calls an onto-epistemology – the entanglement of what we know about 
the world and how we come to know it. This resonates well with the auto-ethnographic 
undertones of this work. 
 
Apparatus 
 
As explained previously, in Bohr’s work, the configuration of the apparatus is key to which 
properties of a phenomenon become determinate when measured – that is to say, the material 
form that an entity takes.  As they play such an imperative role in this theory and how it sees the 
world in its constant state of becoming, it is important to examine the concept of the apparatus 
in greater detail. The apparatus in Agential Realism is a phenomenon in and of itself, as this is the 
smallest ontological unit within the theory.  The configuration of any apparatus is therefore  the 
outcome of some material-discursive practice where all possible configurations  of the apparatus 
were eventually reduced to one  meaningful concept, now imbued with its own material-
discursive agency.  
Bohr describes apparatuses as ‘macroscopical material arrangements through which particular 
concepts are given definition, to the exclusion of others, and through which particular 
phenomena with particular determinate physical properties are produced’ (Barad 2007, 142). 
Barad however departs from Bohr insofar as his interpretation of an apparatus seems to be 
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limited in scope and quite anthropocentric. Instead she argues that beyond the simple notion of 
a neutral observing instrument, the apparatus is a boundary drawing practice. The role that the 
apparatus plays in the intra-action is not detached and as relatively passive as one might think. 
Not only do they ‘emerge in time, but they iteratively reconfigure spacetimematter as part of the 
ongoing dynamism of becoming’ (Barad 2007, 142). That is to say, the apparatus for Barad has 
vitality and plays an active role in materialising our world. 
In a point of departure from Bohr’s approach, Barad takes issue with what she finds to be residual 
anthropocentrism. She therefore identifies a series of features which define the apparatus within 
agential realism: that they are material discursive practices as opposed to mere configurations of 
equipment, that they are themselves productive phenomena -  producing differences that matter  
while themselves being open ended and produced by the phenomena with which they are 
engaged and that they are not located within the world but rather, are dynamic material 
configurations of the world which (re)configure spatiality and temporality (Barad 2007, 147).. 
Each chapter of this work examines the way in which a variety of apparatuses materialise a reality 
which facilitates Trinidad and Tobago’s absent terrorism narrative. 
In her engagement with the concept of discourse as it relates to practice, Barad finds it necessary 
to explore the concept of performativity. She finds that even within popular accounts of 
performativity however, there remains an anthropocentric bias and therefore has sought to read 
Butler and Foucault’s accounts diffractively through each other in an attempt to come to a 
version of performativity which more adequately accounts for the relationship between the 
material and the discursive in her definition of the apparatus (Barad 2007, 145–46). 
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Realism: Representationalism and Performativity 
 
Barad (2007, 97) takes a non-representationalist position on scientific realism; which is to say 
that she rejects the ontological belief in the distinction between representations and the 
represented, wherein the represented is characterised as possessing an independently existing 
reality, which precedes the representation. Put simply, she rejects the notion of ontological 
determinacy espoused by classical approaches. Drawing on Rouse, Barad (2007, 48–49)  asserts 
that this duality hearkens back to Descartes. Representation might thereby be seen as a Cartesian 
by-product, where there exists a division between the internal (representations) and the external 
(that which is represented) such that the internal is privileged by virtue of the knower’s access to 
their own mind. Barad encourages an abandonment of this Cartesian doubt which questions our 
access to knowledge about the external world, opting instead for a performative approach.  
Performativity questions the dichotomy between representation and represented, focusing 
instead on the practices which generate representations, the productive effects of those 
practices and the conditions necessary for them to be effective. For Barad (2007, 135), this focus 
on doings and actions highlights issues of ontology, materiality and agency. Through this lens of 
performativity, representationalism is characterised as the residue of a multiplicity of entangled 
practices of engagement – discursive practice is a key consideration in this regard. 
Discourse  is not quite simply another word for language, it is rather that which gatekeeps what 
can be said. Discursive practices therefore have a legitimising capacity in defining what does or 
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does not count as meaningful. Meaningful statements in this context are not reduced to mere 
speech acts of a unified subject, rather, both statement and subject emerge from a dynamic and 
varied field. (Barad 2007, 146–47). Citing Foucault, Barad explains that discursive practices are 
the ‘local sociohistorical material conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary knowledge 
practices...’ and ‘produce, rather  than merely describe the subjects and objects’ (2007, 147) of  
Agential realism looks at the way in which these discursive practices are entangled in causal 
relationships with specific material phenomena (Barad 2007, 139).  Linking discourse back to 
apparatuses, Barad sees apparatuses as discursive practices. This speaks to their boundary-
drawing capacity insofar as they are the material conditions of possibility and impossibility  of 
mattering – their agential cuts enact what matters and what is excluded in their function as a 
diffraction grating. These agential cuts are what determines which set of variables materialise at 
the expense of which others (Barad 2007, 148). We can see therefore how agential realism 
immediately looks to the previously discussed quantum concepts of ontological indeterminacy, 
complementarity and entanglement. 
We are now familiarised with two of the main components of Barad’s theory of Agential Realism 
– the phenomenon and the apparatus and the importance of ontological indeterminacy to each 
of them. We shall now look further at the dynamic which energises the relationship between 
these components – intra-action. 
 
Intra-Action 
 
84 
 
Intra-Action is the central dynamic of this theory, in that it facilitates material reality coming into 
being. That is to say, that through agential intra-actions ‘boundaries and properties of the 
components of phenomena become determinate and that particular concepts (that is particular 
material articulations of the world) become meaningful’ (Barad 2007, 139). Intra-actions  are able 
to do this by enacting agential cuts (as opposed to orthodox Cartesian cuts) which allow for these 
concepts to emerge. According to Barad (2007, 139–40), the apparatus – allows for agential cuts 
to be enacted within the phenomenon and these cuts in turn, allow for ontological indeterminacy 
to be resolved within the specific context of that phenomenon. Agential cuts then, facilitate the 
condition of exteriority within the phenomenon which in turn creates an alternative for the 
classical ontological condition of objectivity. 
What this means is that agential cuts effect agential separability between the entangled parts of 
the process and allow for the single materialisation  of a concept which is valid for that specific 
intra-action. Barad (2007, 394) describes this process as ‘a cutting together apart’, which refers 
to a single act (as opposed to sequential ones) that simultaneously entangles and differentiates. 
Once this agential separability has been achieved, a causal structure is enacted amongst the 
phenomenon’s components. Measurement is therefore seen in this sense, to be a causal intra-
action.  
This notion of synchronicity rather than linear causality seems counter-intuitive, however recall 
of Bohr’s rebuttal of the EPR paper is useful here. In a rejection of the principle of locality - any 
effects on particle A instantaneously affect particle B within the same entangled system. This 
allows for both entanglement and differentiation – both the materialisation of the concept and 
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the disentanglement from the apparatus – to happen simultaneously. The entanglement 
instantaneously (as opposed to consequently) enacts the agential cut which produces the 
differentiation that separates the pair. By virtue of its focus on entanglement, this dynamic 
therefore provides grounds for challenging the dominance of traditional understandings of 
causality, linearity and duality in traditional approaches to International Relations (Barad 2007, 
140). 
 It is imperative to note that this process of differentiation through intra-action, following from 
the lessons of Bohr’s complementarity, necessarily materialises certain properties or features at 
the exclusion of others. For this reason, one must consider the implications of intra-actions – 
what is being excluded and how those exclusions matter. Accordingly, Barad (2007, 381) 
elaborates her onto-epistemology into an ethico-onto-epistemology. This notion of exclusions 
that matter is a crucial consideration of this work and shall be woven into the analyses 
throughout the following chapters.  
Having now been equipped with the theoretical tools for dissecting the case study, this work shall 
proceed to analysis. The following four chapters are separated into two sections – politics and 
culture. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the role of international and domestic politics in the absence 
of a terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the specific cultural 
idiosyncrasies of Trinidad and Tobago which play an integral part in understanding the security 
culture of that state and, by extension, why a terrorism narrative never developed there. In 
keeping with the spirit of this chapter, and indeed the overall essence of this work, it shall be 
seen that this is an artificial delineation as the two sections are deeply entangled.  The insights 
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gained from each part of this work must be read through the other in order to address the 
research questions. These shall be examined after the analysis of the case study and will show 
how unless the discipline of IR is further diversified, it shall remain, ultimately, impoverished. 
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Chapter 3 
Hemispheric Hegemony and the 
Unexpected Absent Narrative 
 
Having moved on from theoretical considerations, this work now proceeds to examine the 
case – the absentee terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago.  This chapter is the first of 
two which examine the political considerations. It will be exploring the absence of an 
international terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago despite the islands’ history with 
terrorism and despite being in the ‘backyard’ of the self-appointed global guarantor of 
security – the United States (US). It will be followed up by a complementary chapter which 
addresses domestic narratives. 
This chapter demonstrates how US policy makers have acted as the securitising actors for the 
Western Hemisphere since that state’s inception, articulating threats ranging from European 
colonialism, to communism, to narco-terrorism. Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
territories have been recipients of the exceptional measures that came with those 
securitisations however the regions have typically been conflated in the process. This chapter 
is concerned with that conflation and will show how it is a product of US grand strategy, which 
has ultimately led to the absentee terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago.  
 Although some scholars such as Buzan and Wæver (2003) consider the Caribbean to be a part 
of North America in terms of security regions the Caribbean is quite often included in broader 
considerations of Latin America by scholars, states and organisations alike. China for example 
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has been described as having abstracted its Latin American policies onto the Caribbean in its 
penetration into the region (The Caribbean Council 2019). Tickner and Herz were also 
identified earlier in this work as recognising this geographic conflation and indeed they 
literally bracketed the Caribbean into their consequent discussion on the use of theory by 
Latin American scholars (Tickner and Herz 2012, 93). Additionally, Hillman (2003, 8) identifies 
the way in which Latin American regional scholars tend to speak of the Caribbean in terms of 
the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, excluding the anglophone and francophone territories. 
Meanwhile, the OECD, declaring the success of its 20-year relationship with the ‘LAC region’ 
highlights that relations have never been stronger than they are now. Nevertheless, it was 
only in 2018 that the organisation began to develop ‘sub-regional programmes’ due to 
‘recognising the heterogeneity of the region’ (OECD 2018). 
Following from this starting point, the chapter shall look at the ways in which US hegemonic 
narratives have always lumped the Caribbean in with Latin America, denying it the 
individuality and agency to be recognised as a source of potential threat. The position that 
shall be put forward is that the US’ grand strategy has, over time, produced and reproduced 
security narratives that frame the Latin America-Caribbean (LAC) regions in a particular way, 
at the expense of recognising that they are far from being a monolith. The chapter will show 
how through implementing grand strategy, the US has created an enduring hegemonic 
security narrative for the western hemisphere. The most recent iteration of this narrative sees 
the LAC regions in terms of transnational-organised crime – particularly with regards to narco-
trafficking.  
The chapter advances that this narrative has subjugated other competing security narratives 
such as the terrorism narrative. Terrorism has been a major concern of the US since the 
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terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Colucci 2018, 135; Bobea 2009, 92), informing much 
of its foreign policy concerns. Nevertheless, radicalism was able to flourish invisibly nearby, 
never being problematised until it was actively part of a global terror threat. It will be posited 
in this chapter, that as a result of the way in which the global terrorism narrative (as a 
hegemonic security narrative informed by grand strategy) has been framed, it too tends to be 
exclusionary in informing who is perceived as a terrorist threat. It is the nature of these  
combined exclusions that this work will ultimately argue, results in Trinidad and Tobago not 
having been securitised within the global terrorism narrative. 
The chapter shall proceed through this discussion by first outlining grand strategy during 
several key eras of US history. It does this chronologically by looking at the way in which it is 
manifested in early American expansionism, then in Cold War (CW) Relations, and post-Cold 
War Relations which have been focused on the War on Drugs. It will then look at how that 
well-established and enduring narrative has interacted with the global terrorism narrative 
which emerged after 2001. In so doing, this work will rationalise the absence of Trinidad and 
Tobago within the global hegemonic narrative on terrorism embodied in the War on Terror.   
Despite this chronological approach, used for organisational signposts, this work takes as its 
position that there is continuity across the history of US grand strategising which informs its 
security narratives regardless of administration. To identify this common thread, it is more 
effective to abstract outwards to these broad periods in time, rather than focusing on the 
character of grand strategy of specific presidencies, of which there are too many to consider 
in this work. By reading the insights gained from and about the two hegemonic narratives (on 
drugs and terrorism) through each other, the discussion will then move to analysis. It will 
apply theoretical frameworks to consider how despite the continuity in the character of US 
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grand strategy, the primacy of one narrative nevertheless resulted in the subjugation of the 
other, ultimately allowing for the absence of Trinidad and Tobago in the global terrorism 
narrative.  
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United States Grand Strategy and Security in the LAC 
Regions 
 
In order to engage with the way in which US grand strategy has led to an overarching security 
narrative for the LAC regions, it is imperative to first understand what the term means. This 
is by no means a simple task, as, like many concepts in the discipline of International Relations, 
there fails to be a single universally accepted definition (Balzacq, Dombrowski, and Reich 
2019, 66; Brands 2014, 1).  This work will be adopting Peter Feaver’s simple description of 
grand strategy, as referring to: 
[T]he collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to 
harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance 
that state’s national interest. Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and 
means. It involves purposive action — what leaders think and want. Such action 
is constrained by factors leaders explicitly recognize … and by those they might 
only implicitly feel… 
(Feaver 2009) 
In the case of the US, grand strategy is quite often linked in the literature to history and to US 
exceptionalism (Colucci 2018, 140; Benjamin 1987, 91). It is also, by virtue of the link to the 
desires of leaders, that it is often articulated in terms of individual administrations. Keeping 
the above definition in mind, this chapter will argue that notwithstanding the various 
administrations, exceptionalism has proven a consistent thread across the various iterations 
of grand strategy in US history. It will now proceed to examine the character of that thread, 
in terms of the overall character of grand strategising at different periods in history in order 
to speak to overarching narratives of the LAC regions. 
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Early American Expansionism 
 
As a Caribbean IR scholar, it is not uncommon to hear the US described as the proxy for British 
colonialism in the New World (Palmer 1998, 8; Watson 1980, 30). This can be seen not only 
in its early foreign policy, but also in its early domestic policy with regards to expansionism. 
Not unlike Europe, US expansionism was rife with imperialism and racism based on pseudo-
science. This informed US actions in so far as they not only articulated the superiority of the 
Anglo Saxon over others, but simultaneously asserted that it was their responsibility to 
provide others with their leadership. This responsibility was articulated in terms of divine 
mission – the nation was ordained by God in its destiny to expand (Maingot and Lozano 2005, 
5; Horsman 1994, 43–44; Livingstone 2009, 6). American exceptionalism and by extension US 
expansionism can therefore be seen as an entanglement between the ideational racist 
imaginary and the material territories and bodies in the ‘New World’ with which it engaged. 
 
Manifest Destiny 
 
Coined in the mid-19th Century, Manifest Destiny is the term often used to refer to this notion.  
It is the basis of American exceptionalism which informs its ‘altruistic and virtuous mission’ 
(Muno and Brand 2014, 380) or destiny rather, to expand its dominion and spread democracy 
and capitalism across the Americas. Indeed, B.H Liddell Hart, one of the most prominent 
names in work on grand strategy, asserts that ideology is one of its fundamental components, 
as ‘the people’s willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of 
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power’ (Liddell Hart 1991, 322). Colucci argues that as a result of the ideology embedded in 
Manifest Destiny, the concept of ‘an imperial republic’ formed quite early in US history and 
‘four hundred years of steady expansion were based on this belief’ (Colucci 2018, 140–41). 
From very early in the United States’ existence, then, the ideational and the material (land 
and financial capital) can be seen as closely entangled through expansionism. 
As the nascent state expanded, first westwards to the Pacific Coast and then south to the 
Latin American territories, we can see the early iteration of US grand strategy  in action. 
Material national interests of territory acquisition and wealth were contextualised in terms 
of moral and ethical constructs, and institutionalised in national policy such as the Monroe 
Doctrine. This led to the genocide of the indigenous people and the usurping of their land. It 
included war and military occupation as expansion moved further south – actions justified by 
subsequent policies which built on the ideological premises of Manifest Destiny as enshrined 
in the Monroe Doctrine. The US had thusly positioned itself to create and tell the story of the 
Western Hemisphere.  
In discussing grand strategy, Thierry Balzacq, Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich (2019, 80) 
speak about the way in which, for countries such as France and the United Kingdom, grand 
strategising can be seen as historically linked to imperialism. Indeed, one might argue that for 
the US, the same can be said – especially in considering the argument made above. Grace 
Livingstone (2009, 5) argues that imperialism reflects the period of early US expansionism 
right up to the habitual intervention and occupation of the early 20th Century under 
Roosevelt. Thereafter, she speaks in terms of hegemony, citing less direct influence on 
outcomes as the rationale for this.  
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Following from this, Colucci (2018, 139) argues that scholars studying US national security 
doctrine - which informs its grand strategy - have identified ‘nine consistent, identifiable 
themes’ over its history. Amongst these themes are pre-emption, unilateralism, hegemony, 
moral pragmatism and legalism. These last two concepts speak to the role of the US insofar 
as it may act as the moral arbiter of states’ behaviour and as the source of global stability, 
respectively (Gaddis 2005, 16–30; Hastedt 2015, 62). This work shall  recall these consistent 
themes as it makes the argument for American exceptionalism, enshrined in Manifest 
Destiny, being that common thread which materialises one iteration of the LAC regions at the 
expense of others. 
 
Manifest Destiny and Early US-LAC Relations 
 
Muno and Brand (2014, 376) argue that from a macro perspective, the US foreign policy which 
has created hegemonic narratives for Latin America and the Caribbean, has historically 
oscillated between two dominant narratives for itself in the region: leadership and 
partnership. What is seen in Manifest Destiny is the early underlying philosophy of the US 
desire for ‘leadership’ which later played itself out in foreign policy such as the Monroe 
Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary and even the much later Platt Amendment, each of which 
assigns implicit roles to the actors involved. The role assigned to the US in its early foreign 
policy towards the LAC regions, is  guarantor of security in the region in line with Colucci’s 
‘consistent themes’ of  ‘legalism’ as defined in the previous paragraph. LAC territories 
meanwhile are designated as recipients of the outcomes of the securitisation processes 
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within the US national security mechanisms (Livingstone 2009, 6). The US therefore squarely 
placed itself centrally such that it could determine the security narratives of the region. 
Early US perceptions of Latin America and the Caribbean reek of the type of exoticism outlined 
by Edward Said in Orientalism (1978). People who populated LAC countries were infantilised 
and therefore deemed irrational and in need of the ‘manly rational culture of the United 
States’ (O’Brien 2007, 35). The women were hyper-sexualised  and the territories – 
particularly those of the Caribbean — were there for US consumption (O’Brien 2007, 271; 
McCollin 2010, 2–4; Maingot and Lozano 2005, 1–2); though not for integration as  the black 
and mixed race populations of many of the island territories were looked down upon (O’Brien 
2007, 104–10; Renda 2001, 162–63; Livingstone 2009, 12). In a continuation of the 
entanglement between the racist imaginary and the material territories and bodies of the 
south, the Caribbean and Latin America as non-Anglo Saxon territories were lumped together 
in the US narrative as a single region in need of the paternalistic guidance of the enlightened 
United States even though they would never be worthy of acquisition. 
Part of the problem with early US expansionist imperialism, however, is that it was at odds 
with itself.  While the US sought to reshape LAC countries in their own image and likeness, 
believing that their territorial and commercial expansion would be a source of stability for the 
region (Colucci 2018, 142–43; O’Brien 2007, 5), it would find that it could not both promote 
its particular brand of democracy and maximise its self-interests. In challenging the European 
colonial powers in the region while seeking to also set up markets for its industrial products 
(iron, steel, coal), the US intervened in the affairs of the LAC region more than 30 times 
between 1898 and 1934 (Livingstone 2009, 12).The result was destabilising conflict which 
96 
 
threatened the ‘legalism’ feature (the US as a source of global stability)  embedded in their 
national security policies (Colucci 2018, 139). 
Not only did the LAC regions reject some of its fundamental values, but US endeavours which 
privileged its economic interests and treated subordinated populations with a patriarchal 
attitude resulted in a deep lack of popularity with their populations. Indeed, American 
preoccupation with an order and stability that served them outweighed concerns about socio-
economic inequalities within Latin American societies. The result was that American alliances 
with the Latin American elites resulted more in a preservation of the status quo rather than 
encouraging any lessening of the disparity between the rich and the poor in those territories 
(O’Brien 2007, 9–10; Livingstone 2009, 2–3).  
 The US’ initiatives prompted increased resistance as political consciousness of the people 
rose and along with it, a struggle for democracy which resembled not American democratic 
ideals but their own - which would feature socio-economic equality  rather than the large 
disparities facilitated by US interests (O’Brien 2007, 9–10).  The resultant insurgencies and 
revolutions in Latin America would challenge not only domestic regimes but also US regional 
influence for decades and also due in no small part to proximity, would influence the 
Caribbean and how it fit into US security narratives. 
The US engaged in recurrent interference in the affairs of Latin American states as part of its 
self-appointed mandate, or what Muno and Brand (2014, 380) call America’s version of the 
White Man’s Burden. This however resulted not in the desired stabilisation of the 
hemisphere, but created a cycle of continuing military intervention and occupation 
(Livingstone 2009, 5). With the world economic crisis in the early 20th Century, this approach 
was temporarily abandoned in the 1930s, such that the Monroe Doctrine had arguably waned 
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in the early 20th century (Maingot and Lozano 2005, 1). Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy 
was enacted during that decade, which  focused instead on being a good partner with other 
nations, or as Livingstone describes it ‘depending on “friendly dictators”…to maintain order’ 
(Livingstone 2009, 3). Recalling Muno and Brand  (2014, 376) once more, we see here, on the 
surface at least, the oscillation from leadership to partnership.  
As a result  of this change in approach, along with other important international events such 
as the end of the Second World War, there was a huge growth in multilateralism which 
included, in no small part, the LAC regions. As Roosevelt’s policy promised respect for national 
sovereignty and self-determination, the appearance of more cooperation was necessary. The 
United Nations was formed, with most Latin American states being founding members. The 
OAS was also founded, during this time, with a mandate that explicitly emphasised non-
intervention and cooperation (Muno and Brand 2014, 381). It was through these types of 
multilateral mechanisms that the US was later able to facilitate the continuing pursuit of its 
interests in the region and to propagate hegemonic security narratives during the Cold War 
(Dark and Harris 1996, 19; Livingstone 2009, 24).  
Moving into an examination of US-LAC relations during the CW period, this work will keep in 
mind that the chapter has now established the early character of US grand strategy. Its 
collection of bureaucratic tools, diplomatic capabilities and material resources, was 
purposefully directed towards achieving political, economic and territorial expansion in the 
western hemisphere through hegemony, pre-emption and unilateralism. Fundamental to 
American expansionist activity and linked to  American exceptionalism, the US’ grand strategy 
is facilitated by the enduring myth that its mission is divinely assigned and virtuous. Although 
at times less overtly visible through oscillations between leadership- and partnership-focused 
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policy, this character persevered into more modern hemispheric relations embedded in 
institutions which allowed for the continuing export of American values alongside the pursuit 
of national interests. 
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Cold War US-LAC Relations  
 
Confronted with the ‘threat’ of communism, the American gaze shifted globally in the late 
1940s to address that security concern. Jason Parker (2008, 67) asserts that in so doing, the 
Truman administration re-scripted the national security ‘prototype’ to extend beyond its 
original hemispheric sphere of influence to fit the global stage, while retaining the original 
basic tenets informed by Manifest Destiny. By the 1940s, communism was growing in 
popularity in the LAC region as states sought to find a politics which reflected their desire for 
egalitarianism, in overt rejection of American elitist influences on their politics, economies 
and societies. 
By 1947, Picado was attempting the annulment of election results in Costa Rica, with the 
backing of the popular communist party and the US was turning away from its partnership-
driven foreign policy and intervening once more in the affairs of Latin American territories 
(Longley 1993, 149–50). Meanwhile, in the early stages, the Caribbean was virtually ignored 
as Caribbean leaders had done enough to make the US administration feel that they were not 
a threat (Parker 2008, 11). Despite these territories being ‘cold spots’ in the Cold War (CW), 
as evidenced by their absence from the literature on the subject, they retained symbolic and 
geo-political strategic importance for the US (Parker 2008, 6).  
By the early 1950s, when US attention returned to the Caribbean region, there was a more 
international flavour to intervention. The anti-communist counter-offensive in the region 
took place through an alliance between the British and the Americans. Surrogate institutions, 
were used to stamp out communist interest in the English-speaking Caribbean. In Jamaica, 
Barbados, Trinidad and British Guiana (Guyana), for example, labour NGOS neutralised 
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communist sentiment. Nevertheless, the Marxist People’s Progressive Party (PPP) won the 
1953 general elections in Guyana. Despite the contrasting context to undemocratic case of 
Picado in Costa Rica, the outcome was that British troops landed, suspended the constitution 
and threw the PPP out of office, in a show of overt intervention. This action was sponsored 
by the United States – covert intervention – and was the first major anti-communist offensive 
by the US in the Caribbean (Maingot and Lozano 2005, 20–22; Waters and Daniels 2005, 285). 
By March 1954, American and LAC delegates at the OAS were formally adopting anti-
communist positions, such that the Tenth International Conference of American States 
concluded with the ‘Declaration for Solidarity for the Preservation of Political Integrity of the 
American States in the Intervention of International Communism’, also known as the Caracas 
Declaration of Solidarity. Ironically, the Declaration condemned communism as being 
‘incompatible with the concept of American Freedom’ by virtue of its ‘anti-democratic nature 
and interventionist tendency’ which therefore required ‘urgent measures’ to address the 
threat (Livingstone 2009, 24). This, for Maingot and Lozano (2005, 19–22) marks the moment 
when the US officially securitised communism as an existential threat in the context of 
hemispheric relations, legitimising for itself actions which were unacceptable if committed by 
others. This securitisation shall be explored further in relation to hemispheric relations in the 
CW context. 
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Manifest Destiny and Hemispheric Cold War Relations 
 
Following from Maingot and Lozano’s sentiment about  the securitisation of communism at 
the OAS it is possible to once more trace the way in which the ideas informing Manifest 
Destiny run as a common thread through US grand strategy. Following this thread is key as it 
will ultimately inform this chapter’s discussion on Trinidad and Tobago’s exclusion from the 
global terrorism narrative later in history. The securitising move at the OAS was based on 
perceived threats to US ideological and material interests. This is underscored by Manifest 
Destiny insofar as that it represents the divine mission of spreading US values of democracy 
and capitalism across is sphere of influence. The emergency measures implied in the speech 
act, embodied by the resolution, were by extension, also linked to American exceptionalism. 
Recalling Colucci’s (2018, 139) consistent characteristics, they facilitated the legitimation of 
US hegemonic behaviour through legalism (the positioning of the US as a source of stability), 
and intervention.  
Recalling Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka’s (2015, 508–9) argument that actors bring into the 
securitising move pre-existing power configurations that either facilitate, or preclude the 
process of securitisation, this example shows the relevance of arguments for giving due 
consideration to the power laden nature of the securitisation process. The US’ position as 
regional hegemon endowed it with greater persuasive capabilities, allowing for the LAC 
regions to be assigned this security narrative. By virtue of successful securitisation of the 
issue, it can be seen how the US was able to increase its own power in the region through the 
sanctioning of exceptional measures, highlighting another aspect of the power dynamics 
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involved in securitising threats  (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 504). This is an important 
consideration that shall be revisited in the following section on Post-CW relations. 
On the point of communist threat, Livingstone (2009, 24) adds, that in the LAC regions, this 
was ‘greatly exaggerated’, a position supported by Castañeda (1990, 471). This suggests that 
the securitisation of the threat within the region was in fact a reconciliation of means and a 
larger end. This can be interpreted as the US’ deliberate and strategic inclusion of the 
hemisphere in the global security narrative as part of a harnessing all of its resources – 
including its diplomatic resources, towards addressing the CW – that is to say part of its grand 
strategy. Its approach to the LAC region, rooted in Manifest Destiny and the myth of American 
exceptionalism fits into the overall US grand strategy for addressing the Cold War.  
In this instance, there is a change in character to the ideational aspect of US policy – while 
still present, the political aspect of American exceptionalism has come to the fore with 
democratic ideology being threatened. The southern territories nevertheless continue to be 
treated as a monolith in relation to a security narrative rather than seeing them as individual 
territories or separate regions situated at differing places within that narrative by virtue of 
their differing identities. In the CW era political ideology along with the racist imaginary 
continue to be entangled with the bodies and states of the LAC territories. 
The case of Grenada shows how the Caribbean continued to matter geo-politically to the US 
during the CW, but more as a part of the larger security narrative rather than as a local 
hemispheric communist threat. When Maurice Bishop, leader of the New Jewel Movement 
(NJM) came into power in Grenada, after toppling Eric Gairy in a coup d’état, he was popular 
with the Grenadian people as well as with the wider region (Maingot and Lozano 2005, 30; 
Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 33). His People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) took 
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office in 1979, after having taken hard critical stances against US foreign policy. Despite this, 
the PRG’s stance towards the US was conciliatory, offering a mixed economy and it went on 
to develop normal diplomatic relations with non-revolutionary governments such as France 
and Canada.  
The Carter Administration  was ambivalent in its response to Grenada, neither supporting the 
ousted Eric Gairy’s request for assistance in returning to power, nor Bishop’s request for aid 
in defending the state against Gairy’s mercenaries. There was no preoccupation with the 
threat to that deeply held American value of democracy reflected in the Administration’s 
response. There was no concern specifically with communism gaining a foothold in and 
spreading through the eastern Caribbean. Indeed, it was only when a Cuban delegation visited 
Grenada, that the US ambassador to the eastern Caribbean was dispatched with haste 
(Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 36). That is to say, that only when the Caribbean experience 
became linked to the larger narrative, through Cuba as a proxy for the USSR, did the US 
become interested. 
Only after the Bishop Administration grew stronger ties with Cuba – which was already seen 
as the gateway to the west for Soviet entry – did tensions grow between Grenada and the US. 
The hegemon began to perceive Grenada as a threat to other anglophone Caribbean 
territories (Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 39). The Reagan Administration was far more 
explicit, denouncing the PRG’s practice and clearly directed Grenada away from anti-
American propaganda and acting like a Cuban proxy. The US instead recommended 
reorientation towards constitutional democracy and non-alignment. So close had ties 
between the Bishop Administration and Cuba become, that when Bishop was executed in 
104 
 
1983 by his detractors, Cuba observed three official days of  mourning as the Grenadian 
military began its short, 6-day rule (Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 133).  
On the  morning of October 25th 1983, US Armed forces accompanied by men from other 
Caribbean nations landed in Grenada. The invasion was framed as the response to a formal 
request from the OECS, and to ensure the personal safety of the roughly 1000 US citizens on 
the island whose lives were at stake due to the ‘leftist thugs’ who had seized power 
(Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 85). The island was only viewed as a threat insofar as it had 
a relationship with Cuba, and fell into the broader narrative, not as a potential source of threat 
in its own right. Indeed, Regan had months before publicly spoken of Grenada in such a way 
as to indicate that it was a ‘geopolitical nightmare’, as part of a broader discussion on Central 
America and El Salvador again demonstrating the notion that the US tends to mistakenly think 
of the regions as a homogenous group (Schoenhals and Melanson 1985, 133). 
The military operation in Grenada, a token win, was meant primarily to provide a display of 
strength and success in the post-Vietnam context (Brands 2014, 113–14). Grenada only 
mattered insofar as it related to broader strategic concerns about Cuba as a Soviet proxy and 
projecting strength to the world. The southern part of the hemisphere was a bloc and 
mattered  insofar as it related to the overarching security narrative created for the world.  
Hemispheric relations during the CW illustrate that despite a turn from a regional to a global 
focus, US policies, diplomacy, military resources continued to be used in a hegemonic manner 
in order to secure US national security interests against the perceived threat – no longer 
colonialism - but communism. Along with hegemony, moral pragmatism and legalism 
underscored by American Messianism continued to feature strongly in US grand strategy such 
that ideals of democracy were simultaneously invoked and dispensed with, in the pursuit of 
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US national interest. The LAC  regions continue during this period to be seen as one and in 
need of US paternalism in order to save them from the ills of communism. 
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Post-Cold War US-LAC Relations 
 
With the end of the Cold War, United States rhetoric shifted considerably once again. With 
the rise of the New World Order, post-CW US policy refocused its attentions towards new 
priorities: promoting liberal democracy and stemming the flow of illegal narcotics (Council on 
Foreign Relations 2008, 7–8). By examining these priorities, one can see once more how,  
despite its changing concerns, the US bundled the Latin American and Caribbean experiences 
together into broad approaches. This will bring us to the narrative that remains the dominant 
one for the LAC regions.  
 
Encouraging Liberal Democracy 
 
In examining the post-CW era of hemispheric relations, it is possible to see a return to 
offensive rather than defensive action with regards to US commitment to the spread of liberal 
economics. This can be seen in terms of the plethora of economic policy that emerged after 
the end of the CW as the US sought to implement a neo-liberal ‘new world economic order’ 
(Livingstone 2009, 102; Saxe-Fernández 1994, 226). Once more the enduring notion of 
exceptionalism mandated it to bear the burden of leadership (Dark and Harris 1996, 131) and 
growing competition from Asian economies made it important for the US to find new markets 
if it were to remain as economically powerful as it was politically, in the Post-CW context 
(Livingstone 2009, 101). 
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In western hemispheric relations, this manifested in the creation of multilateral trading 
agreements such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative ( CBI - 1983), the Andean Trade Preference 
Act (1991), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA - 1993) and the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA 1994- ) which encouraged privatisation and deepening of trade ties. The 
last of these was never well established, as the period was also characterised by a resurgence 
of antagonistic views on economics along North-South lines (Yilmaz 2008, 52; Council on 
Foreign Relations 2008, 7–8). John Saxe-Fernández (1994, 225) points out that that these 
economic strategies and policies were formulated in part by the Monroe Doctrine and 
subsequent extensions upon it – all of which build upon Manifest Destiny and the mandate 
to spread these values. 
Jorge Castañeda (1990, 472) builds upon this, advancing that running alongside the 
implementation of these aggressive economic policies and tied to others, was the elevation 
of the narcotics issue to a place of prominence. While the issue was by no means new, he 
argues that elevating it – that is to say, by securitising it, the US could introduce more 
‘intrusive forms of cooperation’ to the hemisphere once more. Livingstone (2009, 102) 
supports this assertion, recognising that the cocaine supply to the US had been steadily rising 
since the 1980s but that the drug trade was also used as a pretext for interventionism and re-
establishing a military presence in the southern part of the hemisphere given that 
communism was no longer a plausible security issue. This provides a segue into the current 
and enduring security narrative for the LAC regions – narco-trafficking – institutionalised 
through the War on Drugs.  
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The War on Drugs 
 
Jorge Castañeda advances that the extent of the US’ focus on the narcotics issue is a result of 
the security and ideology vacuums left in the wake of the fall of the USSR. He claims that the 
regional security narrative has now been framed such that: 
[t]he evil (Soviet/communist) empire to the east has given way to the evil 
(drug-producing/immigration-generating) slum to the south. 
(Castañeda 1990, 471) 
Castañeda’s description of this narrative is important as it introduces an idea which will 
become even more relevant when the chapter progresses into the upcoming section on Post-
9/11 US-LAC Relations. It is also important in that it indicates where the narcotics threat was 
geographically situated in the US’ securitisation of drugs. His description of the USSR and the 
LAC regions as being perceived as ‘evil’ links back once more to Manifest Destiny and a type 
of Manichean dualism that has featured in US security narratives.  
Caroline Kennedy writes, that tied into the Messianism of US exceptionalism and the foreign 
policy which it informs, is the constant of Manichaeism. This, she argues, manifests in a 
‘permanent temptation for the United States to ‘moralise’ its relations with others, often 
rationalising its own actions by demonising (sometimes literally) its opponents’ (Kennedy 
2013, 624). Indeed, this is reminiscent once more of the ‘moral pragmatism’ which Colucci 
(2018, 139) identified as a constant in US grand strategy, supporting the continuing argument 
of the continuity of exceptionalism in US grand strategy over the course of history. It is this 
argument that Castañeda invokes in his rationalising of the War on Drugs and which will be 
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discussed later in this chapter. At this stage, the chapter progresses, looking at how LAC 
regions have been lumped together once more by virtue of being assigned the role of ‘site for 
the production of the narcotics threat to the US’. 
The United States is known for its status as the largest single consumer market for illicit drugs 
with the EU running a close second and usage also on the uptake in Latin America. Latin 
America and the Caribbean tend to supply the US while Afghanistan tends to supply Europe 
(Bagley 2012, 1–3; United Nations 2018). The attempts to regulate drug flow into the US 
escalated during the Reagan presidency; prior to the end of the Cold War, however, it 
continued to receive funding as a priority under the subsequent Bush and Clinton 
Administrations. Trade of illicit narcotics remained a bipartisan priority until the turn of the 
century when attention shifted to the War on Terror after 2001 (Council on Foreign Relations 
2008, 8; Bobea 2009, 92; Teslik 2006). 
Colombia has been one of the major producers of hard drugs in Latin America, where 
production has been driven by US demand. Production shifted there in the mid-1990s after 
partial success in the late 1980s of tackling producers on the southern Andes. By the turn of 
the millennium, Colombia was producing 90% of the world’s coca leaf (Bagley 2012, 3–4). As 
a result of US intervention – backing the Colombian government in war against Pablo Escobar 
- the Medellin Cartel was dismantled and following this, negotiations with the Cali Cartel led 
to its dissolution as well. With a vacuum left to fill and only small networks remaining after 
the fall of the cartel giants, the late 1990s saw paramilitary militias taking control of the drug 
trade and the  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),  and the United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) engaged in increasing drug-related violence as they rose to fill the 
gap. The early 2000s were marked by more US backed initiatives. While Colombia remained 
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the principal source of cocaine in the Andes,  US involvement caused a shift in the operations 
of organised crime groups towards Mexico (Bagley 2012, 3–5; Norman 2018, 641–50). These 
shifting operations, as a result of US intervention, were the start of the ‘regionalising’ of the 
drug trade. 
Narcotics related organised crime in Mexico has flourished as groups vie for control of 
smuggling operations across the US border and patterns suggest that continued US 
involvement and intervention will serve only to continue the balloon or ‘push down, pop up’ 
effect - shifting operations across various territories in Latin America rather than stopping 
them (Bagley 2012, 1; Teslik 2006; Cardash, Cillufo, and Tussing 2011, 11–12). For example, 
Venezuela is now a key transit point for smuggling through the Caribbean, with the Mexican 
routes having become more problematic.  
The Caribbean has therefore now become an important part of smuggling routes (Bagley 
2012, 7; Council on Foreign Relations 2008, 8; Francis and Mauser 2011, 165–66)  with 
Trinidad, by virtue of proximity to the mainland, becoming a central player in the supply of 
drugs to North American markets. Indeed as Bobea elaborates, the Caribbean’s geographical 
salience has placed it between the production and consumption zones of hard drugs such that 
in the case of cocaine for example, 500 of the 575 tons produced worldwide were passing 
through the Caribbean during the first decade of the new millennium (Bobea 2009, 92). 
US recognition of this fact can be seen in terms of the types of foreign policy that came into 
being as a result of this changing trafficking landscape. The Shiprider Agreement is one 
example of this, with the US demanding from island territories the right to engage in pursuit 
and board vessels in their territorial waters which would have been disallowed under 
maritime law. This Agreement was the source of much discord within the Caribbean, as 
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though Trinidad and Tobago signed onto the policy without dispute, other countries such as 
Jamaica took umbrage with the entitlement which the US felt to trample on their sovereignty 
to seek its own interests (Ferguson 2003, 41; Maingot and Lozano 2005, 15). 
This hegemonic influence of the US can further be seen in various ways – including 
intervention, as in the case of Manuel Noriega’s capture and conviction in 1989.  It can further 
be seen terms of the way that the superpower has used multilateral institutions in order to 
institutionalise its security interests regarding the narco-trafficking. Just as during the CW, 
both the OAS and the UN have been used to achieve this, as official channels for securitising 
the threat to the US. Doing this in the multilateral context allows for justification the type of 
measure which the US desired to use while ensuring that it would have a hand in designing 
those measures (Horwitz 2010, 140–41; Francis and Mauser 2011, 172).  
This use of multilateralism is a later iteration of early US policy in this regard. It reflects an 
oscillation towards partnership in US strategy – at least on the surface. Before this turn to 
partnership, the US took a leadership approach, using both carrots and sticks to coerce 
cooperation. Preferential trade agreements were granted and trade sanctions were 
instituted, denial of funding through international-development lending institutions was 
restricted - all based on cooperation with US drug policy (Francis and Mauser 2011, 163–64).  
The nature of US foreign policy and strategy for the War on Drugs has been the source of 
frustration for LAC administrations. States have found that US policy creates impediments to 
implementing their own indigenous policies which might overlap with methods or ideas that 
the United States rejects. This has resulted in further regulatory failures and increasing 
disfavour amongst the Latin American people (Teslik 2006; Council on Foreign Relations 2008, 
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7; Bagley 2012, 12–13). It illustrates as well, the way in which US foreign policy treats the LAC 
region as a monolith, that can be addressed with a single approach. 
This chapter has up until now concerned itself with the way in which US grand strategy from 
its fledgling stage up until the end of the 20th Century has, despite changing contexts, retained 
fundamentally the same character which has in turn led to it framing the LAC regions in a 
consistent way. Even as interests, policy rhetoric and the priority of the regions to the US has 
changed over time, the territories have, by virtue of the nature of American exceptionalism 
(which informs foreign policy) consistently been conflated. Most recently they have both 
been subsumed under the narrative of transnational organised crime as part of the United 
States’ hegemonic security narrative. As the drug trade has been securitised as a threat to the 
US, the LAC regions have been identified as the source of that threat. Referring to the diagram 
below, this trend can be observed.  
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Early American Expansionism & LAC 
Relations
•US FP informed by: Manifest Destiny, 
American exceptionalism, divine mandate, 
imperialist ideology, pseudo-scientific 
racism, exoticism, paternalism, moral 
pragmatism, leadership role, legalism, 
unilateralism, interventionism
•Threat: European Colonialism
•LAC Region: geographically salient, inferior, 
for consumption, in need of the US, recipient 
of US foreign policy
US-LAC CW Relations
•US FP informed by: Manifest Destiny, divine 
mandate, hegemony, moral pragmatism, 
manichaenism legalism, institutions as 
vehicles for FP, interventionism, ideology, 
liberal democracy, occupation
•Threat: Communism
•LAC Region: source of trade, geographically 
salient,  gateway for communism, recipient of 
US foreign policy
Post-CW US-LAC Relations
•US FP informed by: Manifest Destiny, 
economic neo-imperialism, hegemony, 
paternalism, moral pragmatism, 
manichaenism, legalism, interventionism, 
liberal democracy
•Threat: Narco-trafficking
•LAC Region: geographically salient,  
gateway for illicit narcotics, politically 
inept, in need of the US, recipient of US 
foreign policy 
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Reading this through the insights of securitisation theory, historically, by virtue of its self-
appointed Messianic role, US policy makers having been the securitising actors for the Western 
Hemisphere. They have articulated threats ranging from European colonialism, to communism, 
to illicit narcotics, situating the United States as the primary referent object. By virtue of the 
paternalistic character underlying the ideologies that inform US foreign policy, the LAC regions 
have found themselves designated as within the US’ ‘sphere of interest’ and therefore a 
secondary referent object of sorts which receives the policies emerging from various 
securitisations.  
Drawing on Balzacq’s (2005, 179–81) argument for giving attention not only to the speech act, 
but to context and audience(s), one can further argue that the domestic success of the 
securitising moves in question was facilitated by contexts which made them amenable to the 
enabling audience within the US Congress. The presence of colonies in the western hemisphere, 
the growing popularity of communist activity in the LAC regions and a  Post-CW security vacuum 
allowed for the securitising moves to be framed in ways that would have resonated strongly with 
members if its legislature. The perseverance of the myth of American exceptionalism was a strong  
undercurrent which would also have served as a psychocultural factor, interacting with these 
contextual factors to create the desired perlocutionary effects and encourage audience assent.   
Another audience in this regard would have been the international community as embodied in 
multilateral organisations which became a factor in later foreign policy choices. Insofar as the US 
was able to successfully securitise in this context, we see once more the persuasive and or 
coercive power brought to bear on the audience in question. Indeed, the power dynamics within 
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these organisations show how powerful states can, as John Mearsheimer (1994, 13) argues, use 
these institutions for their calculated, self-interested pursuits. This appears to be a perfect 
example of how ‘securitisation combines the politics of threat design with that of threat 
management’ (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2015, 495) as in one fell swoop, the US is able to 
use the pre-existing power configurations embedded in these institutions both to construct a 
threat and legitimise the steps that US leaders want to take to manage it. 
As recipients of US foreign policy themselves, not only did LAC regions end up secondary referent 
objects, but they also functioned as audiences in their own right. Unlike the domestic enabling 
audience of the US government, the audiences within the LAC territories did not completely buy 
the US rhetoric of threat. This is reflected in the growth an anti-US sentiment identified in the 
LAC regions over the course of examples shown in this chapter. Here we see the importance of 
the power dynamics that critics of speech act theory insist be given consideration. It is by virtue 
of its imperialist and later hegemonic status that the US was able to coerce assent out of these 
territories, resorting even to military intervention to ensure cooperation. Thusly, by the end of 
the 20th Century the LAC regions were situated within the overarching narrative of the War on 
Drugs as a monolith and on the receiving end of a variety of exceptional measures – political and 
military, which arguably secured one referent object (the US) considerably more than the other 
in the immediate sense, but as this work shall come to argue, left the US more vulnerable to other 
potential threats in the long run. 
Presented as such, Balzacq’s (2005, 171–73)  pragmatic approach to theorising securitisation 
does seem to do a good job at explaining the way in which US grand strategy has informed its 
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hemispheric relations, leading up to the War on Drugs. Indeed, given the particularly realist 
approach which underscores the US’ international relations practice, it would make sense that 
the speech act and pragmatic action approaches to theorising securitisation are highly applicable. 
Retaining residual state centrism and focus on the ‘analytics of government’ within their 
framework even as they integrate constructivism and linguistics and other non-mainstream 
factors, this type of analysis seems to fall squarely within their remit. 
Nevertheless, this work argues that the effectiveness of applying the securitisation approach is 
based on the fact that it was ‘presented as such’. Theories of securitisation look at individual 
processes at a specific point in time, to explain outcomes. This work however, has made a 
different argument.  It applied securitisation theory not to a single securitising move, but rather 
to the cumulative behaviour of the US over a long period of time, as connected by an enduring 
commonality - the fundamental ideological thread that runs through all of its strategising. This 
established the argument that there are a deep entanglements between the ideational aspects 
of US grand strategy and the material world with which it negotiates.  
These entanglements have been brought to bear on every security issue identified, ultimately in 
the same way. US grand strategy functions as an apparatus which is informed by American 
exceptionalism as and ideology. The racist imaginary embedded in that ideology intra-acts with 
the phenomenon of LAC territories and their constituent populations. The agential cuts enacted 
by the apparatus reduce the LAC regions to a single homogenous entity for US policy makers. This  
excludes a perspective which takes the individuality of the regions and their component states 
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into consideration. This work will continue to argue in the upcoming section on post-9/11 
hemispheric relations that this particular exclusion matters.  
The validity of this argument can be illustrated by showing how Agential Realism allows for a 
more profound analysis than contemporary approaches to theorising security on their own. By 
virtue of its commitment not to classically informed understandings of science, but to quantum 
thinking, Agential Realism gifts this analysis the conception of time, not in a linear deterministic 
way, but rather in terms of ‘hauntology’ (Barad 2017, 67–69). This is where the nuance has come 
from in the above argument on the way that the US has securitised threats in the hemisphere. 
Recalling the notion of temporal diffraction discussed in the previous chapter, we need not think 
of time in terms of individual, chronological seconds, where each must finish for the other to end. 
Rather, we can think of the past as happening – a bleeding of moments into each other as part 
of the world’s material becoming. This shall be a recurrent theme haunting this writing and shall 
play a great role once more in the fifth chapter of this work. 
What this hauntological understanding of time offers us in this chapter is a way to see what has 
been excluded by studies of US grand strategy which look at individual cases on an administration 
by administration basis or others which are preoccupied with other academic considerations 
within the debates on grand strategy, such as definitions. By tracing the impact of American 
exceptionalism on grand strategy through time and identifying the way in which it, primarily 
through Manifest Destiny, has continued to unfold in various overlapping contexts, one can see 
what this exceptionalism excluded. There is the absence of a view of LAC territories as entities in 
their own right – dynamic entities with agency, as opposed to a monolith to be unchangingly seen 
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as ‘recipient of foreign policy’. As this chapter moves into its final section which brings us to the 
concern of this work’s case study – narratives of terrorism, it shall do so, keeping in the fore, the 
understanding that this exclusion matters in explaining the absence of Trinidad and Tobago in 
the global terrorism narrative. 
  
Post 9/11 US-LAC Relations 
 
Since the turn of the 21st century, the US has privileged a new security narrative, and a global one 
at that - terrorism. This narrative is not new in the sense of novel, but new in the sense that 
despite having been normalised over decades from as far back as the 1980s (R. Jackson 2004b, 
5)  it was institutionalised in the global context recently by way of the War on Terror (R. Jackson 
2011, 392). The US’ War on Terror , since its commencement in 2001 has been focused on radical 
Islamic terrorists and the extremist groups to which they belong (Lansford, Watson, and 
Covarrubias 2009, 6). This  is a reflection of the argument that the War on Terror is in itself made 
up of two common false narratives – that terrorists are always brown Muslims and that white 
people are never terrorists (Corbin 2017, 455). It is the first of these false narratives that informs 
the present discussion of how a possible narrative of terrorism for the Trinidad and Tobago never 
fully formed. 
Caroline Corbin (2017, 456–64) explains that the narrative of all terrorists being Muslim, 
sometimes also morphs into the fallacy that all Muslims are terrorists. This fallacy also conflates 
Islam and radical Islam, such that all Muslims are radicalised. This has combined with another 
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conflation between Arab ethnicity and Islam that has been popular in the US even before 2001. 
Mavelli (2013, 165–66)  endorses this, arguing that this combination has made it such that 
securitisation of Islam (conflated with Arab ethnicity and radicalised Islam) is inextricably linked 
to the securitisation of the terrorism all over the western world.  
Corbin (2017, 458–62) continues to argue that the US government’s response to terrorism, even 
before the 2001 attacks, disproportionately targeted Muslims. She further explains that these 
misperceptions and fallacies are not necessarily the result of  mal-intent, but can also very much 
be the product of unconscious cognitive processes which are reinforced by Hollywood portrayals 
and  news narratives which repeatedly link Islam with terrorism and gives more attention to 
attacks which have been perpetrated by Muslims than those which do not. Corbin’s argument 
links back to one which was started earlier in this chapter and which shall now be further 
explored, as it plays a more significant role moving forward in this part of the argument – the 
notion of the Manichaean aspect of US exceptionalism. 
Recalling Caroline Kennedy’s (2013, 623–24) commentary on this, she argues that embedded in 
US exceptionalism is the propensity of the state to ‘moralise’ its relations with other states – a 
framing of the US as virtuous which runs alongside the demonisation of opponents . This is the 
duality that characterises the legacy of Manichaean philosophy. It was previously argued that this 
duality was manifested in US narratives of the Cold War, and of the War on Drugs (Kennedy 2013, 
627; Castañeda 1990, 471). The chapter now argues that this manifests in the War on Terror as 
well, as Kennedy continues to argue that that the 2001 attacks brought to the table debates 
about evil and justifiable means of treating with evil (Kennedy 2013, 629).  
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Lee Jarvis writes that the Bush Administration can be identified by its tendency towards framing 
the War on Terror through use of ‘explicitly moral rhetoric’ which he in turn links to a Manichaean 
philosophy underlying the American psyche (Jarvis 2009, 134). Richard Jackson endorses this 
taking a strong position that in counter-terrorism discourses: 
Terrorists are endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman, 
while America and its coalition partners are described as being heroic, decent and 
peaceful – the defenders of freedom. 
(R. Jackson 2005, 59) 
Elaborating this notion of barbarism, Dag Tuastad  (2003, 591–92) articulates this in terms of 
Neo-Orientalism. He invokes Edward Said’s explication of the imaginaries of the ‘Arab’ in Western 
thought, as illustrating an inherently inferior, incapable, backwards people lacking the civic-
mindedness to engage in political communities. This Tuastad explains, is how terrorism and the 
Arab mind are linked in these sorts of Manichaean binaries with the West and ‘civilised 
democracy’. As the Arab mind is considered to be a product of backwardness and terrorism is 
claimed to be product of that mind, terrorism  is necessarily the product of the irrationality and 
backwardness embedded in that specific culture. 
The Bush Administration devised a particularly bold grand strategy for the US in the post-9/11 
context which featured several factors that Colucci identifies as constants– unilateralism, pre-
emption and assertion of US authority (Livingstone 2009, 120; Brands 2014, 146). To action these 
factors, the US had to place itself  in a place of moral superiority, or else it would have struggled 
to find support. Jackson (R. Jackson 2005, 59) argues that the Manichean character of the Bush 
Doctrine on the War on Terror was deliberate and carefully constructed with the intent to induce 
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‘othering’ so as to make the notion of war understandable to the American public. Josefin Graef, 
Raquel da Silva and Nicolas Lamay-Herbert (2018, 1) thusly cite the War on Terror as an 
exceptionally powerful example how narratives can legitimise political violence. They advance 
that by creating this duality of good/American versus evil/terrorist the administration could 
frame dissent as unpatriotic and ‘anti-American’. 
Morten Kelstrup, in his discussion of globalisation and societal insecurity examines terrorism and 
its implications for governance – both global and domestic. In so doing, he asserts that the threat 
of terrorism was successfully securitised in the post September 11th 2001 context on a global 
scale.  According to Kelstrup, not unlike when the threat of climate change is securitised, this 
particular process identified terrorism as an existential threat to the universal referent object of 
the world and sought to legitimise a reformation of norms and rules in the international system 
for dealing with this threat (Kelstrup 2004, 112–13). He asserts that this securitisation potentially 
changes ‘a basically unilateral strategy into a much broader and more legitimate power project’ 
(Kelstrup 2004, 115). 
Writing several years after Kelstrup, Barry Buzan supports this idea in his discussion of how the 
War on Terror might be seen as the new Cold War. In this vein, the Copenhagen scholar explains 
how the War on Terror was able to fill the global threat deficit which the US experienced after 
the end of the CW and how it has now been framed as  ‘a defence of the West, or western 
civilization, against those who would seek to destroy it’ (Buzan 2006, 1101). This ‘macro-
securitization’ he posits, was a unifying move by the US with the potential to ‘reassert and 
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legitimise its leadership of global security’  (Buzan 2006, 1101–2) and one which has been rather 
successful.  
Balzacq et al (2015) can be invoked here, to consider the importance of context and power 
dynamics to any securitisation process. The post-9/11 context was one of sympathy for the 
United States, this was certainly amenable to making audiences at home and abroad more open 
to assent when the securitising move was made by the securitising actor(s). Furthermore, the 
nature of the speech act involved, framed the threat in such a way as to make it particularly 
difficult to refrain from support, without being aligned with ‘evil’. Lee Jarvis (2009, 134–35) would 
add that this particular framing of the speech act also ruptures time, abstracting the war away 
from considerations of the past, of the present or of the future which might be brought to bear 
on the audiences’ deliberations of support.. The pre-existing power configurations of the political 
world then, were also important in the success of this securitising move and by extension the 
creation of the security narrative of terrorism and the War on Terror. 
What this section argues thus far is that the War on Terror and the overarching global terrorism 
narrative to which it belongs, are ultimately based on a Manichaean expression of American 
exceptionalism. This facilitated the assertion of US authority and the later unilateralism and pre-
emption that are key factors of the US grand strategy during this time. Recalling Colucci (2018, 
139) once more and the constant character of US grand strategy in relation to exceptionalism,  
the securitisation of terrorism manifests a number of characteristics identified earlier in this 
chapter - unilateralism, pre-emption, hegemony, legalism and moral pragmatism. In this case, 
the exclusion which results from the application of this Manichaean lens, takes place as a result 
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of terrorism being viewed as an evil associated with the ‘Muslim Arab world’ at the exclusion of 
other considerations.  
This brings us, finally, to the point where it is possible examine the way the exclusion associated 
with terrorism interacts with the exclusion which materialised from the application of US 
exceptionalism to the LAC regions. In this last section, the chapter will argue that one of these 
exceptions have been privileged in the regional context, ultimately resulting in Trinidad and 
Tobago remaining invisible in the global narrative on terrorism. 
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The LAC Regions and the War on Terror 
 
A number of regions grew in relevance to the United States as a result of The War on Terror. The 
war began in Afghanistan, extended pre-emptively to Iraq and then outwards to areas such as 
Pakistan and Yemen where military operations have been undertaken via use of drones (Ralph 
2013, 46–47). In its other forms, the war on terror can be seen in relations with states such as 
the Philippines where, in return for joining the coalition, economic and military aid was provided 
for counter-terrorism capacity building against the Philippines’ Islamic separatist groups (Tyner 
2005, 8). Africa also grew in relevance in the post-9/11 period and giving rise to regional 
partnerships such as the Combined Joined Task Force in the Horn of Africa - which was at one 
point described as ‘America’s most productive post-9-11 alliance’ (Davis 2007, 164). 
Comparatively, the LAC region has not received the same type of attention as the rest of the 
world in the War on Terror. Livingstone (2009, 121) argues that the LAC regions had not been a 
US priority since the fall of the USSR and became even less so after the terrorist attacks of 2001. 
Youngers (2003) supports this argument, claiming that while Latin American countries rallied 
around the US after the attacks – perhaps due to their own experience having experienced the 
most terrorist attacks in the world for the period 1995-2000 (Munroe 2004, 167–68) - the US 
Administration largely turned its back on its allies in the region. Indeed, one might argue that the 
US attitude towards the region was routine at best. 
Diplomatically, the US’ efforts extended to Latin America with a delegation being sent to the OAS’ 
Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism in March of 2003 for the purposes of improving 
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technological measures to prevent acts of terrorism in the region. Additionally, in the previous 
year, the United States participated in a conference in Argentina with the aim of promoting the 
cooperation in financial-intelligence sharing and prevention of terrorist fundraising initiatives 
(Lansford, Watson, and Covarrubias 2009, 11). Emerson (2010, 33) argues, that despite these 
efforts, the narrative has failed to take root in the region as evidenced by regional condemnation 
of Colombia’s 2008 air strikes on Ecuador despite their having been justified in the language of 
the War on Terror as a pre-emptive move against a terrorist threat. 
Trevor Munroe, writing circa 2004, points out that in the meanwhile, ‘the Caribbean subregion 
remained absent from the radar screen tracking global terrorism’ (Munroe 2004, 167–68). 
Munroe posits that the Caribbean is faced with narco-terrorism rather than the type of terrorism 
with which the global narrative is concerned. He further asserts that even after the attacks on 
the United States in 2001, the links between terrorism and drugs has been subordinated by what 
he calls the US’ ‘preoccupation with homeland security’ (Munroe 2004, 169) and so the Caribbean 
has been neglected. Munroe’s point about narco-terrorism now brings the chapter to a place 
where it can begin to discuss reconciling the dominant hemispheric narrative set by the US for 
the region – narco-trafficking - and the global hegemonic security narrative of the War on terror. 
Munroe’s argument is that the regional security narrative of narco-trafficking has become 
subsumed by a preoccupation with security that is situated within the global security narrative 
of terrorism. This resonates with other positions in the literature. Wolfgang Muno and Alexander 
Brand for instance, claim that : 
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The Bush Jr administration re-branded the WoD [War on Drugs] as part of the 
Global War on Terror at the beginning of the twentieth century. In Colombia, for 
instance, the local guerrillas were first labelled as narco-guerrillas, and later on as 
a narco-terrorist-alliance. 
(Muno and Brand 2014, 383) 
Livingstone (2009, 121) and Youngers (Youngers 2003) suggest that as the War on Terror 
progressed, hemispheric relations drifted apart, as the LAC regions’ views diverged increasingly 
from the US on acceptable ‘exceptional measures’. They highlight the alarm at the illegitimacy of 
the invasion of Iraq, and the questionable legality of the Guantánamo Bay facilities and what took 
place there, as illustrations of this.  
The most relevant example to this work however is the response to a dispute over the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Twelve states within the LAC regions, inclusive of 
Trinidad and Tobago2 refused to extend immunity from the ICC to US military personnel within 
their territories as the US attempted to sidestep being held accountable for what might be 
considered as war crimes during the War on Terror (Johansen 2006, 311–19). The result of this 
was that during the period 2003- 2006, the US repeatedly suspended all military aid that was not 
directly related to narco-trafficking (Livingstone 2009, 121; Johansen 2006, 317). What this 
example suggests and what this work argues is the opposite to the position advanced by Munroe. 
The narco-trafficking  security narrative persevered above and beyond the need to securitise 
terrorism in the region. 
                                                     
2 Trinidad and Tobago typically acquiesces to the desires of the US to protect close trade ties in the energy sector, 
however having played a leading role in the formation of the ICC and having a sitting judge on the Court, it was 
unable to legally grant exemption to the US. See Johansen (2006) for more on this. 
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In making sense of this twist, this work turns to an aspect of discourse analysis which speaks to 
the idea of subjugated knowledges. According to Jennifer Milliken, subjugated knowledges are 
excluded or silenced discourses which have been made so by the primacy of hegemonic discourse 
(Milliken 1999, 229–30). This seems particularly relevant in considering the primacy of the 
regional security narrative of crime as opposed to global security narrative terrorism, however at 
first glance, it does not explain why the global narrative in this case became subjugated by the 
regional, despite them both being the product of the same hegemonic thinking by the same 
hegemon. In resolving this seeming contradiction it is necessary to, as this work argues, go back 
to the underlying thread which runs through all US hegemonic discourse. 
This work takes the position, that the particular exclusionary nature of the global narrative, 
renders itself necessarily subordinate to the regional discourse by virtue of the role which 
American exceptionalism has played in each. As this chapter has established American 
exceptionalism has played a role in the securitisation of terrorism from a neo-Orientalist 
perspective -  within the remit of imaginaries of ‘Arab’ culture, conflated with the Middle East, 
additionally conflated with Islam, which is in turn conflated with radical Islam at the expense of 
other interpretations. The LAC regions do not fall within this securitisation of terrorism. At the 
same time, the US has historically, consistently imagined the LAC regions primarily as a place of 
promise and opportunity for the US, except for when it is the site for the production of the 
regional security threat of narco-trafficking. In the context of a security discussion therefore, the 
global hegemonic narrative dictates that the LAC regions are not included in US thoughts on 
terrorism,  and they are included in thoughts on narco-trafficking. 
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The global hegemonic discourse on terror, has in the case of the LAC region, silenced itself, 
subjugating itself to the privileging of the regional discourse. Having obtained primacy in the 
region, the security narrative of narco-trafficking has unexpectedly subsumed discourse on the 
war on terror such that rather than Muno and Brand’s assertion that the War on Drugs was 
rebranded the War on Terror, in actuality, the War on Terror was integrated into the War on 
Drugs. This can be seen in the way that these narratives have now merged in security discourse 
on the region. As Francis and Mauser (Francis and Mauser 2011, 164) put it the War on Drugs’ 
‘objectives and approaches have widened to incorporate the “War on Terror” and the ‘evil (drug-
producing/immigration-generating) slum to the south’ that Castañeda (Castañeda 1990, 471) 
described as the War on Drugs began, has become the ‘Latin American Axis of Evil’ led by narco-
terrorists (Youngers 2003) in the War on Terror. 
How then does this relate to Trinidad and Tobago and its absent narrative? In perhaps the most 
anti-climactic way ever, and in a way that has little to do with Trinidad and Tobago itself other 
than for the fact that it is situated within the Caribbean – the part of the LAC regions which is of 
least interest to the US in general. This chapter has consistently argued that the US, by virtue of 
its particular brand of exceptionalism, has formulated foreign policy in such a way that the LAC 
regions are seen as and treated as a monolith – and one which is primarily defined by the Latin 
American region. Currently, the dominant security narrative for the region has taken primacy 
over the global security narrative by virtue of that same brand of American exceptionalism. As a 
result – that global security narrative – terrorism, has been subsumed by the narco-trafficking 
narrative.  
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While Trinidad and Tobago does play a role in that regional narrative, it is not as a producer or 
direct supplier, it is as a transhipment point. It is therefore not even today, central to narco-
trafficking narratives or their hybrid narco-terrorism narratives, and even less so before 2016 
when reports of Trinidadian jihadis in Daesh began to emerge. Beyond this, one can argue that 
despite the connections to radical Islam and actual terrorist attacks which were outlined in the 
introduction to this work, as part of the LAC regional ‘lump’, these terrorism-related issues did 
not fit the neo-Orientalist character of the US’ global terrorism narrative and were not given due 
consideration. Consequently, Trinidad and Tobago has, according to the priorities of the global 
and regional security narratives, had no real reason to be considered as anything beyond a speck, 
one no different from any other speck making up the LAC region and therefore one requiring no 
particular attention.  The result, has been that radical Islam has flourished invisibly due to the 
myopia induced by US foreign policy. 
This chapter has ultimately shown that trying to explain the absence of Trinidad and Tobago from 
the global terrorism narrative cannot be done purely by examining that narrative, nor can it be 
done by looking at looking at the way in which any one US administration has interacted with 
that state. Rather, the argument here is that one must step back and look at the forest, rather 
than the trees, as it is indeed the forest which US foreign policy addresses. Chapter 3 is unique in 
this work for more than one reason. It is the only one which argues for finding detail in 
generalising where specification is the norm, and it is also the only one which can stand alone in 
an explanation  for the absence of a narrative. Nevertheless, it shall play a role in the following 
chapter which examines the absence of a domestic narrative. The discussion there, will continue 
to explore subjugated knowledges, their exclusions and how those exclusions matter in 
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explaining Trinidad and Tobago’s invisible jihadis. This chapter provides the hegemonic narrative 
which shall be considered in Chapter 4. 
In terms of the overarching argument of this work, Chapter 3 also, perhaps more than any other 
that follows, shows how profoundly our analyses can be affected by our approach to theory 
within the discipline. The approaches to theorising securitisation which were employed here 
were undeniably useful, however they became even more so when their insights were read 
through those offered by Agential Realism, which is not bound by the same concerns or residues 
of classical philosophy in theorising. It is therefore a satisfying start to this work, which shall carry 
this rationale forward into a more case-specific chapter, which looks at Trinidad and Tobago 
specifically. 
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Chapter 4 
Domestic Politics 
 
Once upon a time there was a magic island 
Full of magic people. 
Let me tell you a story 
'Bout their pain and their glory, oh yeah. 
 
Many rivers flowed to this naked isle 
Bringing fear and pain 
But also a brand new style. 
And of all these rivers that shaped this land 
Two mighty ones move like a sculptor’s hand. 
And today those hands, across the land, man, they're still landscaping. 
And there's no doubt we go work it out, there is no escaping. 
As the river flows there are those who would change its passage. 
But every common man got to under-stand up and send a message. 
So put up your hand if you understand now. 
Come. 
 
See how we moving, watch how we grooving 
See how we step in style. 
One lovely nation, under a groove 
The Ganges come meet the Nile. 
Them boys with the hidden agendas, and the mind-benders, 
People done take in front. 
Various smart-men, and politicians can come along if they want. 
  
David Rudder, The Ganges and the Nile  
 
In Trinidad and Tobago,  politics cannot be thought of as separate from culture, culture cannot 
be thought of as separate from history, and history cannot be thought of as the past. This is 
the fundamental argument that must be grasped in order to examine the case of Trinidad and 
Tobago and its absent domestic terrorism narrative. It is also the argument that will remain 
constant for this and the next two chapters of this work and for that reason, this chapter on 
domestic politics starts with the lyrics of a calypso song that illustrate this connection. 
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The music of Trinidad and Tobago has historically been very closely linked to socio-political 
commentary – something which shall be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5 of this work. 
This is reflected in the song lyrics above, which speak to several things, each of which is 
directly relevant to this chapter. Firstly, the lyrics reference the Ganges and Nile rivers 
‘meeting’ in Trinidad -  a metaphor for race relations between the two largest ethnic groups 
in the country – Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians. Secondly, the song points out that 
these relations have shaped the landscape of Trinidad and Tobago in the past and that they 
continue to do so in the present – the metaphor of the continuous flow of rivers is particularly 
apt for showing the continuity of these relations. Finally, the song references those seeking 
to direct the flow of the rivers - mind benders, politicians, persons with hidden agendas - 
highlighting the troubled intersections between race relations and politics in Trinidad and 
Tobago. Implicit in these lyrics, for those familiar with the history of Trinidad and Tobago, is 
the role that British colonialism played in these race relations and the way that they continue 
to impact Trinidad and Tobago politics today. 
This chapter is going to explore the political culture of Trinidad and Tobago, arguing that tribal 
politics is so deeply embedded  in that culture as a result of the legacy of colonialism, that it 
results in inefficient governance. These sub-optimal governing practices have, by extension,  
affected treatment of security issues within that state, which has, in turn, informed the 
absence of a security narrative for terrorism in Trinidad and Tobago. Additionally,  it shall take 
into consideration the way in which the domestic considerations and the dominant, 
hegemonic regional security narrative discussed in Chapter 3 intersect such that the 
securitisation of terrorist threat in Trinidad and Tobago was always unlikely.  Finally, this 
chapter shall look at the way in which other legacies of colonialism – legal and socio-economic 
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structures that predispose towards exclusion - interact with the political culture, resulting in 
exclusions which matter in explaining the absence of a security narrative. 
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Chapter 4 
Coloniality and the Absent 
Domestic Narrative 
 
In writing a commentary for the American Historical Association on the importance of 
Caribbean history, Lillian Guerra (2014) speaks to her experience of being questioned on  the 
preoccupation of historians with slavery in Haiti, as well as scepticism that Haitians could 
possibly remember slavery, which ended centuries ago. Guerra speaks to the ‘luxury of 
forgetting’ which certain societies - those which benefitted from the institution of slavery, are 
able to indulge in - while explaining that Caribbean nationals are faced daily with the historical 
accumulation of the effects and disadvantages of slavery. She does not limit this to slavery, 
but continues to explain how the entire experience of colonialism is part of the region’s living 
memory. Guerra states: 
Caribbean history matters for the same reason everyone in the Caribbean 
“remembers” slavery: the legacies of slavery, imperialism, and historical 
responses to it are, in the Caribbean, immediately evident in all the “weightier” 
concepts we associate with modernity…it addresses the most fundamental 
questions of who we are, what we believe, and how we got that way. 
(Guerra 2014) 
 
Puerto Rican decolonial scholar, Ramon Grosfoguel, in his commentary on modernity, speaks 
to the way in which modernity and capitalism are entangled. Grosfoguel (2007, 218) argues 
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that some states – those which reaped the benefits of slavery and colonialism - were by virtue 
of their ill-gotten privileges, able to move quickly through time, able to develop, industrialise, 
‘modernise’ such that it was easy to jettison into the future after colonialism ended. The other 
side of that coin, is that former colonies, robbed of the same opportunities, of their human 
and natural resources, and burdened by the social and economic institutional legacies of their 
colonial history, even in the post-colonialism era do not progress at the same rate (Acemoğlu 
and Robinson 2017).  
Linking these perspectives together, one can postulate that time moves more slowly for post-
colonial developing nations as colonial legacies are immediately evident and brought to bear 
on the daily lives of the people. This is no less true of Trinidadian society than of Haitian and 
it can be seen both politically and socially. That said, the colonial racial hegemony shall be the 
main apparatus considered in this chapter.  It fits Barad’s (2007, 147) characterisation of an 
apparatus in Agential Realism – it is neither a configuration of physical equipment, nor a 
material object in the world. Rather, it is a discourse embodied in colonial practices which 
produced, reproduced and continues to shape the aforementioned nexus while in turn 
transfiguring itself in response to that morphing dynamic, so much so that it has become 
invisible in the present context. 
The past is present in the Caribbean experience at all times and any attempt at analysis which 
does not give this due consideration will be impoverished - this is strongly reflected in this 
work throughout this chapter and in the following one. As promised in Chapter 3, this work is 
haunted by unconventional understandings of time. Whereas the previous analysis of 
hegemonic security narratives looked at the way in which an enduring ideological thread has 
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run through US Foreign policy,  this chapter looks at the way multiple times can be seen as 
concurrently forming the present. 
It will argue firstly, that the colonial apparatus continues to act upon on Trinidad and Tobago’s 
society invisibly, long after the end of colonialism – much like the mentality of Manifest 
Destiny has persisted in US foreign policy. In the place where it is perhaps most deeply 
embedded – the institution of government - it manifests most overtly. The persistence of 
race-based politics for over one hundred and fifty years, keeps the past so stubbornly present, 
that the post-colonial government has come to be stymied by its effects. The operations of 
the state move slowly through time.  Concurrently, the world continues to speed ahead, such 
that the present is made up of time unfolding at different paces. Globalisation has reduced 
time and space such that interactions with states and issues unencumbered by Trinidad’s 
history, become entangled with that history. Trinidad’s material reality is a production of 
these entanglements, which have led to, in the case of this work the absence of a terrorism 
narrative. 
This is the dynamic underlying much of what this chapter has to offer and with this in mind,  
this section will now proceed to look at the colonial experience and how it lent itself to the 
materialisation of a specific political culture within Trinidad and Tobago. It shall do this firstly 
by examining the way in which the British used exclusion as a means of social stratification 
and exploring how this facilitated the emergence of tribal politics in the post-colonial setting.  
 
Divide et Impera 
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‘The British enjoyed drawing lines on maps of other countries’ - the words of Shashi Tharoor 
(2017), written while chairing the Foreign Affairs committee of India’s parliament.  Tharoor 
was speaking in the context of the partitioning of India prior to the end of colonialism there, 
while making reference as well to Middle Eastern territories after the First World War. He 
relates this propensity to partition as part of  the British imperial policy divide et impera - to 
divide and rule. Indeed, Tharoor cites the partitioning of India as a manifestation of this 
strategy, as the British were  deeply troubled by the coming together of the Hindu and Muslim 
populations to revolt against their colonial rule in 1857. Neil Stewart (1951, 49), writing more 
than half a century prior to Tharoor, endorses this position. He cites Sir John Strachey as 
supporting stratifications in Indian society along lines of caste and creed, as hostility amongst 
the people was considered to be one of Britain’s political strengths.  
For Strachey, ‘the growth of any dangerous identity from community of race, religion, caste 
or local feeling ‘ (as cited in Stewart 1951, 49) needed to be prevented in order to maintain 
this power. Similarly, though not on the same scale, the British sought to divide to rule in 
Trinidad and Tobago when, by virtue of their both being colonies at the same time, Indian 
indentured labourers were imported into the Caribbean colony to treat with the dearth of 
manpower after abolition of the slave trade and subsequent emancipation from slavery. 
Much as Tharoor (2017) finds divide and conquer to have been the most enduring legacy of 
colonialism in India, Deosaran (1987, 63) says the same of Trinidad and Tobago, as he points 
to the functional nature of social stratification  which exploits multiculturalism, in order to 
preserve and perpetuate the colonial status quo. 
India and Trinidad and Tobago have enjoyed diplomatic relations for approximately 70 years, 
as its Mission in Port of Spain was established in 1948 – amongst its first after gaining its 
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independence from British colonial rule. The relationship between the two territories 
however began about a century earlier when in 1845 East Indian indentureship was 
introduced to the plantocracy of Trinidad and Tobago (Chand 2017, 143–44). Despite 
attempts by the landowning elite to control the haemorrhaging of labour in the immediate 
post emancipation context, they had failed terribly, only retaining 19% of the labour force by 
a decade after slaves were freed (Tsuji 2008, 1157–61; Reddock 1985, WS79).  Whilst still 
thought of as chattel – referred to as ‘cargo’ on ships for example (Reddock 1985, WS81–82), 
the installation of the East Indian population into plantation life was very different to that 
experienced by the African slaves who came before them. 
Despite arriving after emancipation,  the indentured labourers did not escape the social 
ramifications of plantation life. The European elite instituted a deliberate segregation 
amongst the labourers based on their presumed proximity to whiteness (Munasinghe 2001, 
261). There was additional division amongst those who remained a part of the agricultural 
labour force, stratifying not only the type of work which was done by each group, but also 
their associated cultural elements (Tsuji 2008, 1158–59). This led to the eventual 
internalisation of the stereotypes constructed by the European, such that each group began 
to link their acquired traits to racial and ethnic attributes and consequently, they considered 
each other to be ‘fundamentally and inalterably different’ from each other (Tsuji 2008, 1162–
65).  
Unlike the slaves who went through rigorous processes of deculturisation with the intent of 
forcing submission, and despite being closely monitored by the administration (Tsuji 2008, 
1166), the indentured labourers were not required to give up their identities, culture, family 
or lives in the process (Tsuji 2008, 156; F. McDonald 1969, 3).They were even allowed to bring 
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material items with them from India, bundled up into a piece of cloth known as the ‘jahaji 
bandal’ (boat bundle). These often contained religious texts, seeds and some clothing – 
tangible heritage which allowed them to better preserve their intangible heritage (beliefs, 
customs etc) (Chand 2017, 146–47). By the time a few decades had passed, the restrictions 
on the Indian community were relaxed and they were able to further develop their 
communities – even celebrating their religious festivals such as Divali and Holi from as far 
back as the 1860s.  
The Afro-Trinidadian population resented that the Indian immigrant community so 
successfully reinstituted its cultural identity. There was further resentment amongst the 
European population as ‘English’ was the aspired standard to which all were intended to 
strive. These tensions played out most prominently with the Afro-Trinidadians though, whose 
antagonisms lay in a distaste for this group who submitted to the plantation system willingly 
and who were compensated for what they and their ancestors were forced to do under slave 
conditions. Additionally, the indentured labourers caused a glut in the labour market such 
that it became even more difficult for the former slaves to find employment in the 
emancipation context. Meanwhile, the Indian community looked down on the Afro-
Trinidadian community as inferior for being outcasts on the bottom rung of society, and for 
having assimilated somewhat into the culture of the oppressor (Chand 2017, 154; Premdas 
1996, 9; Reddy 2011, 145). 
As a result of these societal tensions, the Indian community turned inwards, formulating its 
own groups to look after its own interests such that Chand (2017, 147) claims that a ‘miniature 
India’ was formed in Trinidad. Furthermore, in so doing, the Indian community found its niche 
in agriculture, such that in an attempt to retain the labour force after the terms of servitude 
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were over, 5-10 acres of land were offered to indentured labourers in lieu of return passage 
to India between the years 1969 and 1880. By the start of the 20th century, the East Indians 
became one of the largest land owning classes in the colony (Chand 2017, 149–50). Thusly, 
seeds of discord were sown between the peasantry of Trinidad on the plantations. 
Colonial Trinidad was a society where people and things mattered – especially as people were 
things. The colony was a collection of plantations which, though in the context of this chapter 
no longer physically chained black bodies to slavery, locked them into a social structure 
informed by it. Joined by East Indians during the period of indentureship, black and brown 
bodies were valorised relative to the plantation and relative to white bodies. This nexus of 
geography and bodies constitute the phenomenon of Trinidadian society in this chapter which 
shall be seen as intra-acting with the phenomenon of colonial racist hegemony.  
At this stage of Trinidadian society, we are able to see the way in which the hierarchy of race 
and class, constructed by the British was brought to bear on Trinidadian society. Entangled 
with the bodies present on the island, this racist apparatus enacted agential cuts on the 
society. Alternative configurations - such as one of mutual recognition of subjugation and a 
unified population of colour - vanished, as the black and brown communities, components of 
the phenomenon themselves became transformed, viewing each other through the colonial 
lens. Trinidadian society in its material becoming, now featured antagonisms between ethnic 
groups which further played out physically on the plantations as well as in the way that 
physical communities formed off of the plantations. This manifestation of the society then 
maintained the colonial status quo, reinforcing the existing racist discourse, but also 
transfiguring it to include these new dynamics. 
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Ethnic Discord in Trinidad and Tobago’s Politics 
 
The deep chasm running through Trinidad’s society has had significant effects on self-
governance in the island state, such that the ‘plantation  model’ of race relations (Deosaran 
1987, 62), with all of its patterns of dominance and submission transferred from the socio-
economic to the political context. In as much as the Indian community’s reach grew into the 
economy of the island, the coloured middle class came to dominate the polity (Premdas 1996, 
7–8). This is as a result of the planter-class of Europeans not inheriting power as the nation 
moved towards colonialism, but rather, the coloured middle-class educated elites, who were 
prone, if not groomed, to perpetuate the colonial dynamic under the guise of independence 
(N. T. Duncan and Woods 2007, 205–13; Girvan 2015, 97–99). Trinidad and Tobago’s Oxford-
educated Dr. Eric Williams was one such elite. 
Calls for self-governance grew in the colony in the early 20th Century. During the first few 
decades of the 1900s there were two different agendas being pushed in that regard. The 
Indian community was pushing for ‘communal’ representation based on economic interests, 
while the Afro Trinidadian and European population favoured a representative government 
(Deosaran 1987, 66–67). The latter was favoured by the colonial administration, along with 
an English language requirement for nomination, which immediately incensed the Indian 
population who felt that they were being excluded. This was a particularly sensitive issue for 
the Indian community given that their resistance to assimilation and preservation of their 
culture and language was a fundamental part of their resistance to the colonial project. From 
the very onset, they therefore felt marginalised in the self-governance structures for Trinidad. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that Eric Williams successfully rallied a majority of Afro-
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Trinidadians behind his nationalist agenda, which, while it spoke to a single Trinidadian 
identity, still retained underlying tribal influences (Deosaran 1987, 67; Spackman 1965, 284–
85). 
Eric Williams had a vision for the nation where in order to move forward as an independent 
state, it would require a ‘construction’ of a national identity where a ‘Mother Trinidad’ would 
replace previous allegiances to Mother China, India, Africa, etc. Under the gaze of Mother 
Trinidad, all of her children would be equal, and the artificial stratifications of the colonial 
social structure would be abandoned (Tsuji 2008, 1151). The hybrid ‘creolised’ values that 
would emerge from recognising the commonality of colonial subjugation would supplant 
ethnic cleavages and provide the basis for good governance. Williams believed that this 
already existed to a degree in certain villages on the fringes of the plantation society and set 
out to replicate this through a variety of methods, most recognisably in the ‘Best Village 
Competition’ which was integrated into the Trinidad Carnival and deliberately encouraged 
creolisation in performances.  
Despite the hubris of creolisation, Williams’ words were at times alienating, revealing his 
Afrocentric bias and deeply Orientalist views. He for example, referred to Indian traditional 
cultures and customs as ‘Oriental primitiveness’, which along with their commitment to 
agriculture, trapped them in lower economic positions (Tsuji 2008, 1153). The competitions 
reflected this, as there was very little Indo-Trinidadian participation, which meant that the 
hybridisation process was not taking place as he intended it. Indeed, the Indian community 
had already established its identity as incommensurable with creolisation, which was deemed 
the remit of the European and African cultures (Tsuji 2008, 1170–71). Williams’ vision for 
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Trinidad was therefore never realised, and as the Indo-Trinidadian community chose to self-
segregate, his politics became representative of the Afro-Trinidadian majority.  
Pausing briefly to recall the notion of temporal diffraction discussed in the previous chapter, 
quantum thinking allows us to conceptualise time beyond just linear terms of individual, 
identical seconds, each passing before the other can begin. We can think of time as 
ontologically indeterminate, of the past as continuously unfolding and happening in the 
present – a bleeding of moments into each other as part of the material world’s iterative 
becoming (Barad 2017, 67–68). As Trinidadian history progressed, from the mid-19th to the 
mid-20th century, the constant intra-action between apparatus and phenomenon continued 
to produce iterations of Trinidadian society which reproduced certain features as these times 
bled into each other – a racially divided community was one of them. 
 As the society moved towards self-governance, the colonial apparatus no longer existed in 
formal institutions embodied in the British colonial administration. Instead, in its own 
iterative becoming, the colonial apparatus was rendered invisible after being embedded in 
the minds of the people – pointing to the way in which apparatuses are themselves produced 
by the intra-actions in which they are entangled. This idea of the invisible continuity of 
domination by colonial forms of power  even after the end of formal colonial administration 
is referred to as ‘coloniality’ (Grosfoguel 2002, 206). Through coloniality, Trinidadian politics 
remained entrenched in ethnic antagonisms even in the self-governance context. 
With this in mind, the chapter now moves from the historical context which eventuated race-
based tribal politics in Trinidad and Tobago to the way in which that has been brought to bear 
on the governance of that nation. This shift in focus towards governance sets the stage for 
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discussing the way in which security issues are addressed in that state and ultimately, 
considering the absence of the domestic terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
From Discord in Politics to Inefficient Governance 
 
The period from the 1950s to 1986 is known in Trinidadian politics as ‘The Williams Era’ by 
virtue of the fact that Eric Williams’ People’s National Movement (PNM) party remained 
undefeated from the first election as a colony in the early 1950s, through the series of 
subsequent general elections after independence in 1962 (Reddy 2011, 194). Williams was 
consequently the nation’s first Premier during colonialism and later its first Prime Minister as 
an independent state. During that time, he had significant influence on the way in which 
democracy was shaped in Trinidad and Tobago as there was no credible opposition in any 
general elections (Spackman 1965, 289). Still unable to compete with the Afro-Trinidadian 
party, the Indo-Trinidadian community, as a smaller demographic, was moved to silent 
acceptance and a withdrawal from politics until the PNM regime was ousted after Williams’ 
death (Premdas 1996, 4–5). 
What was at play here was coloniality. Despite the move towards self-governance, the 
presence of the colonial racial hierarchy persevered in Williams’ words and attitude towards 
the Indian community,  regardless of his intentions to undertake a decolonising project on the 
basis of a common history of colonial subjugation. Intra-acting with the divided society, 
wherein the Indian community had already felt politically excluded in the first instance, 
colonial racist hegemony continued to magnify fissures in this era resulting in decades of 
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political exclusion and resentment. Even the partially self-induced character of this exclusion 
is a product of coloniality. Part of the imperative to divide and rule was to induce a sense of 
superiority wherein the Indian community was allowed to retain aspects of its identity which 
encouraged the feeling of cultural incommensurability with the Afro-Trinidadian population. 
The divided society which had materialised as a result of in intra-action between the invisible 
colonial apparatus and the Trinidadian society, therefore became mirrored in the politics of 
the state. 
In a 1969 correspondence with the Institute of Current World Affairs in New York, Frank 
McDonald (F. McDonald 1969) spoke directly to the race issues plaguing Trinidad and Tobago 
politics, questioning whether the cleavage between the demographics would endanger 
democracy there. Almost half a century later, as the country celebrated its 50th year of 
independence, these questions persisted, especially given the implications of the monopoly 
of the PNM during the Williams era. Commenting on that momentous occasion, Selwyn Ryan 
references the importance of Williams’ renowned political pamphlet ‘A Case for Party Politics’ 
for Trinidadian history, however argues that it may be time for a case for coalitional politics, 
or against two-party politics, given the disservice that party politics has done the country 
(Ryan 2012, 101–2). 
What informs both McDonald’s letter, as well as Ryan’s opinion on the state of party politics 
is the integration of the Westminster system of government into British colonies as they 
moved towards independence. Amongst the essential features of the Independence Pact 
made between Caribbean states and the British crown were: maintenance of the Monarchy 
(despite local heads of government, the Queen would remain head of state), entrenchment 
of the two-party system and preservation of the laws, institutions and symbols of the colonial 
146 
 
state (Girvan 2015, 95–96). Thusly, the Westminster system was adopted; however, as 
Norman Girvan (2015, 100) has highlighted, transplanting this political system into nations 
with features such as deep ethnic fissures and practices of social exclusion, resulted not in the 
system that was intended, but in a contortion which has profoundly affected West Indian 
politics. 
Longstanding concerns about the installation of the Westminster system in Trinidad and other 
West Indian territories have focused on the way in which it has not only institutionalised, but 
inflamed tribal politics (Hinds 2006, 35). Ralph Premdas (1996, 4–5) explains that the British 
parliamentary system is based upon a ‘zero-sum competitive party system’ which in the 
context of tribal politics results in the uneven distribution of privileges. He asserts that for 
democracy to operate effectively, partisan politics must take place under the mandate of an 
overarching commitment to the general values and beliefs which engender trust between the 
citizens of a nation (Premdas 1996, 5–6). In the case of Trinidad, this is absent, or at the very 
least, quite fragile due to the racial cleavages in Trinidadian society, which are mirrored in the 
political culture. 
What has arisen in Trinidad is not a political culture of trust despite differing interests, but 
rather the entanglement of race and politics, such that control of the government - political 
power -  is seen as the determinant of threat or survival to the country’s major ethnic groups 
(Premdas 1996, 7; F. McDonald 1969, 2; Deosaran 1987, 71). Ralph Premdas (2006, 15) argues 
that in the current context it is the material interests that seem to be the greater factor than 
identity, even if identity is used as the premise upon which to make arguments which lead to 
accessing material resources. This resonates with Girvan’s (2015, 101) position that 
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corruption and ‘plundering of state resources’ is another main concern regarding the 
(mal)functioning of the Westminster system.  
Accordingly, politics is primarily a site for competition over the distribution of resources to 
antagonistic ethnic groups, and public spending is linked to the ability to move the 
benefactors to re-election. Facilitated by a divided society – itself the product of coloniality – 
this particular character of the Trinidad and Tobago government can be seen as having 
materialised through the intra-action of the implemented Westminster system and the 
invisible colonial apparatus. The social and political reality of Trinidad and Tobago can be seen 
as an assemblage of intra-acting phenomena, all informed by coloniality, such that the 
nation’s politics, history and culture are deeply entangled. 
Whether articulated in terms of survival to the ethnic group, or in terms of material gains, 
power grabbing in Trinidad and Tobago is now a fundamental part of the political culture 
which has been institutionalised in the local iteration of the Westminster system. Each ethnic 
group has a vested interest in gaining as much power as possible and retaining that power 
indefinitely for survival or enrichment. Further to this, Ramesh Deosaran puts forward two 
hypotheses regarding the party on the losing end of access to socio-economic rewards. He 
proposes that:  
(i) The further removed a cultural group is from the source of socio-economic 
rewards, the greater the stress factors in that group’s attempt to compete 
and gain access to such rewards. 
(ii) The further removed a cultural group is from the source of the socio-
economic rewards, the greater the pressures for deculturalisation and the 
greater the likelihood that negative stereotyping would be used to justify 
that group’s exclusion from social and economic rewards. 
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(Deosaran 1987, 63) 
Following from these hypotheses, we can surmise that in the case of Trinidadian political 
culture, as much as there is the motivation for those in power to retain it, there is at least as 
much motivation for those out of power to obtain it. We can additionally see how the self-
perpetuating nature of this issue is such that it has remained relevant almost 50 years later 
from the time of Frank McDonald’s writing in 1969. It is on the basis of this perpetual struggle 
for power, that this work shall now continue to show the effects of tribal, race-based politics 
on governance and by extension, national security narratives, including those on terrorism. 
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The Effects of Race-based Tribal Politics on Governance 
 
Anywhere you turn somebody chanting to we 
Vote for we and we go set you free 
Somebody promising natural law […] 
Somebody clean out the weed well fast 
But somebody letting the cocaine pass 
Somebody promise to abolish the tax 
Somebody promise to give we the facts 
Somebody promise to clean up the land 
But in this clean land, rat still killing man […] 
Somebody take ‘One Love’ off the shelf 
Then the ‘One Love’ boys start to sell out dey self 
Somebody going to end all this talk about race 
But they can't tell me that with a straight, straight face 
Big, big men dying, the crime can't solve 
A madman rant is my only resolve 
 
David Rudder, A Madman’s Rant 
 
This section begins as this chapter began – returning once more to the calypso music of 
Trinidad and Tobago.  Rudder’s social commentary again highlights the focus of this section, 
by speaking to the continuity of race politics in Trinidad and Tobago and pointing to something 
which is very little spoken about in the available literature3 - the effects of race politics on 
Trinidadian governance and society. His lyrics further point to issues of crime, corruption and 
lack of accountability linked to the destructive political culture, which will be the entryway 
                                                     
3  By extension, there has been no rationalising of this gap in literature on the politics of the West Indies in the 
academy even when it has been pointed out. Conversing on this topic with Professor Robbie Shilliam, who has 
done extensive research on the British Empire in the Caribbean context, he has suggested that the drop in geo-
political salience after the British decolonisation period closed off academic interest in the area.  Accordingly,  
when appearing in the literature thereafter, the region is typically framed within topical politics such as CW 
politics. He believes that it is for this reason that discussion of West Indian politics emerged more through 
literature (e.g. V.S Naipaul and Derek Walcott) and music (e.g. Bob Marley and David Rudder) than through the 
academy. This is anecdotal and does not seem to be the topic of any writing emerging from the region either, 
suggesting that it is perhaps so naturalised within the academy that the exclusion is par for the course. 
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into discussing how this chapter relates more specifically to security narratives and the 
absence of a domestic terrorism narrative. 
The questionable ability of any sitting government in Trinidad and Tobago to govern for the 
entire electorate, as opposed to for their own ethnic group, has been cited as problematic for 
the development of Trinidad and Tobago (Premdas 1996, 10). Although this has been  masked 
by the benefits of an oil based economy, Selwyn Ryan (2012, 106) highlights that some believe 
that Trinidad and Tobago can be seen as having achieved what it has in spite of rather than 
because of party politics. Given the relative lack of research on the contemporary politics of 
the region in general and on Trinidad in particular (N. T. Duncan and Woods 2007, 203; 
Lowenthal 1983, 159), this work is largely left to piece this argument together from 
suggestions which run alongside the main focus of other scholarship on the presence ethnic 
conflict in politics rather than the effects of said conflict. 
Trinidad and Tobago (and most of the Caribbean) are amongst the few former British colonies 
which have sustained democracy for the entire of their existence as independent states (N. T. 
Duncan and Woods 2007). Despite its small size, Trinidad and Tobago has additionally been 
one of the stronger economies in the region by virtue of its natural resources in the energy 
sector. How then can one make the claim that its political culture has gotten in the way of its 
development? Kirk Meighoo (2009) addresses this effectively by collating what empirical 
evidence does exist and highlights that the quality of Trinidad and Tobago’s democracy is 
highly questionable and this in fact does affect development. He argues that Trinidad and 
Tobago does not reflect two-party governance but rather a ‘one-party dominant system’  
which, though achieved in a democratic setting of free and fair elections results in an 
unhealthy democracy and a dangerous setting (Meighoo 2009, 21–25). 
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Meighoo’s argument shows yet another iteration of the governing system of Trinidad and 
Tobago, eventuated by the legacy of colonialism. The Westminster system, intra-acting with 
the political culture of a deeply divided society, informed by coloniality has materialised a 
version – or a contortion, to invoke Girvan’s (2015, 100) description - of that system. The 
highly competitive, race-based  Trinidadian political culture - itself a materialisation of the 
effects of racist hegemony on society - has become entangled with the phenomenon that is 
the institution of government. Acting as an apparatus, it has enacted agential cuts on the 
Westminster system, transforming it from a two-party system in its initial state, to a one-party 
dominant system in the Trinidadian context. In so doing, the system of government has 
become particularly amenable to the highly competitive tribal party-politics of Trinidad and 
Tobago. At the same time, this intra-action has again, transfigured the apparatus, such that 
the race-based political culture has become embedded in the parliament – institutionalised 
once more as it had been in colonial times, even if invisible. 
In elaborating the dangers of one-party dominance, Meighoo identifies three hazards: a 
weakened parliament, blurring of the boundaries between ruling party and government as 
well as vulnerability and powerlessness of dissenting minorities. It is the first two of these 
which are particularly relevant to this part of the discussion. In problematising the weakened 
parliament, Meighoo explains that the absence of a meaningful opposition effectively renders 
the parliament a rubber stamp, where the majority position of one party often gives it default 
success in voting contexts. He explains further that where the lines between party and 
government become blurry, it not only breeds alienation and resentment from those outside 
of that party’s support base but it breeds institutional corruption amongst party supporters 
(Meighoo 2009, 25–26). The absence of effective checks and balances as well as clearly 
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defined boundaries are therefore exclusions which have emerged as a result of the agential 
cuts enacted in materialising the one-party dominant system and as Meighoo continues to 
explain – exclusions that matter in defining the quality of Trinidadian democracy. 
The ‘resource curse’ is a concept which Meighoo (2009, 28–30) links to these hazards and 
which also links to understanding how development is impeded by these hazards. He explains 
that the abundance of revenue which has been enjoyed by Trinidad and Tobago by virtue of 
its oil and gas reserves, masks developmental issues arising out of poor governing. Closer 
attention reveals that the country continues to experience concerns of a nature typically 
associated with countries of much lower income brackets. Meighoo gives a long list of 
examples of problems which he believes have emerged as a result of the race-based, one-
party dominant system of government in Trinidad - ‘crime, infrastructure, education, 
inequality, health, basic utilities, poverty, education and governance’ (Meighoo 2009, 28) .  
On unpacking Meighoo’s argument, the implication is that ineffective governance has given 
rise to these socio-economic problems in so far as the administrations have been unable to 
translate national wealth into collective human development. This can be illustrated by 
comparing Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, its regional neighbour. Despite having at least 
three times (sometimes four) the annual GDP of Barbados and a relatively small difference in 
per capita GDP, Barbados has consistently outranked Trinidad and Tobago on the Human 
Development Index for the last 2 decades (UNDP 2018, 26–27). Whilst it is unclear as to 
whether this has occurred as a result of weak policy making in the ‘rubber stamp’ context, as 
a result of corrupt practices, or both, this does seem to vindicate Meighoo’s position that one-
party dominant, race-based governance is negatively impacting development. 
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Attached to the resource curse is the idea of patronage. This refers to the government’s reach 
in terms of redistributing the wealth of the nation and the power dynamics which emerge as 
a result. Premdas (2006, 30) as well as Duncan and Woods (2007, 211–13) recognise that in 
Trinidad this is closely linked to dependency syndrome and retaining the support of the 
ethnically divided electorate, however Meighoo takes the elaboration even further. He 
asserts that because the economy and the society rely greatly upon the revenues of the oil-
based economy, controlled largely by the state, the government has a dominant role in both 
of these spheres, giving it immense power.  
Not only is there a very large public sector in Trinidad, but the state redistributes wealth 
gained from the energy sector to the private sector via fiscal policies such as subsidies as well 
as the purchase of goods and services to facilitate the running of the sizeable public sector. 
Resultantly the head of government and their parliamentary cabinet are endowed with 
‘immense powers of patronage from high-level executives and professionals to casual labours 
and unskilled workers, to private sector businesses…’ (Meighoo 2009, 30). This means that 
there is scope for extensive corruption, which incentivises the continuation of poor governing 
practices for government members. It also incentivises citizens who stand to gain from the 
patronage of the government to not oppose their actions. The government can therefore 
count on a significant portion of the population not holding them accountable for their actions 
such that – to reference Rudder’s lyrics once more – even in such a supposedly ‘clean’ land, 
‘rats’ (as opposed to humans) are somehow out there killing people. 
To add weight to this argument, Meighoo (2009, 26) compares international rankings on 
democracy, asserting that the ethnically informed one-party dominance of Trinidadian 
government has negatively affected these rankings. He cites The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
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2007 Democracy Index, which characterised Trinidad as a flawed democracy. In the 2018 
report, Trinidad and Tobago retains that characterisation – its lowest scoring being for 
political culture – 5.63 of a possible 10 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2019, 20). He 
additionally looks at the Freedom in the World Report for 2008, which classifies Trinidad and 
Tobago as ‘Free’; however, it is only given a rating of 2 out of 7 for its freedom rating. In 2019, 
this remains the case – with political rights also rating at 2 out of 7 (Freedom House 2019). 
Meanwhile, Trinidad’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
was at the time of his writing 72nd out of 180 – a decade later and it has dropped to 78th out 
of 180 (Transparency International 2018). 
As the updated figures continue to reflect impaired governance in Trinidad and Tobago,  and 
given the fact that race-based politics continue to define governance there, it is not an 
unreasonable claim that development continues to be impeded  by this legacy of colonial 
politics. We can add to this, the previous assertion that regardless of these negative effects 
on the Trinidadian society, large segments of the population (especially along ethnic divisions) 
stand to gain from keeping any given party in power and  may choose to overlook  poor 
governance such that they are unlikely to question  narratives put forward to any significant 
extent. Meanwhile, cognisant of the consummate competition for power, any ruling party has 
a vested interest in avoiding any narrative which makes it appear  vulnerable to criticism by 
the opposition and the opposition has an equally vested interest in delegitimising the 
incumbent administration to take power for itself. 
As this may still seem somewhat abstract and speculative, we can turn to the work of Darius 
Figueira (2010), who in examining the dynamics of racist hegemony in politics, offers some 
useful examples from parliamentary sittings. The first example is relatively mundane – a 
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debate in the House of Representatives on the Emergency Ambulance Service Bill.  This bill 
was being debated in July of 2009 as an  act meant to  register emergency health care 
providers as part of the establishment of a National Emergency Ambulance Authority.  
In his contribution to debating the bill, one member of parliament (MP), Dr.  Tim Gopeesingh 
(an Indo-Trinidadian) made a claim, without any evidence, that ethnic cleansing of the Indo-
Trinidadian medical staff at the Port of Spain General Hospital was taking place, such that it 
had become ‘a virtual African hospital’. In his response to the  MP,  the Prime Minister, Patrick 
Manning (an Afro-Trinidadian) responded not by neutralising the discourse in condemnation 
of any such acts and offering assurances that  they would be investigated and  prosecuted  
accordingly, but by dismissing it as inappropriate discussion for the parliament. Figueira 
(2010, 184) points out how this served only to inflame the racial tensions, and distract from 
the actual matter at hand.   What  one can begin to discern from this example is how routine 
politics in Trinidad and Tobago can instantly be marred and derailed by race-based agendas 
meant to  delegitimise the party in power.  It is also notable that the reaction of the Prime 
Minister was not to address, but to dismiss or remove from debate, the point of contention 
that challenged his administration. 
Another, more security-related example can be taken from two years prior, in 2007, as a 
Senate sitting focused on the  government’s treatment of the crime situation. In response to 
one   senator from the ruling party framing the crime issue within the context of drug-related 
violence, an opposition senator, Harry Persad Mungalsingh, claimed that crime was 
concentrated in certain PNM (therefore black) constituencies and that a response needed to 
take into consideration the ‘social structure’ of said communities. His  plan included  a change 
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in abortion laws and cash incentives for voluntary sterilisation along with exposure to drama, 
art and classical music (Figueira 2010, 178–79) 4.  
In both of these instances, ethnicity was invoked in the legislative context of the Trinidad 
parliament, interrupting the governance process in such a way as to derail focus on the actual 
issue, redirecting it towards identity politics, intended to disrupt and ultimately usurp power. 
In the first example, we can see how this can relate to material interests, while in the second, 
it is obvious how it can be linked to the more fundamental interest of survival. Looking 
therefore at the way in which historically inherited perceptions of ethnicity have been used 
the parliamentary setting – that is to say the way which history has intersected with culture 
and politics - one can begin to imagine why any incumbent administration in Trinidad and 
Tobago might be unwilling to politicise an issue as incendiary as terrorism. Indeed, this 
chapter shall now argue that  any Trinidad and Tobago government is more likely to attempt 
to depoliticise a security issue rather than securitise  it. 
                                                     
4 These examples both show  responses towards PNM administrations however, this does not mean to suggest 
that there is any shortage of race-based  discourse in  the other direction.  This is more likely to be seen outside 
of the parliament however and during campaign times than in parliament. As the PNM has been the governing 
party for the majority of Trinidad and Tobago’s statehood, having won 11 of the country’s 15 general elections 
from 1956 to the present, it is less likely to try to upset its own agenda in parliament than the opposition is. 
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Political Culture and Securitisation in Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
Despite its practical utilitarian nature, securitisation presents itself as bearing the potential for 
far reaching political consequences – this is particularly true for Trinidad and Tobago. The 
Copenhagen School does not regard security or securitisation to be ‘an unambiguously positive 
value’ (M. C. Williams 2003, 523). Wæver discusses the political implications of securitisation 
insofar as potentially militarising our approach to certain issues by facilitating their social 
construction as a threat/defence problem – issues which may be better addressed from a 
different perspective (Wæver 1995). He asserts instead that one of the main characteristics of 
the Copenhagen School is its recognition of this fact and its position that ‘most often our aim 
should be to limit the rhetoric of security and its accompanying politics of exceptions and 
emergencies’ (Wæver 2004a, 13). Desecuritisation then, can be seen as ‘the reverse of 
securitization, whereby issues are being moved out of the exceptional status, back into the 
normal policy making realm’ (Floyd 2007, 48). 
This normative position finds its roots partly in the notion of securitisation as being outside of 
the realm of conventional politics. Matt MacDonald explains that within the Copenhagen 
doctrine, where politics is considered to implicitly facilitate ‘the possibility for more open 
engagement and dialogue’ (M. McDonald 2008, 566), security and securitisation is characterised 
as its antithesis – the failure of politics. This though, does not seem to fit neatly with our case, 
where, as demonstrated throughout this chapter so far, politics cannot be considered as 
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facilitating dialogue of that nature. Indeed, it would appear instead that failed politics has 
become the default in the context in which it is meant to be most constructive. 
It can be argued that what has happened in Trinidad, is that the ethnic groups which comprise 
competing political factions, have in fact securitised each other, within the sphere of their own 
support bases. Political leaders and their mouthpieces have historically been securitising actors. 
Their securitising moves have constituted othering, based on racial stereotyping, steeped in the 
colonial mentality afforded them by the legacy of British colonialism, though contextualised in 
modern circumstances. The exceptional measures which they seek to put in place – if we return 
to the example of the Senate sitting on crime offered above – are the kind which require power, 
such that power seeking or power grabbing is a primary concern. This then resonates entirely 
with Deosaran’s (1987, 63) two hypotheses presented earlier in this chapter – that those furthest 
away from the resources are likely to compete the hardest for them and that negative racist 
stereotyping is likely to be used to justify exclusion. 
For Trinidad and Tobago then, the Copenhagen School’s understanding of desecuritisation holds 
as what would be best for society in theory. Nevertheless it is not, in practice, the standard which 
political actors are aiming for in Trinidad. Rather than desecuritise each other, political parties 
have a vested interest in treating each other as a threat. Incumbent governments are always 
attempting to avoid the politicisation of any issue, but especially of security issues which will 
threaten their power, and access to resources.  Interesting insights into this can be gained from 
looking at respondents’ answers to research undertaken for this study. The research was 
undertaken over ten days in July of 2018 in the form of an electronic questionnaire which 
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solicited opinions from Trinidadians both in Trinidad and in the diaspora. It was disseminated via 
social media platforms as well as through an email mailing list service and received 123 
responses5. 
Three questions asked in the questionnaire are pertinent to this discussion. Question 23 asks 
respondents whether they believe that the previous People’s Partnership government took the 
threat of terrorism seriously. Question 24 asks the same question of the incumbent PNM 
government. Meanwhile Question 27 asks whether respondents whether they believe that the  
incumbent PNM government ought to be taking terrorism more seriously. The responses to these 
questions, shown in Appendix I, suggest that regardless of the Administration in power, people 
generally found that little has been done outside of the routine legislative action identified in the 
introduction to this work.  
Even keeping in mind that national security measures are not advertised to the public for good 
reason, very little was shared in terms of reassuring the public that something was being done - 
at the community-building level for example. Responses to all three questions such as  ‘they 
never openly addressed it as an issue’ (Appendix I, p2), ‘Nothing was visible’ (Appendix I, p2), ‘It 
does not seem to be a focus to make the population aware of the fight…’ (Appendix I, p5), ‘They 
seem to be in denial that it is even an issue’ (Appendix I, p5) and ‘Is there anything to suggest the 
government are not in denial about terrorism (amongst other things)?’ (Appendix I, p8) do seem 
                                                     
5 Ethical approval for this research was received in June 2017. The approval letter can be found directly before  to 
Appendix I of this work. 
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to suggest that there was no discourse developing around treating with the problem, even in the 
expected and warranted absence of tactical details. 
Meanwhile, other responses to these same questions point to the type of politics which this work 
advances as being the norm in Trinidadian political culture. This can be seen in responses to 
questions 23 and 24: ‘They dismantled rather than build on the systems that were in place’ 
(Appendix I, p2), ‘I don’t think they took anything seriously except lining their pockets’ (Appendix 
I, p2), ‘No government takes anything other than their own agenda seriously’, ‘They played the 
blame game, spouted rhetoric and did nothing to increase national security’ (Appendix I, p5). It 
can further be seen in  response to question 27: ‘They need to take crossing the road more 
seriously, so yes - terrorism becomes part of the everything they need to take more seriously’ 
(Appendix I, p8).  
The responses to these questions support this work’s assertion that regardless of which political 
party is in power,  governance in Trinidad and Tobago is impaired. Given that these questions 
were asked specifically about terrorism, they also suggest that this argument carries over into 
the way in which that the threat of terrorism has been addressed in Trinidad and Tobago. It is 
therefore not completely the product of imagination to suggest that the absence of a domestic 
terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago is not a coincidence, or an oversight, but rather a 
deliberate choice made by administrations. 
 Paraphrasing from Wæver’s discussion on options that policy makers might adopt in order to 
desecuritise or to try to keep issues desecuritised (Wæver 2000, 253–54), Bezen Balamir-Coskun 
(2011, 19) identifies the three actions. Firstly, avoiding talking about issues in security terms; 
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secondly, avoid creating security dilemmas involving the issue being desecuritised; and finally,  
actively downgrading the issue such that it returns to the realm of orthodox politics. In the case 
of Trinidad and Tobago, security issues are not being desecuritised so much as they are being de-
politicised – that is to say that in terms of securitisation as process whereby an issue is 
transformed along a continuum of non-politicised to politicised to securitised (Buzan, Wæver, 
and Wilde 1998, 23–24). The Trinidadian case does not find utility in moving from securitised 
back to politicised, but rather, from politicised to non-politicised. If we therefore consider the 
Wæver’s  desecuritisation options once removed, we can see how they apply to this case.  
Starting with the second suggestion – avoidance of security dilemmas involving the issue – this is 
perhaps the strongest explanation for the absence of a domestic terrorism narrative in Trinidad 
and Tobago. By avoiding any public articulation of terrorism as a problem either domestically or 
as part of an international problem like Daesh, the issue remains invisible, even if the government 
is aware of it and might (or might not) be addressing it. If the issue remains invisible, there is no 
reason to speak of it in security or any other  terms. In the case of Trinidad, once the news of 
Daesh recruitment became public, this was unavoidable.  
Nevertheless, what did emerge as a result of the issue coming to the fore was legislation and 
international cooperation – a visual framing of the issue in legislative terms and global 
governance terms as opposed in security terms. In the meanwhile, only three press releases were 
ever made by the Ministry of National Security regarding the issue6. Whilst international news 
outlets carried news on US forces having assisted in foiling a terrorist plot on the 2018 Trinidad 
                                                     
6 The Ministry’s website which archives all press releases only indicates 3 pieces of correspondence with the public. 
See http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.tt/Media-Center/News 
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Carnival, with the US, Canada and the UK issuing travel advisories that terrorist attacks were likely 
during the Carnival, local news sources were reporting on the international media reports rather 
than having had any initial coverage themselves (CNC3 2018b). Whilst CNN was reporting that 
they had official confirmation that US military personnel from US Southern Command took part 
in the raids, local officials sought to minimise perceptions of foreign involvement and encourage 
the Carnival revelry. One business association commented in a press release on the ‘vagueness 
and opacity’ of the government’s response, arguing that ‘We should not be promoting 
uncertainty’ (CNC3 2018a).   
Such control of the issue allowed for it to be addressed in ways that minimised the ability for 
detractors to use it as an opportunity to delegitimise to government and allowed for supporters 
to retain confidence. Indeed, even the encouragement of the population to resume their Carnival 
celebrations was an attempt to actively downgrade the issue to the non-politicised. Balamir-
Coskun (2011, 20) explains that security issues can be either transformed or managed; 
management of a security issue does not resolve or eliminate the threat, but merely creates a 
sense of normality despite the presence of the securitised threat. Indeed it would appear that 
the culture of Trinidadian politics is to ‘manage threats’ which might pose a danger to the 
incumbent party’s ability to retain power. 
Jennifer Milliken speaks to the notion of discourse productivity and its reproductive ability in 
operationalising a regime of truth which necessarily excludes other possible alternatives. It 
functions in selectively privileging some and not others with narrative license, while also defining 
appropriate responses towards the object of the discourse (Milliken 1999, 236). Extending from 
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this notion of discursive productivity, Milliken speaks about common sense as a recurrent theme, 
positing that: 
Discourses produce the common sense(s) of societies, limiting possible resistance 
among a broader public to a given course of action, legitimating the state as a 
political unit and creating reasonable and warranted relations of domination. 
(Milliken 1999, 237) 
For the government of Trinidad and Tobago then, the identity of the nation as a ‘state without 
terrorist threat’ is a ‘social good’ (Gee 2011, 5) to be obtained by retarding the development of 
a domestic narrative on terrorism and promoting discourse of Trinidad and Tobago as safe from 
terrorism and safe for Carnival in particular.  
This social good possesses value on both a domestic level and a broader scale at the system level. 
Promoting discourse that gives the appearance of a ‘safe state’ protects Trinidad and Tobago 
from negative international attention which could pose economic and diplomatic threats to the 
small nation and the wider Caribbean region – a main concern of the electorate. It will also allow 
the nation to protect a ‘Trinidadian Identity’ which shall be explored in the following chapters. 
Furthermore, and most relevant to this chapter, the safe-state discourse produces a ‘common 
sense’, legitimising the state as being in control of security issues, and limiting resistance from 
the public, as well as political opponents, by controlling who is licensed to contribute to the 
narrative. 
The work on securitisation obviously has much to offer this analysis.  Yet, it is important to note 
that it only becomes meaningful in the context of understanding  the politics of the state, and 
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how that is deeply entangled with history and culture. Indeed, Balzacq (2005, 171–73) argues 
that context and psychocultural considerations are an important part of theorising securitisation.  
In this case, they are considerations related to the mutual securitisation of ethnic groups 
(symbolised by political parties) which in turn relates to the intentional de-politicising of security 
issues. Even so, the depth of this analysis was only possible by virtue of an approach which 
allowed the insights of securitisation to be read through the insights gained from a more 
profound look at the entanglements of culture, politics and history than approaches to 
securitisation could have afforded this work. 
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Impact of Contemporary International Politics On the 
Domestic 
 
This chapter has argued thus far, that in the domestic space, successful securitising moves are 
unlikely as the one-party dominant system government in Trinidad and Tobago is not prone to 
legitimising threats which may make them politically vulnerable. Rather, they are inclined to de-
politicise in order to reduce threats to maintenance of power, in line with material and survival 
interests along ethnic divisions. The race-based, power-grabbing political culture which informs 
this tendency is a product of coloniality – the way in which colonial forms of domination persist 
in the post-colonial context. This work argues that this particular manifestation of coloniality – 
the racist imaginary - has resulted in a context where despite sustained democracy and resource 
wealth, the country has moved through time slowly, unable to cut the restraining tether to the 
stagnation of colonialism. 
Taking time as ontologically indeterminate, this chapter posits that outside of Trinidad and 
Tobago – particularly in more developed regions – the world moves at a different pace, on 
different timelines informed by different contexts. These varied histories overlap – temporal 
entanglements - whereby the past is happening in the world’s present material becoming. 
Chapter 3 of this work examined the way in which the United States’ hegemonic security 
narratives continually move forward, propelled by their historical experience, which has been 
informed by American exceptionalism. It considered how this resulted in specific narratives being 
formed for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) regions and how these narratives have resulted 
in Trinidad and Tobago being framed as part of one very specific type of threat to the United 
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States in the contemporary context – part of the narcotrafficking problematique. It is the 
entanglement between the US hegemonic narrative and the Trinidadian political context, which 
this chapter shall now consider, as it seeks to explain the absence of a domestic narrative for 
terrorism in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Chapter 3 of this work concluded with the position that the nature of the global hegemonic 
discourse on terrorism was such that when applied to the LAC regions, it subordinated itself to 
the regional security narrative of the War on Drugs. Consequently, even in the face of the War 
on Terror being the primary security concern for the United States, it is still narcotrafficking and 
related transnational organised crime that is considered to be the threat which the LAC regions 
host. Concerns about terrorism are embedded within the regional security narrative, revealing 
hybrid concerns such as narco-terrorism, however the trade in illicit narcotics and associated 
illicit trade, such as in small arms and humans remains the focus. 
Within this chapter, the hegemonic narrative serves as an apparatus which intra-acts with the 
phenomenon of securitisation within Trinidad and Tobago. As an apparatus, it fits Barad’s (2007, 
147) criteria in that it is neither a physical configuration of equipment, nor is it a material object 
in the world. It is a discourse embodied in hegemonic practices which has produced, and 
continues to reproduce the character of existential threat in the region while also being 
transformed by the shifting nature of the War on Drugs. The phenomenon of securitisation in 
this case constitutes the Trinidad and Tobago government, the bodies which constitute that 
government (insofar as the racist imaginary is embedded in that institution) and the islands’ 
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communities – bodies and spaces which are the recipients of any outcomes of successful 
securitisations. 
As previously established, any government of Trinidad and Tobago has a vested interest in 
avoiding securitisation for their own longevity. The trend is towards management of threat – the 
appearance of normality despite the presence of threat - a situation of persistent insecurity 
rather than security. We can recall Meighoo (2009, 28) identifying crime as one of the domains 
in which Trinidad has been underperforming and which he attributes to the race-based one-party 
dominant governance. It is therefore unsurprising that administrations tend to avoid narratives 
of crime, as the persistence of this problem would make them vulnerable to opposition and losing 
power. This however changes when a hegemonic security narrative is introduced. 
Thinking in terms of the securitisation process, we necessarily remember Balzacq, Leonard and 
Ruzicka (2015, 504) who argue that it is necessary to take into consideration the latent power 
dynamics of that process. The United States, in its capacity as regional hegemon, has securitised 
the illicit drug trade and situated the source of the threat within the LAC regions. Aside from their 
domestic enabling audiences, the US could only enact their War on Drugs in cooperation with the 
sovereign states of the LAC region and therefore these states too form legitimising audiences. 
Recalling that Chapter 3 outlined various methods of coercion which were associated with the 
War on Drugs, it is easy to understand how the superpower’s influence was brought to bear on 
the perlocutionary effects of the securitisation process and the subsequent success of the 
securitising move. By extension, the domestic context of Trinidad and Tobago would have 
necessarily been affected by this securitisation. 
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This work argues that crime in Trinidad has, as a result of the overarching security narrative of 
the region, been framed in the terms of that organised crime. Gang violence, violent crime, drug 
related crime have all been securitised in Trinidad within the nexus of the organised crime 
narrative which spans the LAC regions.  The securitisation from ‘above’ allows for the domestic 
situation to be framed in a manageable way – such that it is possible for the state to show 
international cooperation as being a pro-active move on their part, deflecting dangerous 
criticism. Indeed, the interlinkages between crime, violence and drugs are not insignificant in 
Trinidad and whether intentional or unintentional, the drug-related crime narrative has become 
the default narrative invoked when discussing the issue. 
Thinking through this intra-action, one can argue that the War on Drugs narrative has intra-acted 
with the securitisation processes within Trinidad such that  in terms of crime, they are  now 
reversed – no longer moving towards de-politicisation but towards securitisation once more. 
Additionally, by virtue of the character of the narco-trafficking nexus, the particular iteration of 
securitisation which has emerged in Trinidad has articulated much of the country’s crime in terms 
of drug-related crime. Recalling that agential cuts within an intra-action materialise one outcome 
at the expense of other outcomes, in this case, the War on Drugs narrative has enacted cuts upon 
the securitisation process within Trinidad such that it produced securitisation of crime as 
conflated with drug-related crime.  
This chapter promised to examine the legacy of colonialism in the political culture of Trinidad and 
the way it relates to governance and by extension securitisation. It also promised to look at the 
way that domestic securitisation processes are entangled with hegemonic security narratives. It 
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has thus far done both of these things. It shall now proceed to fulfil its last promise – to look at 
other forms of coloniality that have led to exclusions, which reinforce securitisation along the 
lines of drug-related crime, at the expense of the development of other security narratives – such 
as one regarding terrorism. It will argue that these exclusions rendered invisible the 
circumstances which may have pointed towards the potential for radicalisation. To explore this 
further, it is necessary to take a deeper look at a different aspect of the phenomenon in question 
– the more material aspects of it – the communities which make up Trinidad and more specifically 
the way in which they have been criminalised. 
 
Securitisation and Criminalisation 
 
The literature on securitisation reveals very few linkages to criminalisation. The most commonly 
referenced link between the two concepts regards the securitisation of asylum and the 
criminalisation of migration. This has of course in recent years come to the fore as a serious issue 
in Europe and the term covers a very broad expanse of interrelated activity which includes but is 
not limited to: 
all the discourses, facts and practices made by the police, judicial authorities, but 
also local governments, media, and a part of the population that hold 
immigrants/aliens responsible for a large share of criminal offences. 
(Parkin 2013, 1) 
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Migration is of particular interest to the Paris School; Didier Bigo explains that the securitisation 
of migration is also a reflection of the fears governments hold of losing their symbolic power and 
control over their territory, as well as the interests of the security professionals who contribute 
significantly to the securitising discourse (Bigo 2002, 65). 
While securitisation in the context of this discussion of Trinidad and Tobago does not take 
migration or migrants as its existential threat, focusing instead on endogenous marginalised 
communities which have been identified as crime ‘hot spots’, there are similarities which can be 
drawn between the situations. Parkin’s (2013) definition of the securitisation of migration can 
easily be transposed upon the Trinidadian context with a mere substitution of ‘crime hot spots’ 
for ‘immigrants/aliens’ while Bigo’s (2002) argument explains why the government might have 
engaged in this type of securitisation. Although the securitisation literature does not lend itself 
to making a broader connection between securitisation and criminalisation, the field of 
criminology does provide us with a starting point for undertaking one such discussion by helping 
us to make preliminary links between issues of socioeconomic marginalisation and 
criminalisation, allowing for a discussion how that has can be brought to bear on the 
securitisation process. 
Criminalisation is a public policy tool which is intended to address conduct which has been 
deemed as harmful to society. In terms of legislature, it is concerned with the formulation of 
what constitutes a criminal offense and the subsequent punishment when transgressions are 
made. This by extension links to endowing state agencies with power for the purposes of crime 
prevention (McNamara et al. 2018, 92). John Muncie argues that a critical understanding of this 
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concept is crucial insofar as there are hidden dynamics involved which make it very controversial. 
These relate to questions of who has the power to define deviance, who consequently gets to 
determine when a transgression has taken place such that a deviant can be so labelled, and the 
potential effects of labelling (Muncie 2008, 14).  It is very much these hidden dynamics which 
have allowed for another form of coloniality to be brought to bear on this discussion – 
institutionalised social exclusion. 
Jeannine Purdy finds that in Trinidad, race and ethnicity have failed to be contiguous with 
criminalisation; both Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians having experienced periods of disproportionate 
representation in the prison system at different times in history. Purdy continues to explain that 
history has however revealed a more constant dimension to the criminalisation process – an 
economic one (Purdy 1996, 38). She asserts that criminalisation relies on criteria far beyond 
whether an individual has committed a harmful act; criteria which includes the aforementioned 
race and ethnicity in addition to class – all of which she posits are co-related. Socio-economic 
class is pointedly described in her work as a well-known and widely recognised criterion relevant 
to criminalisation (Purdy 1996, 40–43). It is also one which, as elaborated earlier in this chapter 
was constructed as part of the European racist imaginary. 
Purdy discusses how the legacy of British colonialism in Trinidad has informed patterns of 
criminalisation of the marginalised coloured population – answering the question of the ‘who has 
the power?’ in Muncie’s critique. This process began through the British upholding the Spanish 
colonial laws against slave resistance in the 18th Century and  continued into the 19th Century in 
a different form after abolition of the slave trade and emancipation. At this time the legal system 
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shifted to one which criminalised activities such as squatting, idleness and vagabondage, with the 
intent of criminalising ex-slaves trying to leave the plantations. It changed yet again in the 1840s 
when Britain granted Trinidad a legislature of its own and the laws of Britain replaced Spanish 
law on the island  (Purdy 1996, 52–53).  Criminalisation has therefore, historically been very 
closely entangled with black bodies and their physical situatedness in Trinidad.  
Under British law, legal discrimination on racial grounds was prohibited, however, in practice the 
system which existed during the days of slavery continued, as outlined earlier in this chapter. In 
the post-slavery era, labour regulations were enforced by criminal law such that East-Indian 
indentured labourers and working class Afro-Trinidadians and Africans were disproportionately 
criminalised for labour violation. Overall the effects of these legal implications were felt most 
strongly by ‘the urban underclass of poor blacks’ (Purdy 1996, 53). 
Michelle Mycoo, a specialist in urban planning, endorses this notion of the colonial legacy of 
‘more than two centuries of systematic socio-spatial segregation’ (Mycoo 2006, 135). She 
discusses this in the more recent post-colonial context, explaining the way in following the 
country’s 1962 independence it was reinforced by the newly formed government’s inability to 
redistribute wealth amongst its population, such that despite increase in employment 
an acute sense developed among the lower income groups, and especially among 
the urban black population, that the benefits of growth were bypassing them. 
 (Mycoo 2006, 135) 
Meanwhile the local elite, or as she describes them, the traditional gatekeepers to wealth, 
secured their own interests and retreated into distinct communities, further delineating this 
173 
 
socioeconomic marginalisation. Socio-spatial segregation therefore is a form of coloniality – the 
often invisible persistence of colonial forms of domination in the post-colonial context. Mycoo 
further explains that in the post-structural adjustment period of 1989 onwards, this was even 
more deeply ingrained as the austerity measures had facilitated widespread unemployment and 
poverty which disproportionately affected these marginalised communities (Mycoo 2006, 135–
36).  
In support of this, the World Bank attributes marked increases in crime and violence to poverty 
trends during the time of structural adjustment, highlighting that ‘although individuals of all 
socio-economic groups are affected, the urban sector is particularly vulnerable to these social 
problems’ (J. Baker 1996, 9). This chasm was further widened by the recovery of the economy in 
the early 21st Century due to an oil boom which enabled the social mobility of the middle class, 
yet failed to trickle down to the least privileged (Mycoo 2006, 136–37). 
Black bodies can therefore be seen as entangled with poverty, constructed criminality and social, 
as well as spatial exclusion – a situation characterised by a combination of material and ideational 
factors. It is important to note that this is the context which set the stage for the two important 
events outlined in the introduction to this work – the first coup attempt, rooted in the post-
colonial black power movement and the later 1990 coup by the Jamaat al Muslimeen. These 
events, as previously explained were respectively described as indicators for potential terrorist 
activity and actual terrorist activity, which shows the potential link between socioeconomic 
marginalisation, historical criminalisation and radicalism in Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Selwyn Ryan et al (2013, 26), investigated at-risk youth in Trinidad and Tobago, and recognised 
the role that this legacy continues to play in the state’s current crime situation. They explain that 
the way in which the past has unfolded has led to concentrations of crime and violence in urban 
areas of the state, primarily amongst Afro-Trinidadians. These areas later found themselves 
labelled as crime hot spots. Ryan et al define a crime hot spot as an area containing dense clusters 
of criminal incidents. These areas may be extended to include those adjacent to the one in which 
the crime is concentrated and where incidents occur on a relatively frequent basis (Ryan et al. 
2013, 20).  
The Trinidad and Tobago Police Force identified 52 ‘hot spots’ which were used by Prime Minister 
Kamala Persad Bissessar in 2011 in her justification for and execution of a State of Emergency 
(SOE) (Ryan et al. 2013, 94–95).  The SOE, she claimed, was necessary as a result of the surge in 
crime which was eventuated by the government having seized large amounts of narcotics during 
tactical operations (Ragoonath 2011). Therefore, in coming full circle, the exclusionary nature of 
the securitisation process in Trinidad as informed by its entanglement with the hegemonic 
security narrative, has led to securitisation of crime  which privileges interpretations of criminal 
activity as drug related. This interpretation in turn, has rendered invisible, circumstances 
comparable to those which have historically led to radicalisation in Trinidad. This work is now 
well positioned to show how this can be linked to the threat of Trinidadian jihadis radicalising 
undetected in the state. 
The most thorough examination of radical extremism in Trinidad and Tobago to date is likely that 
of John McCoy and Andy Knight. Indeed, these researchers reveal in their article Homegrown 
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Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, Global Trends that government 
officials informed them that they had not even begun collecting intelligence on this issue until 
2013 (McCoy and Knight 2016, 279) and as argued in the introduction to this thesis – there has 
been very little scholarly research on security in the Caribbean, far less for terrorism. These 
authors draw on terrorism studies to explain that Daesh, not unlike al Qaeda, is best conceived 
as a social movement which has amassed influence and territory ‘through exploiting underlying 
human insecurity in weak and failed states’ (McCoy and Knight 2016, 268). They claim that this is 
what has made Trinidad and Tobago vulnerable to extremism and recruitment to Daesh.  
Indeed McCoy and Knight link ‘extremist travel’ to the Middle East to ‘spatially concentrated 
poverty’ and ‘small arms fuelled violence’ (McCoy and Knight 2016, 268). Their research led them 
to the profile of the Trinidadian jihadi as being  male, Afro-Trinidadian converts in their mid to 
early twenties, poor and disillusioned, and often with a criminal background (McCoy and Knight 
2016, 283–87). These researchers’ work seems to support the argument of this chapter that 
these factors were not recognised as pointing once more towards radicalisation in Trinidad. In 
interviews done for this thesis with two former Ministers of National Security, both Brigadier 
John Sandy7 and now Police Commissioner, Captain Gary Griffith8 - they both acknowledged that 
socio-economic and spatial marginalisation were important factors in this situation. Brigadier 
Sandy indicated that he recognised this problem as a national security issue and tried, during his 
tenure as Minister, to implement mentorship programmes in at-risk areas. He however received 
                                                     
7 Sandy, John. (Former Minister of National Security). Interview with author. Tape recording. Port of Spain. January 
2018. 
8 Griffith, Gary. (Former Minister of National Security). Interview with author. Tape recording, Port of Spain. January 
2018. 
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no support from the government to sustain or make these initiatives meaningful. His attempt to 
securitise the problem was rejected by the enabling audience – the rest of the administration. 
McCoy and Knight recognised existing overlaps between gangs which trafficked in drugs and guns 
and socio-political movements – including one gang which identified itself simply as ‘the Muslim 
Gang’ (McCoy and Knight 2016, 288). Nevertheless, by thinking primarily in terms of drug-related 
crime, the state’s security agencies failed to recognise these linkages. Resultantly, the organised-
crime narrative was reinforced at the expense of the development of a domestic terrorism 
narrative, at the very least up until 2013 when, by the government’s own admission, it was not 
at all engaged with extremist travellers movements to the Middle East. Thereafter it is a matter 
of speculation, however if they were aware of recruitment into extremist organisations such as 
Daesh, the administrations made no moves towards community outreach or other such harmless 
visible activities. As these would have been positively received social goods the administration 
would have a vested interest in making them visible, even if not making their rationale public. 
Given Brigadier Sandy’s experience, it is quite possible that the administrations were, managing 
the threat strategically for their political benefit, had not recognised the threat at all, or 
recognised it and dismissed it as insignificant. 
 
This chapter has argued that coloniality plays a significant role in the absence of a terrorism 
narrative for Trinidad and Tobago. It has shown firstly how the legacy of institutionalised racism 
has penetrated the political culture and affected governance such that any administration has a 
vested interest in not securitising threats, but rather managing them. It has additionally shown 
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how the economic, social and spatial marginalisation of predominantly Afro-Trinidadian 
communities has made them vulnerable to extremism. In conjunction with these assertions, the 
chapter has shown that Trinidad’s security context is deeply entangled with that of the United 
States. The material reality which has emerged out of these intra-acting contexts is an 
exceptionally exclusive approach to securitising crime in Trinidad, where indications of a re-
emergence of radicalism in that society were not recognised as such, allowing for that threat to 
flourish invisibly.   
It is quite clear throughout this chapter that approaches to securitisation have a great deal of 
explanatory power in the analysis of politics in this case study. Indeed, as much was to be 
expected as both the speech act approach and the pragmatic approach to theorising 
securitisation retain a residual classical commitment to state-centrism and Chapters 3 and 4 were 
both very preoccupied with the behaviour of states. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there are 
integral aspects of this analysis which securitisation theory on its own could not account for. Even 
where Balzacq et al call for attention to power dynamics and psychocultural factors, it is outside 
the remit of their work to offer a framework for exploring them. Even where Wæver might 
recommend desecuritisation and offer a framework for moving backwards along the 
securitisation continuum, his work could not explain doing so for reasons other than more 
effectively treating with a threat. 
Both Chapters 3 and 4 of this work have demonstrated how deeply entangled the political is with 
the cultural and with the material in the production of reality. Both chapters necessitated an 
approach that would privilege neither culture, nor matter and enable the insights from each to 
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be read through each other productively. Both chapters feature hegemonic structures so deeply 
embedded in history that they would be invisible if a classical approach were taken to looking at 
the progression of time. As an approach unencumbered with classical commitments, Agential 
Realism was able to meaningfully fill the gaps left by critical security studies, allowing for a more 
profound explanation of the absence of narratives from a political perspective. 
These two chapters have already begun to show, that this case study would be deeply 
impoverished by an analysis which adhered to this disciplinary orthodoxy. It shall continue to 
make this case as it moves into the next major section of this work – two chapters which focus 
on cultural accounts for the absence of a domestic terrorism narrative in Trinidad and Tobago. 
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Chapter 6 
God is a Trini – The Myth of 
Trinidadian Exceptionalism 
 
 
This chapter is the second culture-focused chapter of this work. Where Chapter 5 established 
the historical basis for the way in which culture, identity and security are deeply entangled 
and have  forged a distinct ‘Carnival Identity’ for Trinidadians, this chapter concerns itself with 
another aspect of Trinidadian culture – exceptionalism. Trinidad’s distinct brand of 
exceptionalism comes from a well-established narrative that God is a Trinidadian and that his 
divine protection renders the state impervious to threat. This work argues that this enduring 
myth of Trinidadian  Exceptionalism plays a distinct role in the security culture of that state.  
Indeed this chapter shall argue that this notion that ‘God is a Trini’ is entangled with the 
‘Carnival Identity’ outlined in Chapter 5, such that another identity materialises - one  
powerful iteration of the ‘Trinidadian Identity’. This work endeavours not to fall into the trap 
of thinking of culture or identity as wrapped up in a neat, deterministic and reductionist 
package. Indeed, this position has long been discredited as problematic even if it does 
continue to appear within the discipline (Reus-Smit 2019; Goff and Dunn 2004, 2). It is not 
suggesting that this is the Trinidadian Identity – that is to say the only  one. It acknowledges 
that it is one which is entangled with many others to form that society, however in the context 
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of this work, it is the identity which poses complications for securitisation. This is what shall 
be meant when it is referred to as ‘the Trinidadian Identity’ throughout this chapter. 
This argument shall be made by first considering ‘exceptionalism’ as a concept. It shall then 
try to establish an understanding of what gives Trinidadian Exceptionalism its unique flavour 
before examining the nature of the entanglement with the ‘Carnival Identity’. From there, it 
shall proceed to examine the way in which the ‘Trinidadian Identity’ is brought to bear on the 
security culture of Trinidad and Tobago by examining four cases. Finally it shall conclude by 
highlighting the way in which culture, identity and history were central to this explanation 
and by extension what is at stake by either excluding them or not giving them due 
consideration. 
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Conceptualising Exceptionalism 
 
Exceptionalism plays a considerable role in this thesis. This is not the first chapter which 
considers the role of the ‘exceptional’. Indeed, in the form of ‘exceptional measures’ it is a 
defining aspect of the speech act stream of securitisation theory and a point of contention for 
others, especially those who espouse the pragmatic approach to securitisation and argue that 
these measures can also be seen as banal and situated within the everyday (Basaran 2008, 
340; Ciutǎ 2009, 312). This version of the exceptional within securitisation discourse is much 
easier  to elaborate. Scholars take Carl Schmitt’s work as an anchor point from which to begin 
their discussions which gives a convenient reference point for framing discussions (Browning 
and McDonald 2013, 241; Neal 2010, 57). The version of exceptionalism with which this 
chapter is concerned however, does not benefit from the same treatment in the literature. 
In researching this chapter, there was much to be found on exceptionalism. The literature 
however typically constituted case studies of national exceptionalism – political and or 
cultural. For something which is meant to be represent features so outstanding and therefore 
atypical enough to be considered exceptional – one cannot miss the irony that exceptionality 
seems to have been historically, and continues to be contemporarily, a common feature of 
the international system. This is captured in the spirit of Ronald Granieri’s comment that 
‘[e]xceptionalism is not exceptional, though every exceptional state is exceptional in its own 
way’ (Granieri 2016).  
Frustratingly, however, there seems to be a dearth of cases where the authors first explored 
what this concept means. Rather than offering any clear definition of what constitutes 
exceptionalism, the literature indicates that it is something which we take for granted, one of 
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those ubiquitous notions that everyone implicitly understands. Supporting this, there is one 
definition which seems to be reproduced almost exactly in a series of study guides19 by a 
single publisher, a legal academic paper (Goodwin and Whelan 2016, 1287) and even on 
academic forums hosted by reputable universities20, however none of these credit anyone 
specific for this definition. It describes exceptionalism as: 
The perception that a country, society, institution, movement or time period is 
‘exceptional’ (i.e. unusual  or extraordinary) in some way and thus does not 
need to conform to normal rules or general principles. Used in this sense, the 
term reflects a belief formed by lived experience, ideology , perceptual frames 
or perspectives influenced by knowledge (or lack thereof) of historical or 
comparative circumstances. 
(CTI Reviews 2016) 
What also is fairly consistent in the literature and commentary on exceptionalism is  passing 
references to the historical link between exceptionalism and nationalism, invoking the 
German Romantic scholars Johann Gottefried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (E. 
Kaufmann 1999, 454; Plassart 2015, 97; Backer 1998) whose work was preoccupied with 
notions of uniqueness in the context of ‘volksgeist’.  According to this idea, as cultural entities, 
nations were considered to possess a national spirit or soul, distinct from others (Granieri 
2016; Bendixsen 2013). Extrapolating from these various details, this work shall proceed to a 
discussion of what exceptionalism looks like, briefly in the wider context, but then more 
                                                     
19 Just the Facts: Textbook Key Facts  is a series of study guides for select textbooks. In no less than four of these 
study guides it has used the same definition. No citation is provided however each guide indicates that all of the 
material is either written or prepared  by ‘Cram 101 Publishing’ such that it is possibly the source of the 
definition. 
20 Oxford and Princeton Universities jointly organised a public forum in 2008 on Questioning Greek 
Exceptionalism as part of their Research Partnership Initiative. The indicated definition is used repeatedly, 
without citation. 
See https://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/files/exceptionalism/ 
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specifically within the Caribbean region in order to set up for the specific case of Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
Discussions of exceptionalism typically seem to happen along lines of political or cultural 
categories, though these are not mutually exclusive. The political strand is very common, and 
it typically rests on the virtue of the political tradition of a nation. This is a common feature 
underpinning for example, Nordic (Bengtsson et al. 2014, 11–12), Arabic (Beck 2015, 192), 
South African  (Lazarus 2004, 610) and Indian (Vickery Jr 2014) exceptionalism. The case of 
the United States, examined in the first of this work’s chapters on politics (Chapter 3) is 
perhaps the best known example of this and as it was already previously covered in depth, 
the chapter will move forward to another type of exceptionalism that has not yet been 
examined. 
Within discussions of cultural exceptionalism, ethnicity based exceptionalism is another 
common theme, often with political consequences. Japan, China and Europe share a strong 
historical tradition of their politics being informed by mythical understandings of ethnicity. 
Examples of this include Japan’s 20th Century with the hakko ichiu (all the world under one 
Japanese roof) approach (Van Fleet 2016) and China’s zhong guo policy which is part of a 
longstanding historical Chinese tradition of ethnically informed policymaking (Zhang 2013, 
306). It is perhaps Europe’s particular brand of imperial-based ethnic exceptionalism that is 
the best known though, especially in terms of its reach across time and space. Its ethnicity 
based exceptionalism informed its imperialist ideology which provided the justification for its 
monumental colonial exploits and which, as referenced several times in this work, informs 
the concept of coloniality, which perseveres in the absence of formal colonialism.  
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Othering was the primary means of asserting European superiority during the 15th Century 
when colonialism first began. Grosfoguel (2002, 210) argues that this began with  Spanish and 
Portuguese expansionism in the Americas, before spreading to the rest of European powers 
as they began their conquests of the ‘New World’. It was facilitated during early colonial 
periods by the institution of Christianity, then after the Enlightenment period by the pseudo-
science of Scientific Racism (Hira 2015, 138–39; Grosfoguel 2002, 211–13). The political 
ramifications of this type of cultural exceptionalism is clearly seen in the type of narratives of 
exceptionalism that has typically emerged in the ‘New World’.  
Assertions of exceptionalism are not common in Caribbean discourse and seem mainly limited 
to Haitian, Jamaican and Cuban narratives. Each of them relate to the colonial experience in 
some form or fashion and it is unsurprising, given the link between exceptionalism and 
nationalism highlighted early in this chapter, that these are also the states within the 
Caribbean whose nationalistic traditions have been highlighted as impeding the emergence 
of a regional consciousness (Charles 2002, 115). 
 Jamaican exceptionalism was devised as a social control mechanism meant to preserve a neo-
colonial structure on the island after independence. Fearful as they were of the Rastafarian 
movement, the Jamaican government attempted to discredit it by creating a myth which 
denied the Rastafarian claims of systemic race and class issues in Jamaican society by 
assigning that structure outstanding features (King, Bays, and Foster 2002, 66–67). In recent 
times, the concept of Jamaican exceptionalism seems to have been re-appropriated by the 
people within popular culture where it can be seen used in relation to discussions of national 
pride and celebration of accomplishment (Duggan 2012; Matthews 2013). 
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Haitian exceptionalism has been described in terms of ‘fragmented nationalism’ 
characterised by tensions between a national identity and a regional one whose history as the 
hemisphere’s first black republic has made it an icon (Charles 2002, 115–16). Charles argued 
that this is simultaneously constituted by a claim of ‘Blackness with a difference’  the desire 
to be a part of the constructed regional identity - institutionalised in the regional mechanism 
of CARICOM - which is inclusive and normative (Charles 2002, 123). In no small part, the 
tension between these identities is the legacy of colonialism. Additionally, Haiti’s European 
and American ‘punishment’ for its independence which has resulted in deep rooted political, 
economic and social instability has long marginalised it from full CARICOM membership and 
benefits such as freedom of movement and access to the single market (Tardieu 1998). 
In Latin America, the legacy of European exceptionalism can be seen in that narratives of 
exceptionalism seems to align closely with what we consider to be decolonial approaches in 
international relations theory. It views the Latin American region as a space where the 
universal mainstream theories of culture – those which were conceived of in Europe based 
on European perspectives – do not fit. It concurrently views Latin America as a separate space 
from which universal theories of culture no not emerge, but rather one where theories 
informed by indigenous perspectives are explored (Lund 2001, 55–60).  
Cuba exists on the cultural and political boundaries of Latin America and the physical 
boundaries of the Caribbean. Its exceptionalism is based on the understanding that the course 
of Cuban politics – and by virtue of the nature of its politics, also its economic development 
has been and remains deviant from all standard patterns of politics throughout history 
(Whitehead 2016, 3). Interestingly, in illustrating Cuban exceptionalism, Marisa Wilson 
chooses as a comparative case study Trinidad and Tobago. Through her comparison, Trinidad 
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and Tobago cannot be argued as demonstrating the qualities of either political or economic 
exceptionalism  (2016, 146–47) which naturally leads one to wonder – what in fact does 
Trinidadian exceptionalism look like? 
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Trinidadian Exceptionalism 
 
Very little has been said about Trinidadian exceptionalism and what has been said has not 
been done so explicitly, nor does it appear as such within the academic literature. 
Understanding how the concept manifests itself for this country has instead been in large 
part, an exercise in self-reflexivity as a Trinidadian. Indeed, recalling the unattributed 
quotation at the start of this chapter, exceptionalism ‘reflects a belief formed by lived 
experience’ (CTI Reviews 2016). It is from this position that I advance that the narrative that 
‘God is a Trini’ is a discourse that has come to embody Trinidadian Exceptionalism. This 
discourse varies notably from the other Caribbean discourses identified in the previous 
section, insofar as it does has not established itself at all vis-a-vis the colonial experience but 
in terms of its material circumstances. 
Having discussed the myth that God is a Trini in various fora before, the tendency is for people 
of different nationalities to claim this to be true of their own countries as well. The degree to 
which this has been internalised and the consistency with which it has been invoked and in 
some ways performed in Trinidad is, however, nothing short of remarkable. In his discussion 
of discourses on the War on Terror, Richard Jackson (2004b, 159) suggests a simplified 
yardstick for measuring the success of a discourse. This shall therefore be the reference for 
measuring the validity of this claim. 
Jackson argues that one can gauge the success of a discourse by considering four factors. 
Firstly, he suggests examining the extent to which the discourse in question facilitates 
authorities’ ability to enact their policies either with significant support or without significant 
opposition. Secondly, he recommends considering the extent to which exclusion of 
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competing narratives  have been silenced in the public arena. Thirdly, he asserts that when 
the rhetoric of the discourse has become adopted and employed uncritically by opposition 
parties, social institutions and ordinary citizens, it can be measured as successful and, finally, 
when it becomes institutionalised across political and social institutions (R. Jackson 2004b, 
159). As the chapter proceeds, it work shall show that for the myth that ‘God is a Trini’ all of 
these conditions have been met (though to differing extents) such that it has become an 
enduring discourse with a far reach. 
 
God Is A Trini 
 
This section will start with the last of Jackson’s criteria – that the discourse must be 
institutionalised across a range of institutions. Indeed – the most obvious of these institutions 
is the media, where reference to the myth can be seen in headlines such as ‘God (who is a 
Trini) Gave Rock ‘n Roll to you’ (The Trinidad Guardian 2013). It is even used offhandedly in 
articles about arbitrary matters like travel - ‘we just couldn't get it any better - you know 
the saying "God is a Trini", well we have proof’ (Morrisson 2006).  
Secondly, it can be seen as institutionalised through the pride of the nation – the Carnival and 
its associated cultural artefacts such as calypso and soca music. An example of this is a 2012 
song by the name of ‘God is ah Trini’ which was sung by a very well-known calypsonian, The 
Original DeFosto. DeFosto’s song was then adopted for competition by four different 
steelbands in the national Panorama steelband competition - a testament to its popularity 
(When Steel Talks 2012). The phrase also features in a calypso song revered as the unofficial 
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anthem of Trinidad and Tobago, ‘Trini to the Bone’ by another veteran calypsonian – David 
Rudder. The lyrics there read ‘some people say God is a Trini – paradise and all, convincing 
me’ (Island Lyrics 2011).  One can see therefore that the narrative certainly is established in 
social and cultural institutions. 
Less frequent references exist for usage by political figures, however, they do exist. One 
pointed example of this is when former Prime Minister Kamala Persad-Bissessar, in 
announcing a large petroleum deposit which would result in a windfall for the economy 
attributed the good fortune to this myth when commenting to the press (Daily Express 2012). 
Reasons for not seeing this more frequently expressed at the level of the administration might 
be argued as an indication of it not being as deeply embedded as this work suggests, however, 
we will recall the political dynamics of the state as outlined in the fourth chapter of this work. 
Any incumbent administration in Trinidad has a vested interest in keeping credit for itself in 
times of good fortune, while avoiding drawing attention to any shortcomings that might be 
highlighted when commenting on close calls. Politicians are therefore less likely to invoke this 
myth, even if it is a well-established narrative. This shall be revisited later when discussing the 
first measurement indicator. 
 Following from this, we shall consider the third of Jackson’s criteria, as it is by far the most 
visible in this case. The very utterance itself ‘God is ah Trini’ is common in the Trinidadian 
vernacular. This can be seen in the way that it has been incorporated into the everyday. One 
example of this is that it has been commoditised by one small business which sells a range of 
branded paraphernalia online. Aprons, pet clothing, tote bags and t-shirts all featuring the 
slogan are easily available for purchase worldwide21. It also features on personal blogs – with 
                                                     
21 See the store https://www.zazzle.com/relax_god_is_ah_trini_shirt-235539517044207654 
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one actually carrying the words as its name22 and on light-hearted social media posts as 
illustrated in Figure 1, shown below. 
 
 
Appendix III Figure 1 
 
Social Media is perhaps the easiest platform on which to see examples of this myth being 
invoked. Pictured below in Figures 2 and 3, there exists a functioning twitter account for a 
handle of God86823 featuring a digitally altered photograph of a Trinidad and Tobago identity 
card carrying a picture and signature of Jesus Christ.  The account which exists for 
entertainment purposes features as a comment on its profile ‘God, Lord, Allah, Jah, Fada…I 
                                                     
22see http://god-is-ah-trini.blogspot.com/2012/04/god-is-ah-trini.html 
23 868 is the international telephone code for Trinidad and Tobago 
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go by many names’ which even in jest, points to the way that this concept embraces the 
diversity of the Trinidadian identity and is universally understood by the local population.  
 
Appendix III Figure 1 
 
 
 
Appendix III Figure 2 
 
The fundamental rationale underpinning this aspect of Trinidadian exceptionalism is fortune 
that is so good that it can only be the result of direct divine intervention. We shall return to 
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this example later in this chapter as part of the analysis, however at this stage, a case has 
been made for 3 of Jackson’s criteria being met and the fourth shall be addressed later in the 
chapter.  
It is fair at this point to assume that the myth that ‘God is a Trini’ is an established discourse 
in Trinidadian society which shows linkages both to identity and to the Carnival. The chapter 
shall now progress to show how this myth has been rationalised into existence. As with 
carnival, it is an example of how the ideational is deeply entangled with the material in this 
case study such that neither can be excluded. Indeed, it shall in this chapter’s later analysis 
be considered as a phenomenon which intra-acts with the Carnival Identity, to produce the 
Trinidadian Identity which serves as an interrupter to securitisation. 
 
Rationalising Trinidadian Exceptionalism 
 
Geographically, Trinidad and Tobago is situated in a part of the Caribbean which is both so far 
south and west that it finds itself less vulnerable to hurricanes and tropical storms (ODPM 
2013)  in comparison to its relatively close neighbours such as Barbados, St. Vincent and 
Grenada who are more frequently affected and at times devastated by extreme weather 
conditions. Similarly, despite being just on the southern boundary of the same tectonic plate 
as Hispaniola and most of the Lesser Antilles, Trinidad and Tobago has not in its recent history 
experienced any earthquakes comparable to that which destroyed Haiti (ODPM 2013b). 
Furthermore, while there are as many as 16 active volcanoes in the region (Roobol and Smith 
2016), including the Soufrière Hills of Montserrat. That volcano’s eruptions since 1995 have 
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made half of the island uninhabitable and resulted in a refugee exodus of approximately two 
thirds of its population (Sword-Daniels et al. 2014, 471). Trinidad and Tobago meanwhile  
merely has mud volcanoes which have colloquially and light heartedly been likened to 
‘Mother Nature’s indigestion’. 
Instead, Trinidad and Tobago finds its most notable geographic feature to be the La Brea Pitch 
Lake – an anomalous natural asphalt deposit that is a tentative world heritage site. According 
to UNESCO it is the largest and most significant of its kind in the world, spanning 41 hectares 
and 72 metres of depth (UNESCO World Heritage Centre n.d.). This manifestation is an 
pointed example of the prominence of the energy industry which has almost entirely 
sustained the state’s economy for decades. World Bank data indicates that the petroleum and 
petrochemical industries account for approximately 37 percent of the state’s GDP while an 
overwhelming 70% of exports come from its downstream ore and mineral fuel industries (The 
World Bank Group 2016) such that it has become the leader in global exports of methanol 
and ammonia.  
While resource-led prosperity has facilitated a serious case of Dutch Disease24 in the state, it 
also has also enabled successive administrations to cushion the population in many ways such 
that the people have been shielded from many realities. The underdeveloped private sector 
has been held up largely by government subsidies, the population has long benefited from 
significant fuel, tertiary education, health care, utility and housing subsidies amongst others 
– in 2016 these subsidies accounted for 52% of the national budget (A. Wilson 2016). Thusly, 
                                                     
24 This term was coined by The Economist  in the 1970s to describe a phenomenon being experienced by the 
Dutch. Following the discovery of an abundance of natural gas, the effects on their currency were such that non-
oil exports became less competitive and there were a number of social and economic repercussions. The term 
is now used to describe a paradox in economics where what would appear to be a positive resource, has a 
negative impact on the broader economic context of a country . 
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the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago pride themselves on belonging to the one of the three 
happiest states in the Caribbean (Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs 2016, 20) where a permanent 
party atmosphere seems to have taken hold.  
This again can be seen in the attitudes of the people as it manifests especially in music which 
is very closely linked to their cultural identity. One of the most popular songs for 2017’s 
carnival may be one of the clearest depictions of this mindset. The Ultimate Rejects’ Full 
Extreme states: 
Recession doh bother we 
Promote a fete and you will see 
How we go party to the full extreme 
And light it up with kerosene 
The treasury could burn down – we jamming still 
The economy could fall down – we jamming still.... 
No we doh business... 
Get on like yuh doh business... 
Free up like yuh doh business... 
 
 
What we can surmise from this section is that the aspect of invincibility which features in the 
myth of Trinidadian exceptionalism is strongly tied to Trinidadians’ experience with their 
material world. Geography, weather, natural disasters, oil and natural gas, money – quite 
literally the matter which makes up the world around them and the sheer coincidence of good 
fortune regarding each of these is indispensable in thinking through this  issue. Combined 
with normative religious beliefs, these physical aspects of Trinidadian life have led to a 
discourse of imperviousness to threat, by virtue of divine protection. This reflects the 
rationality aspect of definition of exceptionalism given at the start of this chapter - ‘belief 
formed by lived experience’ facilitating a ‘perspective[s] influenced by knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of historical or comparative circumstances’(CTI Reviews 2016) . 
260 
 
 
God is a Trini and the Trinidadian Psyche 
 
The final example in the previous section - song lyrics linking us back to Carnival - is 
convenient, but not coincidental as it is in Carnival that we find an explanation for the 
integration of the ‘God is a Trini’ concept into the Trinidadian psyche. The chapter preceding 
this one,  in discussing how Carnival has come to be integral to the Trinidadian identity, 
explores Riggio’s framework of the Festival and Workaday Worlds.  It is to this framework that 
our discussion returns once more. In her elaboration of the Festival World - which we have 
established as informing the Trinidadian carnival mentality - the spiritual, the metaphysical 
and the primacy of the unseen characterises its actual essence (Riggio 2004b, 21–22). Riggio 
explains that: 
the epistemology of the carnival world, which because it is centred in 
imagination and intuition rather than in logic or reason privileges things of the 
spirit over the material or phenomenological 
(2004b, 27) 
Indeed, she concludes that there lies among many Trinidadians ‘an almost fatalistic belief in 
cosmic inevitability’ (2004b, 28). Following from this understanding of the Trinidadian psyche, 
it begins to make sense as to why factors such as geographic coincidence and global 
circumstances have been attributed to divine intervention. The Carnival ethos – the 
epistemology embedded within the Carnival identity has acted as an apparatus, effecting 
agential cuts on the phenomenon of Trinidadians’ lived experience – that is to say, the 
entanglement of their normative beliefs and their interpretation of the natural world. 
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Emerging from this intra-action is the concept of God is a Trini - a myth of divine protection, 
such that good fortune is inevitable. 
Furthermore, recalling Riggio’s characterisation of time in the Festival World as not holding 
with the linear Homogenous Empty Time (associated with classically informed determinism) 
(Osborne and Charles 2015), we are reminded of the non-linearity of thinking within this 
psyche (Riggio 2004b, 23). Rather, the argument was made for thinking in terms of temporal 
dis/continuity – and a ‘hauntological’ reading of history (Barad 2010, 240). In the context of 
discussion we see the bleeding of histories into each other as we have in each previous 
chapter. In this case, the ghosts of exceptions and exclusions from threat and disaster have 
converged in the mind of the people, intra-acting with religious beliefs such that their 
entanglement materialises an understanding of Trinidad and Trinidadians as exceptionally, 
divinely, protected. 
From here, we are well prepared to proceed to the next section which examines another  
aspect of  this myth of Trinidadian exceptionalism – the idea of a society whose resilience is 
propped up by its indomitable spirit – its indomitable Carnival spirit to be exact. In this 
upcoming section, the nature of the link between the Carnival identity and the narrative that 
‘God is a Trini’ shall be explored such that the ‘Trinidadian identity’ asserted at the beginning 
of this chapter will emerge and reveal its nature as an interrupter to security. 
 
Trinidad’s Festive Resilience:  #WeJamminStill 
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Having established the rationale of the ‘God is a Trini’ narrative, its implications are extensive. 
The material world informs the mythical discourse of exceptionalism which, by virtue of its 
linkages to the Festival World cannot be disentangled from the Trinidadian carnival-based 
identity. We shall now elaborate that last addition to this entanglement, exploring what it 
looks like, in this case when a society’s resilient character is based on the liminal character of 
the Carnival identity and how this is brought to bear on issues of security. 
Trinbagonians are known for their perpetual happiness, taking pride in frequenting the top 5 
happiest countries in the Caribbean according to the United Nations Happiness Index 
(Helliwell, Layard, and Sachs 2016; United Nations 2017). This ‘happiness’ is not, however, 
completely separate from the carnival mentality which informs Trinidadian identity. A Los 
Angeles Times article written more than a decade ago, describes the nation as having a 
‘perpetual party atmosphere’ (C. J. Williams 2005), a sentiment which continues to be echoed 
by visitors and reflected in travel blogs - one of which describes the atmosphere by saying: 
take a steel pan version of Pharrell’s song ‘Happy’, a group of friends and maybe 
a taste of rum and you’ve captured the mood in Trinidad and Tobago – friendly, 
happy and relaxed all of the time. 
 (C. Baker 2016) 
Meanwhile, Lime T&T, one of the country’s most popular event coverage media companies 
claims that its name – which references the colloquial term for partying or enjoying oneself  
‘is synonymous with all things Trini’25 (Lime.tt 2017). 
                                                     
25 This term came into usage during the colonial period when English sailors were treated for scurvy with lime 
juice. The sailors would get together in a group to go ‘get limed’ when they were onshore and were well known 
for their drinking and revelry while so doing. Various iterations of the word ‘lime’ have made it into the 
vernacular representing this spirit of drinking and revelry e.g. a lime (a get together or casual party), a limer 
(someone who frequents limes), liming ( gerund of the verb ‘to lime’ ) 
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Trinidadians believe that this ability to be happy and enjoy life in the face of anything – their 
ability to respond to whatever comes their way with the response ‘We jammin’ still’, makes 
the nation uncommonly (even if paradoxically) resilient. It can be seen as a defence system 
cleverly camouflaged as a fundamentally pleasant thing – fun, humour, happiness. In short 
whether they have intended to or not, Trinidadians have appropriated ‘escapism’ under the 
guise of culture as the source of their resilience. As this work will come to argue however, this 
has ultimately led to greater insecurity, rather than a stronger defence. 
Escapist activity is meant to enable an agent to avoid ‘consideration of offending beliefs’. It 
does so by disallowing said beliefs from penetrating the consciousness, and failing this, by 
distracting the agent from their presence (Longeway 1990, 2). Longeway suggests a list of 
strategies by which this might be accomplished including the deliberate affirmation and 
defence of positions contrary to the offending belief. Similar to escapism is self-deception, 
though where the former seeks to avoid by substitution with a more pleasant focus, the latter 
definitively seeks to avoid awareness of the belief entirely. Self-deception can be understood 
as an extreme form of escapism - the two often go hand in hand and agents tend to employ 
one over the other depending on the unpleasantness of the belief (Longeway 1990, 2–6).  
Through escapism, Trinidadians have found themselves to possess incredible resilience. In 
combination with the myth of divine protection that accompanies God’s Trinidadian 
nationality, they therefore believe their nation to be exceptional and in a sense invincible. 
This dynamic must be understood however as it relates to being part of an integrated 
Trinidadian identity and the discussion of how that relates to interrupting securitisation. 
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Trinidadian Identity, the Myth of Invincibility and 
Security 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Carnival - from festival, to identity to interrupter 
 
Chapter 5 concluded by bringing us to the point of understanding how the Trinidad Carnival  
created a Carnival Identity for Trinidadians that is inextricably entangled with history and 
security. By virtue of that argument, the conclusion was drawn that in the absence of the use-
value of resisting external threats, the new use-value for the carnival is ultimate affirmation 
of identity. This chapter has thus far added an extra nuance to this argument by explicating 
the phenomenon of Trinidadian exceptionalism conceptualised as God is a Trini. This has been 
articulated as the product of an intra-action between the Carnival ethos (embedded in the 
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Carnival identity) and the lived experience of Trinidadians. It facilitates a brand of Trinidadian 
exceptionalism which is based on a myth of the nation being impervious to the dangers faced 
by others. The ‘Trinidadian Identity’  has emerged as a result of intra-action between God is 
a Trini and the broader Carnival Identity. Within this Trinidadian identity, the underlying belief 
of divine protection is entwined with management of threat to the use-value of consummate 
affirmation. 
We have now reached a point in the chapter where the argument will present this Trinidadian 
Identity and its embedded myth of invincibility as interrupters to security. The position 
advanced is that threats are either disregarded entirely, as irrelevant, due to divine 
protection, or are reduced to threats to identity and treated with accordingly. In either case, 
the outcome is that they are never interpreted as being threatening in a larger and more 
dangerous context enough that they are successfully securitised. The result of this inherently 
exclusionary practice is that issues that matter remain un-politicised, or un-securitised, 
therefore leaving the population more vulnerable. This then is the paradox – that by treating 
with perceived threat, vulnerability increases, because the exclusions that are made, matter. 
At this stage, what has been discussed can be seen largely as conjecture. In an effort therefore 
to illustrate the reality of this dynamic, this study shall now examine examples of how this can 
be seen regularly in Trinidadian life and return to social media for illustration.  
 
Rotigate   
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The first example will look at the relatively harmless review of arguably the most popular food 
in Trinidad – the wrapped roti – by a Canadian health reporter. This is a very high calorie meal, 
in most cases, constituting curried meat and or vegetables wrapped in a flour roti skin26.  
Reporting for the Toronto star, Megan Ogilvie highlighted various nutritional facts, ultimately 
coming to the conclusion that the meal was best consumed in portions (Ogilvie 2017). The 
response this elicited from the Trinidadian population was powerful, as they took it as a 
deeply cultural affront despite the fact that there is evidence that lifestyle diseases pose a 
serious threat to the health of the population. The upset was coined ‘Rotigate 2017’ on social 
media (see Appendix III – Figures 3 and 4) and was covered by various news outlets (Santoo 
2017; Doodnath 2017).  
Lifestyle diseases are estimated to cost the Trinidad and Tobago economy 8.7 billion annually  
- an approximate TTD $6355 per capita - a figure that was made public by the Ministry of 
Health barely 5 weeks before the Rotigate incident (G. Alexander 2017). Two years before 
this incident, in 2015, Trinidad and Tobago was identified as ranking in the top 12% globally 
for diabetes and as far back as 2010 a locally conducted study indicated that 15% of school 
children between the ages of 7 and 19 years were obese (Mahabir 2018). 
None of these statistics are novel in what they reveal, nevertheless the population’s reaction 
is not to the facts, but to what they consider the cultural affront.  The threat that is recognised 
is being linked to the cultural identity and this is privileged in their response, with any 
reference to the facts being either ignored completely or cast aside. The way in which they 
do respond therefore hearkens back to our understandings of escapism. Avoidance and 
redirection play a significant role in this response as the conversation is directed instead 
                                                     
26 See Appendix III, Figure 6 for a picture of a wrapped roti 
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towards the reporter’s accent in her video report, or towards questioning other unhealthy 
food choices. 
 
              
Appendix III Figure 6     Appendix III Figure 7 
 
Figure 6, pictured above, is an internet  meme which was  created in response to this issue 
and the captioning speaks exclusively to the reporter’s North American accent and the way 
she pronounced the word roti (i.e. like roadie as opposed to row-tee) – it completely avoids 
the actual content of her video with regards to the health concerns. Figure 7 on the other 
hand, rather than ignoring or avoiding the content of the video, selectively engaged with one 
aspect of it – her portion recommendations. Instead of focusing on what was said about the 
nutritional values of Trinidadian food, the meme attempts to turn her portioning 
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recommendation on its head, redirecting the argument away from the local cultural cuisine 
and towards North American cuisine. 
Furthermore, humour plays a significant role in the response to this threat to identity. This is 
the manifestation of the same type of picong as was characteristic in satirical calypsos of 
yesteryear – the haunting of identity affirmation. Instead of being related to an external 
threat however, it is related to rejecting a threat on cultural identity. In this case, 
problematising the review as an attack on culture prevented Trinidadians from recognising  
the real threat of lifestyle illnesses which have a significant impact on mortality rates in the 
country.  
Joint policies were put in place shortly after Rotigate by the Ministries of Health and 
Education. One restricted the sale of sugary drinks in schools and the other created physical 
activity programmes to counter sedentary lifestyles. Despite this, at the time of writing in 
2019, the most recent statistics released by a Parliamentary Joint-Select Committee revealed 
that since 2017, the rate of obesity in primary and secondary school children went from 1 in 
3 to 1 in 2. President of the Diabetes Association of Trinidad and Tobago Andrew Dhanoo 
expressed serious concern at these statistics, stating that if the trend continued, the nation 
was at risk of half of its children potentially dying before their parents (Hassanali 2019). 
This case is very interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly we can consider the securitisation 
of this issue by the government of Trinidad and Tobago. Applying Balzacq’s pragmatic 
approach, a securitising actor would have made a securitising move towards one or more 
audiences, such that success would result in the implementation of policy measures by the 
government. If the medical community is taken as the securitising actor in this case, Balzacq’s 
approach would suggest that this was in fact a successful securitisation. The government, as 
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the enabling audience received the securitising move and in the context of increasing rates of 
diabetes approved policy measure. The convening of the Parliamentary Joint-Select 
Committee, the sale restrictions in schools,  and the activity programmes embody these 
measures. 
Despite these measures however, the desired outcome of the securitisation of the threat of 
diabetes as a lifestyle disease was not achieved. The theory does not extend into 
considerations of success beyond the implementation of these measures such that a 
successful securitisation could result in no change, or a negative change in the security of the 
referent object. Securitisation theory therefore excludes a consideration that matters a great 
deal – the effect on the referent object. This can be seen as a result of its preoccupation with 
the analytics of government – residual classically informed state-centrism making it less 
effective in the ‘real world’ despite its preoccupation with pragmatics. 
Balzacq advocates giving due consideration to audiences, both identifying them and 
considering the psychoanalytical factors which would be brought to bear on their inter-
subjective negotiation of the speech act with the securitising actor. In this case, we have the 
added complication of the referent object coinciding with an audience. Even if we assume 
that security analysts recognised this overlap, the theory still could not reconcile the paradox 
with their pragmatic philosophy. The rejection of the less powerful of the two audiences 
resulted in the actual effects on the referent object, while the banal routinised effects of the 
successful securitisation process were rendered null. Furthermore, as highlighted earlier in 
this work, Balzacq offers no framework for analysing the audience such that even though he 
critiques it, he reproduces the shortcoming of the theory to gauge how important different 
270 
 
audiences are to the securitisation process. Additionally, without a framework, there is no 
way to gauge how effective  the theory would be in explaining this paradox. 
Agential Realism on the other hand, clearly gives us a profound understanding of the 
audience/referent object in this case. Indeed it is by virtue of the analysis in these two 
chapters on culture that the paradox was identified in the first place. We are able to see how 
attempts to politicise and then securitise lifestyle – a factor that can be associated with the 
festival world and with the Carnival ethos that informs the Trinidadian Identity - were 
resisted. We can further see how this cultural identity, interrupting the securitisation process, 
consequently rendered the referent object – the Trinidadian population more vulnerable. 
Finally, Agential Realism, by virtue of its diffractive method, has helped to point out that the 
exclusion of the referent object in the outcome of the securitisation process is problematic 
and warrants ethical consideration. 
Taking a diffractive reading of the outputs of both theories therefore offers the most useful 
account of the situation and shows the value of integrating theoretical approaches that are 
unburdened by the limitations of classical orthodoxy in order to complement the exclusions 
of our existing classically informed theories.  
 
Tropical Storm Bret 
 
This is a pattern that can be traced across events which go beyond mere media sensations. 
We can consider for example the response of many to Tropical Storm Bret which hit the 
islands in late June 2017. As was previously explained, Trinidad and Tobago has been relatively 
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fortunate where natural disasters are concerned when compared to its regional neighbours. 
Even in the wake of several close calls with hurricanes, Trinidadians in particular (Tobago has 
not always been spared) have developed a misplaced sense of imperviousness and 
exceptionalism, such that the saying that ‘God is a Trini’  has become the default response to 
environmental threats.  
In the face of inclement weather ‘God is a Trini’ is invoked to defend the masses from 
confronting serious preparation – a response that would require dispensing, even if 
temporarily, with the party spirit. This was exactly what took place when Trinidad was hit by 
the storm. Immediately the narrative became relevant. One news outlet, for example, polled 
the public on their opinions on whether their Trinidadian god had given up his citizenship.  
       
Appendix III Figure8     Appendix III Figure 9 
 
Figure 8  shows a screenshot of a poll question that was run by one of the television stations 
during the storm. As this work argues, Trinidadians took the threat to the storm as threat 
being faced for the first time Trinidadians rushing to reaffirm their beliefs. Figure 9 shows a 
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meme which not only refutes the questioning of God being a Trini but goes further to 
contextualise that assertion. Not only is God a Trini, but he is so much of one, that he used a 
storm to create an extended weekend. Unable to avoid or redirect from an imminent threat, 
the move was towards the more drastic self-deception to reassert the myth of 
imperviousness. 
It is important to notice that in this case, having been challenged by the reality of the storm 
hitting the island, the response was first to protect that sense of invincibility, and secondly to 
escape from the reality and in reassuring themselves of their safety (regardless of it limited 
truth) turning the conversation towards the perpetual party notion.  
  
Appendix III Figure 10    Appendix III Figure 11 
 
Turning now to Figure 10, this example features the invocation of humour as part of this 
affirmation of Trinidadian Identity. The viral ‘salt bae’ meme was captioned to suggest, 
following from the previous example, that if a holiday weekend is too short, sprinkle some 
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storm on it, so that the party can continue. This idea of the storm as a site for performing this 
Trinidadian identity is expressed further in the meme of a ‘storm prep starter pack’ for 
Trinidadians (Appendix I, Figure 11). Rather than emergency supplies, it contains typical 
‘liming’ items each with different iconic values to Trinidadian party culture. The message then, 
was in order  to be prepared, be as Trinidadian as possible. 
Even during the storm, Trinidadians performed their Carnival identity with the level of 
creativity and picong one would expect from a society that lives the Festival World. Twitter 
handles were created for the storm (@StormBret) and for a galvanised roof (@galvanizeroof) 
giving the threat, and a symbol of a referent object – the roof of a typical Trinidadian house – 
personhood.  Throughout the duration of the storm they interacted with each other and with 
the public – satirising the storm and mocking even the politicians as calypsonians did in the 
past.  
 
Appendix III Figure 12 
 
Figure 12 shows the screenshot of a tweet posted by @galvanizeroof questioning whether 
the storm was at all threatening. It did so by comparing the Eurocentric name given to the 
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storm to the types of names students of the International School are perceived as having. The 
International School, being the sphere of only the most privileged in Trinidadian society, is 
associated with the negative perception of being weak and pampered – not threatening like 
a ‘badman’ or gangster. A storm thusly named could be no threat to the resilient Trinidadian 
identity. 
 
Appendix III Figure 13 
 
Figure 13 shows the continued satirising of the situation through these two characters. The 
roof – symbolic of the Trinidadian — yawns in boredom, suggesting that the storm is not that 
big of a deal (i.e. unthreatening). The storm, replies, quite unimpressed with this disrespect. 
The roof in turn mocks the storm by equating it to a man in an article of clothing typically 
reserved for women. The insinuation is that such a man is a joke – hardly threatening at all 
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and therefore the storm should just ‘go so’ – it has been dismissed in the Trinidadian 
vernacular. 
 
 
Appendix III Figure 14 
  
Figure 14 sees continuation of the dialogue between the storm and, this time, a citizen of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The citizen mocks the storm, saying that the Prime Minister has 
described it as disorganised and therefore not a significant threat. The storm’s response is to 
mock the Prime Minister, saying that people in glass houses ought not throw stones. This is 
in particular an interesting interaction in that it tacitly speaks to something of which  
Trinidadians are well aware. The way that the ‘God is a Trini’ narrative has manifested on the 
administrative side of security is that while, as indicated earlier in this work, it is rarely 
articulated in speech, implicitly it is practiced in the lack of attention and seriousness given to 
disaster preparedness and management. Trinidadians know this; however, it has never truly 
mattered as they believe that they are divinely protected. The various administrations have 
therefore successfully relied on this narrative to allow for their lax policies to go unopposed. 
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This finally illustrates the missing criteria from Jackson’s yardstick for successful narratives as 
outlined at the start of this chapter – that the narrative facilitates authorities’ ability to enact 
their policies either with significant support or without significant opposition. 
This series of examples are illustrating the invocation of liminality and the carnivalesque. The 
subversion of the storm’s power through mockery and satire and fun, the dialogical nature of 
the interaction harkening back even to the call and response format seen in the Kalinda of 
colonial carnivals point once more to the presence of the past in the interpretation of threat.   
It even links it, as is tradition, back to politics and mocking those in power, although now the 
threat is no longer linked to the administration as it was during earlier iterations of the 
Carnival identity seen in Chapter 5. Again it is hard to miss these hauntings of past approaches 
to threat, that are very much present in the way that current security issues are treated in 
Trinidad. As it has been previously established that they are rooted in a deep entanglement 
of the material and the ideational, thoroughly accounting for them will require an approach 
to security that privileges neither factor, but rather, reads them productively through each 
other. 
These images or responses that have been conjured up in response to the  Rotigate and 
Tropical Storm Bret are undeniably humorous, uplifting and indeed one can see how they 
might be interpreted as making lemonade out of life’s lemons. Nevertheless the question that 
lurks just behind every one of them is – when does it stop being funny and start being a 
problem? Is it when homes collapse? When entire communities are under water for days at 
a time? Unfortunately, the answer is no. Even as a relatively small and weak storm, Bret did 
considerable damage to parts of Trinidad including causing street and flash flooding and 
structural damage, yet this did not dampen the festive spirit. 
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Appendix III Figure 15 
 
Despite the typical warnings of entering flood waters – waterborne diseases, strong currents 
in some areas, debris, dangerous animals such as snakes and caiman - photos emerged of 
‘flood limes’27 where people enjoyed themselves in the flood waters during the inclement 
weather. Figure 15 shows a group of people liming outdoors during the storm, their patio 
furniture located in the flood water. The table is stocked with various bottles of alcohol and 
they are enjoying themselves, asserting the Carnival identity stubbornly amidst the threat of 
the water. This is reminiscent as well of ‘curfew parties’ which took place both during the 
coup of 1990 (Thomas 2010, 74) and the State of Emergency declared in 2011 (Marcelle 2011).  
What then does securitisation theory have to offer us in analysing this example? Firstly, it 
would question whether any securitisation had taken place in this instance. The 
meteorological office would have been the securitising actor, who by virtue of weather 
bulletins and declarations of storm watch and storm warnings would have identified the 
                                                     
27 See footnote 7 for explanation of usage of the word ‘lime’ in the Trinidadian vernacular 
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threat to the referent object of Trinidad and Tobago and its people to multiple audiences – 
the government and the population. We can see clearly that in keeping with the argument of 
this work and following form the previous example, that the population, serving as both 
referent object and audience rejected the securitising move through invocation of 
exceptionalism embedded within the Trinidadian identity and performed through the 
affirmation of the Carnival identity. The outcome, as it was before, was a population rendered 
more vulnerable. The difference in this case though, is that unlike in the case of Rotigate – 
the government did not agree to securitise this issue. 
From the perspective of a theory concerned with survival and the pragmatic actions of 
government, this does not appear to be rational, especially when neighbouring islands have 
regularly been seriously affected by storms and hurricanes. We see here, how the myth of 
invincibility implicitly operates within the action of the government as well. Another aspect 
of this situation which securitisation theory might address is the deliberate de-securitisation 
of the threat by the Prime Minister by declaring it a disorganised weather system to the 
public. Recalling Chapter 4 of this work, any Trinidad government would have a vested 
interest in doing this – especially with rationales underlined by the myth of invincibility. 
Chapter 4 of this work argued that given the dynamics of race-based politics in Trinidad, 
administrations are unlikely to make visible any vulnerability which opponents might take 
advantage of in order to delegitimise the incumbent administration and obtain power. Citing 
Wæver’s position that certain issues are best dealt with within the realm of ‘normal’ politics, 
it highlighted that desecuritisation is the preferred course of action by securitisation theory 
as in its original form forwarded by the Copenhagen School (Wæver 2000, 253–54). Despite 
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this, the argument was made that in Trinidad’s political culture, the preferred course of action 
goes beyond de-securitising, to de-politicising, in order to avoid opposition.  
In this case, as the storm was already being articulated as a threat by the meteorological 
office, so there was already a movement along the continuum from politicised to securitised. 
In keeping with the argument presented on the way in which political culture informs 
securitisation in Trinidad, the government sought to move backwards, away from 
securitisation, back towards politicisation, accounting for the Prime Minister’s choice of 
describing the storm as a ‘disorganised system’28. Here however we are left with another 
paradox.  
This de-securitisation, especially in conjunction with the rejection of the securitising move of 
population, once again rendered the referent object more vulnerable. By avoiding 
securitisation – the country remained with under-developed emergency response systems. 
For example, the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management remains underfunded and 
understaffed, such that when there was unprecedented flooding all over the island in October 
201829 – there was no team in place to treat with the imminent threat to life and land. Further 
to this,  never having been securitised as a result of the enduring myth that ‘God is a Trini’, 
there were never any policy measures put in place to coordinate the protective services to 
respond to the threat.  
During the 2018 flood, the coast guard for example, had no vessels small enough to navigate 
the flooded neighbourhoods where families were marooned on top of their houses or trapped 
                                                     
28 In the spirit of keeping exclusions in mind, it is also possible and to some extent likely that this position was 
also taken to prevent panic amongst a population unused to dealing with adverse conditions however this does 
not change the subsequent argument. 
29  See YouTube video entitled ‘Flood in Trinidad and Tobago Compilation 20th & 21st October 2018 for footage 
to contextualise the extent of this situation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHMM2ldgypg 
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inside of them in precarious positions. Indeed – that de-securitisation be considered 
favourable without very specific caveats indicates a classical vein underlying the theory – that 
the states in question are all the same in terms of resources, priorities and rationales which 
would ultimately favour a de-securitised approach with a positive outcome for dealing with a 
perceived threat. The great irony attached to this is that finally faced with a crisis beyond 
anything experienced previously, affecting so much of the island and in the face of a 
government response so obviously inadequate – the population’s belief in the myth of 
invincibility was suspended long enough that one form of exceptionality was replaced by 
another.  
The exceptional measures ought to have been activated by the government according to 
securitisation theories which frame these measures in terms of policy and politics. 
Nevertheless, they were mustered and activated by the people themselves. Fishermen, river-
tour guides, private citizens with leisure crafts, divers and surfers from all different parts of 
the country converged on areas which were affected, rescuing families that had been 
stranded, at times for days without food, water or shelter on top of homes as pictured in 
Figure 18 below (Seelal 2018; Dowrich-Phillips 2018; TTOC 2018).  
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Appendix III Figure 18 
 
 
Appendix III Figure 17 
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An example of this can be seen in Figure, 17 shown above which features a post from the 
Facebook Page ‘Traffik Spotters TT’. This group typically operates regarding day to day road 
traffic situations. However, in this situation, it turned into a first responder coordinating 
rescue efforts.  The caption states ‘Traffik Spotters TT Members…organised a boat to help out 
in Ibis Gardens…volunteers needed to man the boat and rescue and also needed - someone 
from the area to help mobilise boat routes’. Similar responses can be seen below in other 
examples. 
 
 
 
Appendix III Figure 19 
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Figure 19 shows a post by a local vet coordinating to go to rural areas which were affected, 
to help treat animals to avoid public health issues. She speaks about the potential for 
outbreaks of diseases such as leptospirosis and how transmission relates to flood conditions, 
before continuing to try to mobilise resources for this private undertaking. Meanwhile, As 
makeshift shelters began to emerge through religious organisations, the officially designated 
shelters having themselves been submerged, local businesses added to the effort by 
preparing food for victims at shelters.  An example of this  can be seen in Figure 20, where a 
single restaurant prepared food for hundreds of citizens. 
 
Appendix III Figure 20 
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 In a way, the citizens rather than government were the ones to ultimately securitise the 
threat in the immediate sense. Counterintuitively, they, rather than the government, were 
the enabling audience, and citizens, rather than official agencies were the first responders, 
performing tasks usually coordinated by government agencies created for that purpose. They 
were later joined by the defence forces when they were able to address their resource and 
logistics issues. Neither a speech act nor a pragmatic approach to securitisation can explain 
this phenomenon.  Yet, it reveals one very important point that the myth itself was a specific 
interrupter to action for both audiences and that when removed, security was increased for 
the referent object. 
The case of Bret and the 2018 floods take the chapter a step closer to understanding how this 
discussion speaks to more traditional security issues, leading up to terrorism. The next 
example takes it further in that direction, by directly linking national security issues with the 
Carnival identity. 
 
Parts Unknown 
 
Celebrity food reporter Anthony Bourdain visited Trinidad and Tobago in early 2017. His visit 
initially met with much excitement by the locals. This changed several months later when his 
field notes of his time in the country revealed that despite being received by the typical warm, 
friendly, Trinidadian atmosphere that locals take pride in, the country’s crime statistics point 
to its many social ills (Bourdain 2017). The CNN synopsis of the episode pointed explicitly to 
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the chef questioning whether the country’s fete culture might be related to this crime issue 
(CNN 2017).  
People became even more disgruntled when the episode of his television show Parts 
Unknown aired and Bourdain quoted verifiable statistics comparing the crime rates in 
Trinidad to those of large cities in the US and found that it was much higher in the islands. He 
stated: 
Trinidad, with a population of only 1.3 million people had 460 murders last 
year, giving Port of Spain a per capita murder rate higher than Detroit, Oakland 
or Chicago 
(‘Trinidad’ 2017) 
Further to this, Bourdain interviewed a young man, Muhammad Muwakil, a musician who 
grew up in the Jamaat al Muslimeen compound, as his father took part in the 1990 coup. They 
spoke about Trinidad’s social ills and the role they have played historically in radicalism  on 
the island and how that might relate to current trends of radicalisation. As the interview 
progresses, the pair discuss Daesh recruitment and Bourdain asks Muwakil his opinion. His 
response directly linked the current situation to the 1990 coup. ‘Exclusion breeds crime’ he 
responded, before continuing to explain that the type of socio-economic conditions which 
both contexts share and which he believes have motivated radicalisation and Daesh 
recruitment from Trinidad (‘Trinidad’ 2017).  
This endorses the argument presented in Chapter 4 of this work that domestic security 
narratives are informed by the regional hegemonic narrative on transnational organised 
crime. Criminal activity was shown to be linked both to poverty and to Daesh recruitment, 
however, has been securitised in terms of drug-related violence, at the expense of deeper 
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considerations. The relevance to this chapter comes in the response to the question which 
followed. Bourdain next asked ‘Would you say that Carnival and that Carnival attitude – might 
as well be a brilliant strategy to narcotise the people into being satisfied with the status quo?’. 
Muhammad’s response aligns perfectly with this chapter: 
Everything here is somehow designed to pacify, without us really realising it. 
So our music, which is supposed to give us adrenaline ... is just doling out 
sleeping pills – like – go ahead, enjoy yourself … you’re a Trini. Trini means fun 
loving and happy, despite whatever it is… 
(‘Trinidad’ 2017) 
Muwakil’s response is a particularly strong example for this work because it links both politics 
chapters to the culture chapters, highlighting once more the entanglement between cultural 
identity and security in Trinidad and Tobago.  
Returning to the public response to Bourdain, the facts  and opinions presented are again not 
unknown or unfamiliar to the people, however the country was once more reported in the 
media as being outraged (Boodram 2017)– not about the crime or the terrorist links 
discussed, but about the criticism of the island  and about class relations  - issues related to 
identity. Indeed in Figure 21, shown below, we are able to see one citizen whose response to 
Bourdain’s criticism was to take it personally in terms of ‘Trinidadians and Trinidad’, before 
trying to discredit the chef by questioning the extent of his travels, despite that being 
unrelated to the facts that Bourdain presented. 
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Figure 22, shown above presents us with a screenshot which more fully reflects the argument 
which this work makes. When unpacked, the comment shows a number of things. Firstly, 
there is a negative preoccupation with the Trinidadians who were interviewed that spoke 
about our ISIS recruitment. The person posting the message on social media asks specifically 
why there was no anger in response to ‘interviewees that told the world that we are a large 
supplier of ISIS fighters’.  Those persons – the reporter who broke the ISIS recruitment story 
in local news, and a young man who grew up in the Jamaat al Muslimeen - like Bourdain, 
spoke about facts that have been reported in the news repeatedly and which were published 
in an academic journal30. Nevertheless, the commenter was concerned with the way this 
made Trinidadians appear to the world – challenging the Trinidadian identity. Furthermore, 
she chose to gloss over the loaded commentary given by members of the Syrian-Lebanese 
community, which promoted very divisive views about Trinidadian society.  
During a dinner with a prominent Syrian-Lebanese family, one of the country’s most 
successful businessmen made a prideful comment to Bourdain that he had in one of his 
businesses, created the Starbucks of the Caribbean. He followed it up by asserting that as the 
smallest ethnic group in Trinidad, the 1% of  Arabs controlled 99% of the economy. He even 
reduced the middle class to a ‘buffer zone’ between themselves and criminals, between the 
haves and the have nots (‘Trinidad’ 2017). Ultimately, the businessman was forced to issue 
an apology as the backlash was significant (Dowlat 2017). There was, indeed, the expected 
and unacceptable racist vitriol directed towards the Syrian-Lebanese community. This was 
entwined with a proliferation of conspiracy theories about their involvement in crime (a very 
long established rumour) (Hadeed 2018).  
                                                     
30 See McCoy and Knight (2016) cited earlier in this work. 
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Ryan Hadeed, journalist and member of the Syrian-Lebanese community expressed his view 
on the matter in an article entitled Home Is Where the Hate Is. Published a month after 
Bourdain’s show aired, he expressed his disappointment with the public’s continued reaction 
to the statements made on the television show. He commented on the demonising of the 
Arab community during that time stating ‘ the more extreme voices have sought to portray 
this one ethnicity as the architects for all the criminality in our country’ (Hadeed 2017). 
Perhaps, the outcome with the  most longevity has been the emergence of the ‘99 percent’ 
as a concept which has been used as a rallying cry of sorts for everything from boycotting the 
1% to supporting the ‘buy local’ movement (Looptt 2017b). 
This was the part of the video therefore, which had the potential to actually damage the 
Trinidadian society.  Yet, it was the part framed as indisputable fact. It was the one fact that 
we should not dwell on while the other facts mentioned were problematised. Finally, the 
commenter argued that stick-fighting should be left to die. This is a great irony given that stick 
fighting is part of the tradition that would have seen culture and identity in relation to class 
related threat, as argued in Chapter 5. Its sanitisation (along with other traditions) from 
mainstream carnival is one of the exclusions that led to the ‘carnival without critique’  and 
ultimately contribute to the type of view that she has here shared in her post. 
This example, therefore, shows quite clearly how in cases of traditional security issues, 
preoccupation with the Trinidadian Identity are distractions from facts. Indeed Trinidad 
seems to share a commonality with China’s exceptionalism, parts of which Van Fleet (2016)  
asserts are characterised by ‘denial of fact’ and the ‘creation and nurturing of fictions’. It is 
possible at this stage to at least begin visualise how a domestic terrorism narrative for 
Trinidad had not emerged. This shall be elaborated in the final example. 
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Malcolm Nance and Terrorism 
 
The final example that will be used to illustrate this pattern of Trinidadian behaviour is the 
one most directly related to the issue of contemporary radicalism and Daesh recruitment 
from Trinidad and Tobago. It is the response of the people of Trinidad to counter-terrorism 
expert Malcolm Nance’s comments on an MSNBC interview. While being interviewed, Nance 
described the United States’ travel ban on certain countries due to terrorism as unjust. His 
argument was that there were other countries with citizens fighting for Daesh in Syria which 
were not included. Trinidad and Tobago was named as one such country (Baldeosingh 2017). 
This was indeed a fact as the story of recruitment was well established by that time. Andy 
Knight and John McCoy had 6 months prior to Nance’s interview, published their frequently 
referenced article Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns, 
Global Trends (2016). 
In keeping with the pattern that we have seen thus far, Trinidadians – including the 
government— immediately and uncritically rejected what was said with some groups even 
demanding an apology. The Office of the Prime Minister released an official statement in 
response to Nance’s interview describing it as broad, simplistic and unsupported by fact (K. 
Rowley 2017). Meanwhile, the National Trade Union Centre demanded immediate 
withdrawal of the statement and issuance of a public apology to the people of Trinidad and 
Tobago, both at home as well as within the US diaspora (Looptt 2017a). Reactions from the 
society were diverse – a number of them can be seen by examining Figures 23, 24 and 25 
below, which feature screenshots of the comment thread on the MSNBC video.  
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Appendix III Figure 7 
 
Some  citizens expressed downright denial of Nance’s statement, dismissing his comments 
with spurious logic. An example of this can be seen in Figure 24, shown above where one 
person claims that it could not be true or else there would have been cases of domestic 
terrorism and attacks on neighbouring countries. What is being said in this example could be 
very convenient political amnesia of how radicalism informed the 1990 coup – a type of self-
deception. It could also be ignorance of the coup and of the other stories of Trinidadians’ 
involvement in terrorist activity as outlined in the introduction to this work. For younger 
persons in particular, this could be a result of the lack of domestic narrative.  
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Figure 24 also shows attempts at dismissal that relies on redirection. One person attempts to 
redirect the attention towards an argument that Daesh is the product of US policy. Another 
person chimed in, in support of this statement, claiming that it was part of US strategy to ‘kill 
us all and take over’. Others attempted to go step further in their redirection, trying to 
discredit Nance via ad hominem remarks. Figure 25 features one such remark, made by a 
person who turns his claims on its head, calling him a terrorist for supposedly spreading 
falsehoods in the attempt to obtain a position in the Trump administration. This is quite the 
stretch given that there is factual evidence to support Nance’s claims however it shows that 
drastic move to self-deception rather than being confronted with what is a perceived attack 
on Trinidadian identity.  
 Other attempts to discredit the comment were based on Trinidad’s character. Shown in 
Figure 23, one person asserts that Trinidadians are lovers not fighters and that anger would 
never survive in Trinidad. True to the Carnival identity, the commenter attempted to mock 
Nance, suggesting that he was bitter over a broken heart at the hands of a Trinidadian woman. 
This again is a direct appeal to the cultural identity of Trinidad which would somehow exclude 
it from violence. Indeed, as Larry Backer puts it, cultural solicitude of this type is grounded in 
exceptionalism and ‘the gravamen of cultural solicitude is the cry “this cannot apply to me!” 
’ (Backer 1998, 1334). Furthermore, there remains the liminal aspect associated with the 
carnivalesque whereby subversion is attempted through mockery. 
The reactions shown above, continue to demonstrate a larger pattern of Trinidadians 
interpreting threats as threat to national identity rather than threat to safety. The pattern 
suggests that typically the Trinidadian Identity, informed by both the Carnival Identity and the 
enduring myth that ‘God is a Trini’ complicates treatment of security issues such that they 
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may not be securitised or that their securitisations may be fruitless. Recent events also 
suggest that removing the interrupter that is the Trinidadian identity from featuring so 
prominently in the minds of the people can result in a different security outcome. The 
instance in which a positive security outcome was seen for the referent object featured 
overwhelming, immediate physical danger as the impetus for temporarily dispensing with the 
myth of imperviousness. The theory showed its utility only when the cultural aspect was 
removed from the situation. This seems to suggest an unproductive over-emphasis on the 
state in theoretical approaches to securitisation – a point which was extensively argued in 
Chapter 5 in relation to analyses of securitising moves in the Trinidad Carnival over the course 
of history. Ultimately this once more reinforces the overall argument of this work that  
We are therefore left with a possible reason for the way in which culture might be brought to 
bear on the way that narratives failed to develop for the case of Daesh recruitment from 
Trinidad and Tobago. Having now over the last four chapters come to a set of political and 
cultural considerations which inform the security culture in Trinidad and Tobago, this work 
shall  move to its final discussion. It shall consider how these considerations can be applied to 
accounting for the lack of terrorism narratives for Trinidad and Tobago and in so doing, make 
a case for challenging the privilege of classically informed perspectives in International 
Relations. 
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Discussion 
 
This thesis argued that gaps in existing approaches to theorising securitisation are 
problematic insofar as they are unable to effectively consider the role of important contextual 
factors such as cultural identity and history in securitisation processes. It argues that critical 
security scholars need to continue to push the boundaries of scholarship to recognise the 
importance of these factors by introducing ways of meaningfully including them in existing 
theoretical frameworks, so that they can be effectively integrated into analyses.  To do this, 
it explores how these factors are imperative to explaining the absence of domestic and 
international terrorism narratives for Trinidad and Tobago, while illustrating how ineffective 
securitisation theory is at recognising this. 
Agential Realism was used as the complementary theoretical perspective in this work, to fill 
the gaps which have been left by securitisation theory. This allowed for the recognition of the 
importance of colonial history and cultural identity to explaining the absent  security 
narrative. Agential Realism’s diffractive methodology allowed for the systematic 
consideration of these factors in order to give a more profound analysis. It also allowed for 
material and ideational considerations to both be given due consideration in examining the 
case study. This diffractive methodology was practiced within chapters through the use of 
Agential Realism, but also across them in a broader sense of reading insights through each 
other, to show how politics and cultural identity both played a significant role in the failure of 
terrorism narratives to materialise for Trinidad and Tobago.  
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This work identified two questions about the case study which it would attempt to address 
through insights from the analysis. It shall now attempt to answer those questions, showing 
the limitations of current thinking on securitisation. It shall also show the analytical potential 
of empowering securitisation to go beyond its current limitations by being more inclusive in 
its theoretical frameworks. 
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Research Question 1: How did terrorist threat in 
Trinidad and Tobago fail to be securitised? 
 
 
This work takes the position that terrorist threat failed to be securitised in Trinidad and 
Tobago for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the dominant hegemonic security narrative 
for the LAC regions is the narco-trafficking narrative, which has subsumed the global 
hegemonic terrorism narrative such that an international narrative never developed. 
Additionally, the political culture of Trinidad and Tobago is also not conducive to securitisation 
as the race-based one-party-dominant system of government tends towards threat 
management in the form of depoliticization. Further to this, internalising the narco-trafficking 
narrative has resulted in certain demographics within Trinidad being securitised along lines of 
drug-related gang violence, at the expense of recognising that the marginalisation of those 
same demographics has resulted in radicalisation previously. There was therefore also no 
reason for a domestic narrative to develop, and consequently, the threat was left to flourish 
invisibly. 
In considering the utility of securitisation theory in reaching this conclusion, it was most useful 
in the context of understanding the absence of the international narrative. This is unsurprising 
considering the nature of US politics which tends to resonate with classically informed IR. 
Balzacq’s integrative approach allowed for an understanding of how the LAC regions managed 
to become securitised in ways which always framed the territories as a monolith. The 
inclusion of psychocultural considerations, the audiences and the power dynamics of the 
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situations were very important in understanding both how the US came to this perception 
and how the regions seemed to accept it.  
Indeed, the US’ realist treatment of the regions is a reflection of the mainstream position that 
washes out culture and identity in contexts of self-help and power, such that there was no 
reason to see the regions as separate. The US’ actions also points out how culture and identity 
have been washed out from IR in that ST offers no meaningful way to address the inclusion 
of those considerations, even though it endorses them. Given that the racist imaginaries 
underlying US exceptionalism - both in terms of Manifest Destiny and the more aggressive 
Manicheanism of the War on Terror – were key to this analysis, this points to the limitations 
of ST. This was further highlighted by how useful Agential Realism was for filling gaps. 
Agential Realism’s diffractive approach which privileges neither material nor cultural 
considerations created a sound analytical structure for reading the cultural into the analysis. 
A non-linear conception of time allowed for a tracing of the ideational factors as a constant 
in US grand strategy. This allowed for culture to become visible in the analysis, so that the 
nature of the LAC monolith could be explained. Making culture visible also allowed for the 
neo-orientalist nature of the War on Terror narrative to be explained in a way that excluded 
the LAC regions and consequently led to the primacy of the regional narco-trafficking 
narrative. It is clear therefore that the international aspect of the absent terrorism narrative 
is best explained by a combination of approaches which give due consideration to history, 
identity and culture without being bound by conventional limitations. 
In terms of the domestic narrative, ST on its own is unable to effectively analyse the case 
study as a direct result of not being able to address the contextual factors of political culture 
and history, even though it endorses their inclusion. Indeed, it is particularly pointed in this 
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example that the absence of elaboration in this regard points to the discipline’s continuing 
struggle of how to meaningfully integrate these factors. Only after Agential Realism was used 
to show the effects of the coloniality of the racial imaginary on Trinidad’s politics – illustrating 
an unconventional understanding of the past as present and informing governance - did ST 
become useful. Once this was done, it was possible to see that parties within the government 
were securitising each other while managing threats to the nation (rendering them invisible) 
such that securitisation of potentially inflammatory issues is an unlikely feature of Trinidad 
politics. Notably, ST nevertheless cannot account for the atypical use of desecuritisation as 
this too is linked to specific political culture as opposed to a universal assumption of states’ 
interests. 
Furthermore, it is through Agential Realism’s diffractive methodology that this domestic 
context could be read through the international context, in order to recognise important 
exclusions. Diffraction – informed by quantum thinking, allowed for a recognition that socio-
economic conditions and marginalisation was seen in terms of drug-related crime, at the 
exclusion of recalling its past linkages with fostering radical activity in Trinidad. This 
combination of perspectives is what ultimately allowed for an understanding of how a 
terrorism narrative failed to develop for Trinidad and Tobago.  
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How did  terrorist threat develop seemingly unnoticed 
by the population of Trinidad and Tobago? 
 
 
This work has argued that the ‘Trinidadian Identity’, which has emerged from the 
entanglement of the Carnival Identity and Trinidadian exceptionalism, plays a significant role 
in securitisation processes in Trinidad and Tobago, by functioning as an interrupter to those 
processes. This, along with the absence of international and domestic narratives to act as a 
cue, led to the threat invisibly flourishing within the small state. It is immediately apparent 
that a diffractive reading of this work’s political and cultural sections is integral to coming to 
this conclusion. This is the first indication of how useful Agential Realism is as an inclusive 
approach. 
Chapter 6 illustrated the power of this interrupter, as Trinidadian Identity is informed by a 
need to consummately affirm the Carnival ethos while simultaneously believing in divine 
protection from threat. In the presence of threat, this results in the invocation of the ‘party 
spirit’ – escapism which in the extreme, becomes self-deception. Consequently successful 
securitisations by the state, fail to have positive security effects on the referent object 
(society) if the population as one audience, rejects the securitising move. Additionally, this 
has come to be something which any administration can count on to not challenge its own 
tendency towards threat management rather than productively dealing with the potential 
danger, which  in turn links back to why a domestic narrative did not emerge. 
Not unlike in the domestic political context, Trinidadian cultural identity - which has been 
shown to be closely entwined with history and the material world – complicates the 
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securitisation process such that paradoxes emerge that cannot be explained using ST. This is 
in part due to the Copenhagen School’s failure to elaborate audiences, a fact which though 
recognised, remains under-theorised even in Balzacq’s integrative approach. The bi-
directional nature of Agential Realism’s intra-action dynamic however addresses this gap. By 
allowing this cultural identity to be read through the conventional securitisation process these 
paradoxes can be explained, highlighting the limitations of the state-centric focus of ST. 
Agential Realism itself allowed for an understanding the Trinidadian Identity. Both the 
Carnival Identity explored in depth in Chapter 5 and the myth of Trinidadian exceptionalism, 
explored in chapter 6 required an approach which would allow for the exploration of the 
entanglement of the material and the ideational. In particular history, and non-linear 
understandings of time played an integral role in seeing how the Carnival Identity was formed 
and then how the Carnival ethos provided the link between the Carnival Identity and divine 
protection, such that the Trinidadian Identity emerged. Meanwhile, securitisation theory 
struggled to account for the types of securitising moves which took place in Trinidad’s colonial 
history, except for when it aligned with ‘traditional’ aspects of politics – when the colonial 
administration securitised the Carnival. This is another reminder of the limitations of state-
centrism and the mainstream assumption that culture and history are inimical to the 
‘scientific’ study of IR. 
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Conclusion 
 
This work has shown that classically-informed thinking in International Relations cannot, by itself, account 
for the complexities of this case study. Indeed, it has shown that while critical approaches to theorising 
securitisation do seek to consider peripheral ideas, those ideas are still limited by the absence of a means to 
study and integrate them into the theory effectively. Furthermore residual commitments to mainstream 
thinking also proved problematic for this research, leaving gaps in attempts to explain the absence of a 
terrorism narrative for Trinidad and Tobago. These shortcomings were addressed through application of an 
approach which did not have these constraints, and which was particularly attuned to gaps and what 
potential they possess. 
The diffractive methodology gifted to this work by Barad’s quantum thinking allowed for a deep exploration 
of the case study which facilitated a reading of the material and ideational through each other. It has 
illustrated the deep entanglement between political processes such as securitisation and factors such as 
culture, history and identity, even where those factors have been rendered invisible. It has further shown 
that this is true not only in contexts where it is obvious – like Trinidad, but also in those where it has been 
rendered invisible, such as in the US, pointing to wide applicability for further work not limited to security 
studies.  
This thesis therefore offers others committed to the discipline of International Relations, and to critical 
security studies, a steppingstone for further exploration. It shows the potential of a securitisation theory 
unencumbered by its current limitations, whilst at the same time recognising the power in agential realism 
for seeing what  is not there and recognising how that absence matters to our material reality. In closing, 
this work invokes Friedrich Nietzsche (2011, 119) to remind that: 
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[t]here is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing;’ and the more affects we 
allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we know ourselves to apply to 
the same thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity,’ be. 
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Appendix I 
 
Responses generated from electronic questionnaire conducted in July 2018. 
 
Q23 - Do you think that the previous government of Trinidad and Tobago (The People’s 
Partnership government) took terrorism seriously? What makes you feel this way? 
 
 
 
Q23_1_TEXT - Yes 
They attempted with certain legislation and the no nonsense attitude 
I believe the former National Security Minister, being a former military officer, was more aware of the 
problem and tried to implement measures to deal with it. 
I think they tried to deal with it 
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Q23_2_TEXT - No 
They had other priorities 
Our relationship deteriorated with the US from our lack of action  in the war against  terror 
According to reports they disbanded national security services and didn't replace it 
Trini's are very lackadaisical and believe that certain things can't happen to them. However, I'm aware 
that a lot of things aren't related to the public so I can only speak from what I've observed 
border controlled was loosened 
Focus what bullshitting the public for personal gains 
Typical, not much thinking and planning happens  in Trinidad and Tobago because our culture has always 
been 'We will cross that bridge when we meet it'. 
We got an inkling of the problem when a group of Trinidadians was held in Venezuela for doing military 
training and attempting to get to Syria.  No plan was put in place to deal with them or their indoctrination 
centre. 
They never openly addressed it as an issue. 
they way of treating boarder control was very weak. They dismantled rather than build on the systems 
that where in place 
the dismissed security since they dismantled all security programmes and policies implemented by the 
previous PNM government 
my response is only based on lack of reports by media during their term 
I don't feel that they took anything seriously 
no. because of the many security measures that were in place that were done away with 
We never take anything seriously in this country 
They played the blame game, spouted rhetoric and did nothing to increase national security. 
No ine does.  There is no authority in trinidad 
Terrorism at home was not a key issue for most of their tenure. 
I don't have an explanation. I don't think any government takes anything seriously in general. 
Throughout their term I never once heard them mention a plan to begin dealing with the problem of locals 
leaving to join ISIS. It didn't seem to even come up on their radar. 
Lack of action. 
No government thus far seems to be taking terrorism seriously 
I don't think they took anything seriously except lining their pockets 
Because the previous Goverment had garnered a significant level of inteligence on the nationals who left 
to assist with ISIS activities in the Middle East and nothing was done to threat with that. 
Nothing was visible 
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Q23_3_TEXT - Maybe 
They attempted to recover assets from the Jamat al Muslimeen and so i could say they expressed some 
level of the need for justice. But their Hindu majority base use social mediums to criticise muslims in a 
religious fundamental level and so such efforts had the opposite effect. 
My first answer was NO and its mainly because of the cancellation of security system already in place 
while planning and waiting to put the measures in place. 
Based on the agreements with the international agencies 
I am not sure about the facts, so I'm not sure! 
certain crimes we held at bay whereas some were allowed to flourished so it's a 50-50 
I don't know, I have lived outside of Trinidad and Tobago since 2012 and have been in and out before that 
and wasn't connecting with the news 
Well, national security which is not evident to ordinary citizens, one can never know the entire plan 
Not sure 
Kamla had signed anti terrorist agreement with the US 
To an extent, from their declaration of a state of emergency during a spate of high fatal criminal activity 
which meant that there was some attention being placed on the possibility of growing terrorism 
They did seek to ban returning fighters, indicating some awareness of the possibility of a threat. 
Aside from some Legislation passed, I can't quite recall anything concrete done by them to combat 
terrorism 
Both parties haven't done enough. No one party is to blame 
 
 
Q23_4_TEXT - Neutral 
I do not know 
Not sure about that governments actions. However, they inherited a big mess to clean up and a huge 
crime problem. 
Crime was lower that's all 
I don't know. 
I tend to think our government is useless, no matter which party is in power. 
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Q24 - Do you think that the current government of Trinidad and Tobago (The PNM 
government) takes terrorism seriously? What makes you feel this way? 
 
 
Q24_1_TEXT - Yes 
Legislation has been past to counter terrorism. Security mechanism and policies have been established or 
some have at least been initiated to counter the treat of terrorism. 
attempts made to improve border security 
Since the 1990 the Manning administration had collaborated with CARICOM to treat with security on both 
national and regional scale,(CARICOM IMPACS) This was done with collaboration with the US security 
department 
the implementation of measures that identify and seize assets of persons who have been identified as 
having terrorists links and the beefing up of security protocols 
Not with their own terrorist but they seem to pay much attention on those who have left or can potentially 
leave to join isis 
More seriously than the previous but no by a large margin. I feel that US economic interests are at play in 
affecting government priorities. 
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Q24_2_TEXT - No 
Because they are shutting.down all major crime fighting initiatives 
We have seen an increase of serious crimes if they can't have that under control how can they take 
terrorism seriously 
It does not seem to be a focus to make the population aware of the fight aggressively from my viewpoint 
Bigger issues more in focus 
Knowing that we have all of these persons with ISIS, no clear plan for dealing with them seems to be in 
place. 
Many home grown Islamic terrorists come from traditionally PNM areas. The PNM's patrimonial approach 
to politics subsidised this phenomenon. 
I feel the same about the previous government 
They don't take anything seriously 
No government takes anything other than their own agenda seriously 
Do they take anything seriously besides taxation? 
They play the blame game, spout rhetoric and do nothing to increase national security. 
I really don't think so based on the news I read about Trinidad and Tobago and Facebook feeds from my 
friends who live in Trinidad and Tobago 
All of our politicians are useless jokers 
To date, the current government hasn't presented a crime prime. And the recent fiasco involving Marlene 
McDonald begs the question of whether party members are in league with criminal elements. 
This govt and ones before are short-sighted and have multiple problems to deal with. Not is taken 
seriously in Trinidad until the problem is staring you in the face, by which time it is too late of course. 
I think they are not doing they all to fight this problem of crime 
The crime rate is higher and the guns are plentiful 
See above answer. At the same time, politics is a complicated game. Perhaps their hands are tied and they 
"cannot" do anything. 
More and stricter measures should be placed 
I still haven't heard of any comprehensive anti-terrorism or anti-radicalisation plan. 
Lack of action. 
As above 
They seem to be in denial that it is even an issue. 
I think they give lip service to it now because it's such a hot topic and the facts are out about our 
connection to ISIS but I don't see anything major being done 
They continue to deny in the media that there are ties to ISIS among locals or that locals are joining ISIS 
to be trained. 
Doesn't seem so 
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As above 
 
 
Q24_3_TEXT - Maybe 
I don't think it's at the top of their priority list given the economic issues 
My first answer is yes, as I did not observe the tenacity to disrupt the security system they met in place . 
I am not sure about the facts, so I'm not sure! 
It doesn't feel that way but I don't have facts to be sure 
They have been pushing for legislation and significant  changes in the way crime is handled 
same approach as previous 
Most likely their preventative measures cannot be wisely discussed in public. 
Same as above 
They are barely dealing with isolated crime activity, but if the danger escalates they may seek to defend 
our people as any government ought to, hopefully before it is too late. 
This present administration has lost momentum from the undertakings of the previous Patrick Manning 
led administration. 
 
 
 
Q24_4_TEXT - Neutral 
I do not know 
i honestly dont think terrorism could be taken seriously by any government 
I don't know their stance. Maybe not, because TT governments are afraid to dictate to religions. 
Same as previous. 
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Q27 - Do you think that the current government of Trinidad and Tobago (The 
PNM government) needs to take  terrorism more seriously? What makes you 
feel this way? 
 
Q27_1_TEXT - Yes 
There is precidence to suggest that it could happen again. And considering our harsh 
economic situations are as similar to what there was then, lughtening could strike twice. 
Better to be prepared than unprepared, especially when taking into consideration of the 
currenty global trends as it pertains to terrorism 
Because the ideas still get into the young minds of.the youths 
Start putting taps on the persons they sent back ensuring they are not coming back to 
recruit 
But how would the population know what is being done? Wouldn't that be construed as a 
breach of security? 
We do not feel safe and our information is  limited to this situation from the authorities 
But I'm not sure if they have any policies against or how serious they are about this 
in talks with the US to get their support in fighting terrorism 
Our very nature is. Wong reactive. We need to deal with the threat proactively 
We are an oil-based economy which will be seriously affected by any terrorist activity. 
ISIS fighters enter and leave Trinidad as they please. What fuctional state would allow this? 
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if your neighbor house is on fire you need to wet yours 
With the alleged numbers of T&T fighters,  there are connections with friends and family 
at home , so measures should be put in place   to avert any security threatse 
I do not know what actions, if any, are taken covertly. That said, their lack of overt or public 
actions leaves me concerned. 
They need to take crossing the road more seriously, so yes - terrorism becomes part of the 
everything they need to take more seriously 
for the simply fact that it is better to try and prevent a possible attack than react to an 
attack 
History has shown that under ALl PNM Governments crime has escalated 
The number of murders and unlawful activities are not dealt with as it is, what will change 
if s terrorist act happens. 
Do they have a plan? For anything? 
They don't right now 
Absolutely; we have a problem because some people of Trinbagonian descent feel 
disenfranchised and disengaged enough to leave Trinidad and Tobago to commit crimes 
against humanity (e.g. Rape oif Yazidi women; beheading of journalists) 
There is still no definitive word on if suspected ISIS nationals can legally return or not. 
Well, if current crime situation seems to be beyond what it can manage, one wonders about 
a terriorist act 
Yes I think they do to avoid another incident like the couple taking place 
Because more and more reports are stating that Trinidadians are going to fight with ISIS 
because it can become a runaway train 
Yea but nothing to do with ISIS. Terrorism is existing in this country long before ISIS and has 
nothing to do with the coup. Citizens are being killed in broad daylight and their killers get 
away with it. Our government is so focussed on what is going on abroad when our own 
country is being terrorised with criminal without a conscience 
As I said above there are too much guns in trinidad and anyone come to trini and stay they 
won't pick up with them 
Of course, I think the current Muslimeen group is a bunch of thugs and criminals. 
They are generally not serious. However, I think that on the subject of terrorism, they need 
to do a proper job of investigating the motives as to why someone would involve 
themselves in terrorism and create ways to deter them for pursuing such a path. 
As a small nation with big interests, we need to oreserve our assets and safeguard a future 
for our children. 
In my opinion it is more a threat and so i believe the army should be better utilised 
If nothing else, just because of the sheer proportion of ISIS-trained operatives within the 
population of the country. 
Every government should, but Trinidad's more so, given the high per capita no. of ISIL 
recruits 
Is there anything to suggest the government are not in denial about terrorism (amongst 
other things)? 
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Fact that Trinidad is linked to isis is hurting our economy. Travel bans to and from island is 
not what we want nor need. 
For the reasons already stated. 
We regularly have people going off to ISIS. At least some of them will return.. That should 
say enough. 
They need to act on the intelligence that they have 
They can no longer live with their head in the sand and deny statistics coming out of the US 
on the level of involvement of nationals joining ISIS,unless they wish a repeat of 1990. 
Of course . If developed nations such as France and the UK are susceptible, why should we 
see ourselves as exempt of such activity ? 
The threat seems larger now with more media stories of people going abroad to fight for 
ISIS 
I think they need to look at terrorism as a symptom of the corrupt inner structure of 
government and focus on ways to limit and stem the localized effects of external forces. 
 
 
Q27_2_TEXT  
No Responses 
 
Q27_3_TEXT - Maybe 
Yes, but domestic terrorism is very hard to control by nature 
Yes and no. If they start to fix the broken social and educational systems then it may allow 
them to focus on terrorism. Then again is the police force in a state to deal with terrorism? 
Probably not. It is quite a complex issue and I think to look at it as a separate issue will just 
encourage them to waste more resources on blimps etc. 
 
 
Q27_4_TEXT - Neutral 
i honestly dont know if that would be good or bad for the safety of citizens. it rests on the 
competence of security intelligence 
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Comments taken from: 
 http://www.looptt.com/content/watch-trinis-outraged-roti-declared-too-big-one-meal 
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Appendix III Figure 17 
Caption reads: Traffik Spotters TT members Kaveesh Maharaj and Ahmad Khan organised a boat to 
help out in Ibis Gardens 
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